Slansky v. Nebraska State Patrol, No. S-03-747.
Court | Supreme Court of Nebraska |
Writing for the Court | GERRARD, J. |
Citation | 268 Neb. 360,685 NW 2d 335 |
Docket Number | No. S-03-747. |
Decision Date | 16 July 2004 |
Parties | TERLE SLANSKY, APPELLANT, v. NEBRASKA STATE PATROL, APPELLEE. |
268 Neb. 360
685 NW 2d 335
v.
NEBRASKA STATE PATROL, APPELLEE
No. S-03-747.
Supreme Court of Nebraska.
Filed July 16, 2004.
Bradley D. Holbrook, of Jacobsen, Orr, Nelson, Wright & Lindstrom, P.C., for appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Mark D. Starr for appellee.
HENDRY, C.J., CONNOLLY, GERRARD, STEPHAN, McCORMACK, and MILLER-LERMAN, JJ.
GERRARD, J.
In 1985, Terle Slansky was convicted pursuant to jury verdict of, inter alia, rape and attempted rape, and was sentenced to a term of 15 to 20 years' imprisonment in Kansas. After his release from prison, Slansky moved to Nebraska and the Nebraska State Patrol (NSP), pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4001 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 2000), determined that Slansky was at a high risk to reoffend sexually and classified him as a Level 3 sex offender. Slansky appealed, and the district court affirmed the NSP's determination. On appeal, Slansky contends that SORA is unconstitutional, the risk assessment instrument used by the NSP to classify sex offenders is invalid, and the evidence was insufficient to classify him as a Level 3 sex offender. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I. SORA
Because Slansky challenges numerous aspects of SORA, we begin by outlining some of its pertinent features, as well as the applicable rules and regulations that implement SORA. Similarly, because Slansky questions the validity of the risk assessment instrument that was developed to classify offenders, we briefly set forth its contours.
In 1994, Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 14071 et seq. (2000), which conditioned certain federal funding on a state's adoption of sex offender registration laws within 3 years. See, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164 (2003); Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999). In response, the Legislature enacted SORA in 1996. Although there have been a number of amendments to SORA since 1996, see § 29-4001 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1998 & 2002) and 2004 Neb. Laws, L.B. 943, 98th Leg., 2d Session (2004), we review SORA as it existed at the time the NSP conducted Slansky's assessment in January 2000.
In enacting SORA, the Legislature stated that it was attempting to protect communities by assisting law enforcement agencies in identifying potential repeat sex offenders. See § 29-4002. In this regard, SORA applies to any person who on or after January 1, 1997, (1) pleads guilty to or is found guilty of one of a number of enumerated offenses, most of which are sexual in nature; (2) enters the State of Nebraska after having pled guilty to or been found guilty of any offense in another state that is substantially equivalent to one of the enumerated offenses; or (3) is incarcerated or is under probation or parole as a result of pleading guilty to or being found guilty of a registrable offense under (1) or (2). See § 29-4003.
Any person subject to SORA must register with the sheriff of the county in which he or she resides within 5 days of becoming subject to SORA. § 29-4004. Registration requires a person to provide, inter alia, his or her name, aliases, date of birth, Social Security number, photograph, fingerprints, current address, place of employment or vocation, any school he or she is attending, a listing of registrable offenses the individual has pled guilty to or been found guilty of, the jurisdiction where the offense was committed, and the name and location of each jail or penal facility in which the person was incarcerated. § 29-4006(1). Such information is then forwarded to the NSP, which must maintain a central registry of persons obligated to register under SORA. § 29-4004.
Although information obtained under SORA was at one time restricted to law enforcement agencies and their authorized personnel, see § 29-4009(1) (Cum. Supp. 1996), this restriction was eliminated in 1998. Under the amendments passed in 1998, in addition to disclosing information obtained under SORA to law enforcement agencies for law enforcement purposes and governmental agencies conducting confidential background checks, the NSP and any law enforcement agency authorized by the NSP may release relevant information concerning the person if it is necessary to protect the public. § 29-4009(1) through (3).
Whether to release information concerning a person subject to SORA to the public is essentially a question about the person's risk of recidivism. See § 29-4013. Generally speaking, the NSP is required to assign a notification level, based on the risk of recidivism, to every person subject to SORA. § 29-4013(2)(e). If the risk of recidivism is low, the person is classified as a Level 1 offender and law enforcement officials who are likely to encounter the offender must be notified. § 29-4013(2)(c)(i). If the risk of recidivism is moderate, the person is classified as a Level 2 offender and schools, daycare centers, and religious and youth organizations must also be notified. § 29-4013(2)(c)(ii). If the risk of recidivism is high, the person is classified as a Level 3 offender and notice must be given to members of the public who are likely to encounter the offender, in addition to those groups that are required to be notified if a person is classified as a Level 1 or 2 offender. § 29-4013(2)(c)(iii).
In order to determine an offender's appropriate classification level, SORA directs the NSP to adopt rules and regulations that identify and incorporate factors that are relevant to a sex offender's risk of recidivism. See § 29-4013. SORA states in part:
Factors relevant to the risk of recidivism include, but are not limited to:
(i) Conditions of release that minimize the risk of recidivism, including probation, parole, counseling, therapy, or treatment;
(ii) Physical conditions that minimize the risk of recidivism, including advanced age or debilitating illness; and
(iii) Any criminal history of the sex offender indicative of a high risk of recidivism, including:
(A) Whether the conduct of the sex offender was found to be characterized by repetitive and compulsive behavior;
(B) Whether the sex offender committed the sexual offense against a child;
(C) Whether the sexual offense involved the use of a weapon, violence, or infliction of serious bodily injury;
(D) The number, date, and nature of prior offenses;
(E) Whether psychological or psychiatric profiles indicate a risk of recidivism;
(F) The sex offender's response to treatment;
(G) Any recent threats by the sex offender against a person or expressions of intent to commit additional crimes; and
(H) Behavior of the sex offender while confined.
§ 29-4013(2)(b).
Relying on these factors, the NSP's rules and regulations, adopted and promulgated pursuant to § 29-4013, identify factors that mitigate against the risk of recidivism, as well as factors that increase the risk of recidivism. Factors which were determined to reduce the risk of recidivism included (1) conditions of release such as supervised probation or parole; (2) counseling, therapy, or treatment following release; and (3) physical conditions such as advanced age or debilitating illness. 272 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 19, § 012.03(A) through (C) (2000). Factors that were identified as increasing the risk of recidivism included (1) criminal history of the offender; (2) repetitive or compulsive behavior including the number of sex-related charges and convictions and offenses committed while confined or on supervised release; (3) age of the victim; (4) age at which the offender was first charged with a sex offense; (5) relationship of the offender to the victim; (6) convictions for sex offenses in jurisdictions other than Nebraska; (7) control of the victim through the threat or use of weapons, force, or violence, or the infliction of serious injury; (8) indications of a risk of recidivism in psychological or psychiatric profiles; (9) the offender's response to treatment; and (10) behavior of the offender while confined. 272 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 19, § 012.04(A) through (J) (2000). Moreover, the following four factors were determined to be so indicative of a high risk of recidivism that their presence should always result in a Level 3 classification: (1) torture or mutilation of the victim or the infliction of death, (2) abduction and forcible transportation of the victim to another location, (3) threats to reoffend sexually or violently, and (4) recent clinical assessment of dangerousness. 272 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 19, § 012.05(A) through (D) (2000).
Under the NSP's rules and regulations, the aforementioned factors were to be incorporated into a risk assessment instrument. 272 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 19, § 012.02 (2000). Thereafter, every offender in the registry was to be evaluated using the risk assessment instrument based upon all records and data available concerning the offender. Id. In order to develop a risk assessment instrument, the NSP collaborated with Mario Scalora, Ph.D., of the law-psychology program at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. To determine what factors best correlate to sexual recidivism, Scalora and a group of researchers tracked 1,300 sex offenders who had either been released from incarceration or placed on community-based probation. Based on this research and a review of the relevant literature, Scalora crafted a risk assessment instrument which scores the risk of recidivism by examining 14 factors. This risk assessment instrument has been used by the NSP to classify every offender in the registry, including Slansky. See § 012.02.
The 14 factors or "Items" in the risk assessment instrument are as follows: (1) number of convictions for sex or sex-related offenses (including current offenses); (2) number of convictions for other offenses, besides traffic infractions; (3) other sex or sex-related charges not...
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