Slater v. Slater

Citation372 Pa. 519,94 A.2d 750
PartiesSLATER v. SLATER et ux.
Decision Date13 February 1953
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Bill in equity seeking cancellation of deeds, a declaration that defendants held certain property as trustees, and to enjoin any dealings by defendants with respect to the title of certain property. The Court of Common Pleas No. 5 Philadelphia County, as of June Term, 1949, No. 2841, Eugene V. Alessandroni, J., entered decree sustaining preliminary objections to plaintiff's bill, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, No. 237, January Term, 1952, held that where bill presented the pivotal issue of the existence of a partnership between plaintiff and one defendant at time of purchase of the property involved, prior decision in suit by plaintiff against such defendant for a partnership accounting, in which the identical issue was determined, was controlling, and the mere addition of a co-defendant, joined solely because she, with other defendant, held certain property as tenants by the entireties, was not sufficient to defeat the defense of res judicata.

Decree affirmed.

James H. McHale, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Frank W. Hatfield, Sabato M. Bendiner and Busser & Bendiner Philadelphia, for appellees.

Before STERN, C. J., and STEARNE, JONES, BELL, CHIDSEY, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

The opinion of Judge ALESSANDRONI follows:

This is a bill in equity seeking the cancellation of deeds; a declaration that defendants hold certain property as trustees; and to enjoin any dealings by defendants with respect to the title of certain property. The transactions which are the basis for this bill were said to arise during the period in which plaintiff, Joseph Slater, and defendant, Raymond Slater, also known as Ray Slater, were partners in a trucking business. The defendant, Helen Slater, is joined solely because she, with defendant Raymond Slater, holds certain property as tenants by the entireties. This is a companion bill to No. 6418, March Term, 1949, requesting a partnership accounting instituted by the same plaintiff.

The accounting requested in the above named bill was denied; Helen Slater was not named as defendant. The Chancellor found as a fact that the alleged partnership was dissolved as of October 30, 1939. This finding was sustained by the Supreme Court in Slater v. Slater, 365 Pa. 321, at page 324, 74 A.2d 179. The question now before us is whether or not the decision in the prior bill is a bar to this bill under the principles of res judicata.

In Hochman v. Mortgage Finance Corp., 289 Pa. 260, at page 263, 137 A. 252, 253, the Court said: ‘ The thing which the court will consider is whether the ultimate and controlling issues have been decided in a prior proceeding in which the present parties actually had an opportunity to appear and assert their rights.’ In that case plaintiff and others had filed a bill asking for the appointment of a receiver, which was denied. Thereafter plaintiff joined with persons other than those of the first bill and sought the same relief. In sustaining the applicability of res judicata, the court took a broad view, refusing to be bound by mere technical requirements. The application of the doctrine will not be defeated by minor differences of form, parties or allegations when these are contrived to obscure the real purpose.

In Baroutsis v. Gregory, 154 Pa.Super. 136,135 A.2d 559, res judicata was held to bar a second suit by plaintiff against the same defendant despite the fact that additional defendants were joined. The application of the doctrine was sustained because the pivotal issue in both cases was the same, namely, the location of the correct division line between plots of land. The same evidence offered during the first trial would have been necessary to sustain plaintiff's allegations in the second suit.

Paragraph 16 of the bill alleges that the properties in question were purchased by money obtained from partnership funds by the defendant without accounting to the plaintiff for same. The properties were purchased on several dates between December, 1941 and June, 1946. The partnership was held to have been terminated October 30, 1939. It is clear that in order to prove the allegation of paragraph 16 plaintiff will...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT