Slater v. State
| Decision Date | 29 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. CR,CR |
| Citation | 310 Ark. 73,832 S.W.2d 846 |
| Parties | Hugh Allen SLATER, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 92-111. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
John R. Henry, Harrisburg, for appellant.
Clint Miller, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
Hugh Allen Slater, Jr., appellant, was convicted of two counts of rape and two counts of kidnapping involving two different victims. He argues that the trial court misconstrued the rape shield statute and erroneously refused to allow him to present evidence of both prosecutrixes' sexual conduct on other occasions. The trial court correctly applied the statute, and we affirm the judgments of conviction.
At trial appellant asserted a consent defense, and filed a motion pursuant to the rape shield statute, Ark.Code Ann. § 16-42-101 (1987), asking that he be allowed to present evidence of both prosecutrixes' sexual conduct on other occasions. Appellant proffered the testimony of a witness concerning the sexual conduct of one prosecutrix before the rape, and concerning the conduct of both prosecutrixes after both rapes. The trial court excluded the proffered testimony.
The statute broadly excludes evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the accused or any other person, for all purposes. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-42-101(b) (1987). It then provides that the evidence directly pertaining to the act upon which the prosecution is based, or evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant, or any other person, may be admitted if the trial court determines that the evidence is relevant and its probative value outweighs its inflammatory nature. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-42-101(c) (1987).
Appellant argues that the trial court's ruling was overly broad since the statute only excludes evidence of "prior" sexual conduct, and not evidence of sexual conduct subsequent to the crime. In making this argument he relies upon a court of appeals case, Flurry v. State, 18 Ark.App. 64, 711 S.W.2d 163 (1986), which held that the statute does not prohibit evidence of sexual conduct of the victim after the rape occurred. However, appellant's reliance is misplaced, for we overruled the court of appeals case in Flurry v. State, 290 Ark. 417, 720 S.W.2d 699 (1986), and said that "prior" sexual conduct includes all sexual behavior of the victim prior to the date of the trial. Accord 1A J.H. Wigmore, Evidence § 62.1, at 1331 (P. Tillers ed. 1983). Thus, the trial court did not err in applying the statute to exclude evidence of sexual conduct of the victims that occurred after the rapes.
Furthermore, the trial court ruled that sexual conduct after the crimes was not relevant and, in ruling whether evidence sought to be admitted under the statute is relevant, the trial court is vested with broad discretion, and we will not overturn its decision unless it was clearly erroneous. Manees v. State, 274 Ark. 69, 622 S.W.2d 166 (1981). The decision here was not clearly erroneous.
The other evidence of subsequent conduct was the...
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Laughlin v. State, CR
...Rape Shield Statute broadly excludes evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct prior to the trial. Slater v. State, 310 Ark. 73, 832 S.W.2d 846 (1992). Under the statute, the trial court, upon proper motion, may engage in a balancing test to assess whether the probative ......
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...Appellant sought to admit this testimony that he deemed was not "sexual conduct" protected by the Rape Shield Statute. Slater v. State, 310 Ark. 73, 832 S.W.2d 846 (1992). The court ruled that this testimony was irrelevant and inadmissible, and we cannot say that the court abused its There ......
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