Slater v. Davis
| Decision Date | 30 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-CV-3576 |
| Parties | PAUL WAYNE SLATER, Petitioner, v. LORIE DAVIS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
In 1996, a Texas jury convicted Paul Wayne Slater of capital murder and he was sentenced to death. After unsuccessfully availing himself of state appellate and post-conviction remedies, Slater filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Docket Entry No. 21). Respondent Lorie Davis has moved for summary judgment. (Docket Entry No. 30). The issue now before the Court is whether Slater has shown an entitlement to relief under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). Having considered the record, the pleadings, and the law, the Court grants the summary judgment motion and denies Slater's federal habeas petition. The Court will not issue a Certificate of Appealability.
On July 19, 1995, Eric Washington left Wharton, Texas with $3,000 to buy six ounces of crack cocaine. After picking up Roddrick Martin and Glenn Andrews, Washington drove to a carwash in southwest Houston. Washington parked his car near the vacuum cleaner. A short time later a Cadillac with two men inside circled the carwash and pulled into a wash bay. Martin and Andrews got into the backseat of the Cadillac. Within minutes, Martin and Andrews had been shot and Washington had fled the scene.
Fire department personnel responded to a call about gunfire, finding Martin and Andrews lying in the car wash bay. Both men had been shot several times. Andrews was pronounced dead at the scene and Martin died en route to the hospital. Responders found two small stacks of bills totaling $200 lying on the ground near Martin.
On August 9 1995, the police stopped a Cadillac driven by teenager Julius Woods. A subsequent search revealed trace evidence of blood inside the car. A bullet strike marred an interior panel. Over a month later, Slater showed up at the police station with his aunt. Slater provided the police a videotaped statement in which he admitted that he and Woods met the victims to engage in a drug deal. Slater also admitted that he shot the victims. In his statement, however, Slater disclaimed any intent to rob or kill the victims. Slater said that, as he was sitting in the front passenger seat at the carwash, one of the men in the back drew a weapon. Slater claimed that he then grabbed his own 9mm pistol and started shooting. Slater said that Woods never fired any shots. He also said that Washington, who had been waiting in the other vehicle, also started firing a weapon and that one of his bullets may have hit the victims. Slater claimed that, before driving away, he left the victim's guns and a bag of cash at the carwash.
The State of Texas charged Slater with committing capital murder during the course of a robbery. Clerk's Record at 6.1 The prosecution elected to proceed under Texas' law of parties which allowed for Slater's capital-murder conviction as a party "if the offense is committed by his ownconduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both." Clerk's Record at 65; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 7.01, 7.02.
Slater retained attorney Charles Freeman to represent him at trial. Slater's confession served as the backbone of his defense. The defense portrayed the crime as a drug deal gone bad, with Slater reflexively shooting when the buyers brandished weapons. As the Court will discuss later, while initially intending to focus the defense on both the lack of a robbery and self-defense, decisions made by Freeman and by Slater shaped the manner in which the jury could consider Slater's confession. In the end, the defense attempted to convince jurors that Slater accurately described the crime in his police statement.
The State also relied on Slater's confession to the crime, supplemented with evidence contradicting the self-serving elements of his narrative. The State emphasized Washington's eyewitness testimony which differed in important aspects from the account given by Slater. Washington testified that the drug buyers did not have weapons. Washington testified that Martin was carrying money in the front of his shorts, though the police never recovered any on his body. Washington saw one occupant of the Cadillac get out and open the trunk. At that point, Washington became momentarily distracted until he heard gunshots. Washington looked up to see the driver of the Cadillac firing a pistol into the back seat. The passenger was outside the car also, firing into an open back door.
Forensic evidence confirmed the portions of Washington's testimony that differed from Slater's police statement. Bullets recovered from the autopsies were from two different weapons, disputing Slater's statement that Woods did not fire a gun. The trajectory of bullet strikes and the victims' wounds refuted Slater's description of having shot from the passenger seat. No weaponswere found in the carwash.2
The jury found Slater guilty of capital murder.
After a Texas jury has convicted a capital defendant, state law determines his sentence through answers to special issue questions. In this case, the trial court's instructions required the jury to decide (1) whether Slater would be a future societal danger, (2) whether Slater actually caused the death of Martin or intended that a human life would be taken,3 and (3) whether sufficient circumstances mitigated against the imposition of a death sentence. Clerk's Record at 441-42. The State presented testimony that Slater would be a future societal danger based on his commission of four extraneous crimes: (1) Slater participated in the delivery of crack cocaine to an undercover narcotics officer in February of 1991; (2) Slater shot a teenager in the buttocks for no apparent reason and then pointed his gun at the pastor during a church youth activity in February of 1991; (3) during a traffic stop in 1994, police found Slater seated near masks, a loaded machine gun, and a loaded pistol; and (4) Slater pawned items stolen during a burglary in 1995. A jail officer opined that, after reviewing jail records which included offenses Slater committed in custody such as assaulting other inmates and refusing to obey orders, Slater would be a future danger while incarcerated.
The defense called only one punishment-phase witness, Slater's mother Barbara Wiley.Wiley provided only brief testimony which focused on her son's low IQ (63) and his low academic functioning. Wiley described how, at age five, Slater ran out into the street and a car hit him. The resultant head injury required surgery and changed his educational development.
After the arguments by the parties, the jury answered Texas' special issue questions in a manner requiring the imposition of a death sentence. The trial court sentenced Slater to death.
Brian W. Wice represented Slater on direct appeal and filed an appellate brief raising thirty-four points of error. In an opinion dated April 15, 1998, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Slater's conviction and sentence. Slater v. State, No. 72,623 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 1998) ("Opinion on Direct Appeal").
The trial court appointed Cynthia J. Cline to represent Slater on state habeas review. In 1998, Slater filed a state habeas application raising sixteen grounds for relief. State habeas review moved sluggishly. The State did not file a reply until 2002. When nothing happened in the case for several years, the Court of Criminal Appeals requested a status update in 2008. The trial court then took the case under advisement until the State filed a supplemental response in 2012. In August 2012, the Court of Criminal Appeals sent a notice to the lower court requiring the resolution of all claims within 120 days. The parties submitted proposed findings and conclusions. On March 5, 2014, the state habeas court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that the Court of Criminal Appeals deny habeas relief. State Habeas Record at 1073-1117.4 The Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the lower court's findings and conclusion and, based on its own review of therecord, denied relief. Ex parte Slater, No. WR-78,134-01, 2014 WL 6989189, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2014).
Federal review followed. Slater filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising the following grounds for relief:
Respondent has filed a motion for summary judgment. (Docket Entry No. 30). Respondent argues that Slater raises three of his claims in a procedurally deficient manner and that none of his claims merit habeas corpus relief. Slater has filed a response. (Docket Entry No. 35). This matter is ripe for adjudication.
Federal habeas review is secondary to the state court process and is limited in scope. The States Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982). How an inmate has litigated his claims in state court determines the course of federal habeas adjudication. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), "[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person...
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