Slater v. Stoffel

• Decision Date: 29 June 1962
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 1196,1197.
• Citation: 206 F. Supp. 534
• Parties: Robert SLATER, Plaintiff, v. Mark E. STOFFEL, Adm'r., et al., Defendants. George SLATER, Plaintiff, v. Mark E. STOFFEL, Adm'r., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

206 F. Supp. 534

Robert SLATER, Plaintiff, v. Mark E. STOFFEL, Adm'r., et al., Defendants.

George SLATER, Plaintiff, v. Mark E. STOFFEL, Adm'r., et al., Defendants.

Civ. Nos. 1196, 1197.

United States District Court N. D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

June 29, 1962.

Michael J. O'Hara, Fort Wayne, Ind., for plaintiff.

Thomas W. Yoder, Fort Wayne, Ind., for defendant.

ESCHBACH, District Judge.

These cases, consolidated for purposes of trial, are presently before the Court on plaintiffs' motions to strike paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of defendants' answers. Due to the nature of the question of law raised by plaintiffs' motions, it is appropriate to include an analysis of the problem and the relevant authorities. However, before doing so, a brief recital of the salient facts is necessary to an appreciation of the question raised.

In this action, plaintiffs are seeking to recover for personal injuries and loss of services thereby resulting from a collision between their vehicle and another vehicle operated by one or the other of defendants' decedents whose demises were occasioned by the tragic event. The collision occurred on June 6, 1959, within the State of Indiana. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in the above-entitled cause in this court on December 2, 1959, and defendants were served on December 8, 1959, within six months after the respective appointments of the defendants herein as administrators and publication of notice to creditors, pursuant to Ind. Stat.Ann. Sec. 7-107 (Burns', 1962 Pocket Supp.), the then applicable statute. This court's jurisdiction of the above-entitled cause is based solely upon diversity of citizenship existing between the parties.

The parties by their pleadings and briefs agree that plaintiffs' right of action is governed by the law of the State of Indiana in its substantive aspects. Defendants' second, third, fourth, and fifth defenses are substantially similar in that they proceed upon the theory that plaintiffs' claims are barred because they were not filed in the Indiana State Court within the statutory time limit and that plaintiffs have failed to comply with the statutory "conditions precedent" to bringing their actions. Therefore, a consideration of the pertinent Indiana statutes is appropriate, noting at the outset that plaintiffs are suing defendants who are amenable to this suit in their representative capacity as the administrators of the estates of the alleged deceased tortfeasors. Ind.Stat.Ann. Sec. 2-403 (Burns', 1962 Pocket Supp.) provides in pertinent part as follows:

"All causes of action shall survive, and may be brought, notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to such action, by or against the representative of the deceased party, * * * in event the action be brought subsequent to the death of the party against whom the cause existed, then the same shall be prosecuted as other claims against said decedent's estate."

Ind.Stat.Ann. Sec. 7-801(a) (Burns', 1953 Repl.) contains the statute of limitations on filing claims against a decedent's estate, which was in force on June 6, 1959, the date upon which plaintiffs' cause of action arose, and provided in pertinent part as follows:

"All claims against a decedents' estate, * * * shall be forever barred against the estate, the personal representative, the heirs, devisees and legatees of the decedent, unless filed * * * within six (6) months after the date of the first published notice to creditors."

Also in force on the date upon which plaintiffs' cause of action arose was Ind. Stat.Ann. Sec. 7-802 (Burns', 1953 Repl.) which provided in pertinent part as follows:

"No action shall be brought by complaint and summons against the personal representative of an estate for the recovery of any claim against the decedent or his estate, but the holder thereof, * * *, shall file a succinct and definite statement thereof in the office of the clerk of the court in which the estate is pending; * * *; the statement * * * shall be accompanied by the affidavit of the claimant, his agent or attorney, * * *, and no claim shall be received unless accompanied by such affidavit; * * *"

Finally, Ind.Stat.Ann. Sec. 7-810 (Burns', 1953 Repl.) which was in force on the date upon which plaintiffs' cause of action arose provided in pertinent part as follows:

"All claims which are disallowed, or which are neither allowed or disallowed within said period of six (6) months and fifteen (15) days, shall be transferred at once to the issue docket for trial * * *."

It should be noted concerning sections 7-801 and 7-802, supra, that by amendment, effective July 6, 1961, claims arising out of tort are no longer subject to the six months statute of limitations, or the notice procedure required by said sections, so that the precise legal questions regarding Indiana law raised by plaintiffs' motions to strike will not again become material to a federal court in regard to actions accruing after July 6, 1961. However, the July 6, 1961 amendment does not affect the case at bar.

It is established that plaintiffs filed their complaint in the above-entitled cause in this court within the six months period provided by section 7-801, supra; however, they filed no claim against the estates for the personal injuries which they allege with the clerk of the state court in which the estates of defendants' decedents were pending, as required by section 7-802, supra, and the time for doing so has long since expired. The legal question presented, therefore, is to what extent should plaintiffs be required to comply with sections 7-801 and 7-802, supra, for the purpose of tolling the state statute of limitations and enabling them to maintain the instant action in a Federal District Court, which cause of action exists solely by reason of state created rights. Ind.Stat.Ann. Sec. 7-802 (Burns', 1953 Repl.)

There can be no question that plaintiffs who seek to assert a state created right in a Federal District Court where jurisdiction is founded solely upon diversity of citizenship can be placed in no better position than they would have enjoyed in the state courts; i. e., in this case, the Indiana courts. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945), Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 76 S.Ct. 273, 100 L.Ed. 199 (1956), Allstate Insurance Co. v. Charneski, C.A.7th, 286 F.2d 238 (1961). This is well settled, and plaintiffs must comply with the laws of the state, except that plaintiffs cannot be barred or precluded from their selection of the federal court as their forum where concurrent jurisdiction exists with the state court. Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33, 30 S.Ct. 10, 54 L.Ed. 80 (1909), United States v. Peoples Trust & Savings Co., C.A.7th, 97 F.2d 771 (1938), Hellrung v. Lafayette Loan & Trust Co., D.C.N.D.Ind., 102 F.Supp. 822 (1951). That is to say that plaintiffs' rights cannot be expanded, nor will their actions be tested by a different body of law merely because they have selected the federal forum.

As already noted in the instant matter, a claimant must file his claim within six months after the first publication of notice to creditors required by Indiana law. Ind.Stat.Ann. Sec. 7-801(a) (Burns', 1953 Repl.). A failure in this regard would forever bar plaintiffs' claims. Ind. Stat.Ann. Sec. 7-801(a) (Burns', 1953 Repl.). A like result would follow in a federal court. Woods v. Klobuchar, C.A. 7th, 257 F.2d 313 (1958).

In the Woods case, supra, plaintiff brought suit against the personal representative of a decedent for personal injuries inter alia sustained in an automobile collision involving himself and defendant's decedent occurring in Indiana. Notice of defendant's appointment as administratrix was published on June 30, 1954. Approximately twenty-two months later, on April 12, 1956, plaintiff filed his action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The Court's language at page 314 indicates the crucial question and limitations of the holding in that case as follows:

"The plaintiff states that the sole contested issue on this appeal is as follows:

"`Was the Plaintiff-Appellant's action in the Federal Court under Section 1332, United States Code, Title 28, governed by the six (6) month time limit for filing claims in the court administering the decedent's estate?'

"Our answer must be in the affirmative."

It is clear, therefore, that the facts presented to the Court in that case necessitated a holding only as to the applicability of the six-month statute of limitations to the action there involved. There is, and can be no question, that a claimant in a federal court in an action founded solely upon diversity is bound by the applicable state statute of limitations. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra. Although there is language in the Woods case, supra, which might arguably extend beyond the question there presented, this Court interprets the holding in that case in the light of the facts there involved; specifically, the crucial fact of plaintiff's failure to file his complaint in the federal court...