Slaughter v. Aculpepper
| Decision Date | 31 December 1866 |
| Citation | 35 Ga. 25 |
| Parties | MARCELLA J. SLAUGHTER, Administratrix of Wm. M. SLAUGHTER, deceased, plaintiff in error. v. BRYANT A.CULPEPPER and MATTHEW J. D. CULPEPPER, executors of DAVID W.CULPEPPER, deceased,defendant in error. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Motion for new trial. In Dougherty Superior Court. Decided by Judge Hansell. At Chambers, July, 1866.
Upon a rule nisi to foreclose a mortgage on land, granted at the instance of Culpepper's executors, against Slaughter's administratrix, a trial by jury was had in Dougherty Superior Court. The mortgage bore date December 5th, 1861, and was made to secure the payment of two promissory notes, of the same date, for $7,875 each, one of them due January 1, 1863, and the other January 1, 1864, the latter bearing interest from January 1, 1863. It would seem, from the evidence, that these notes were given for land, sold at executor's sale, by the mortgagees, to Wm. M. Slaughter, the mortgagor.
It was in proof that the land sold low; that nothing was said as to the kind of currency in which it was to be paid for; that money was scarce; that the circulating medium at that time was bank bills; and that the person who cried the sale had never, until that day, seen any Confederate money, and then saw only one note, which a soldier, just returned from the army, paid to him. There was other evidence, but none which materially varied the foregoing.
The jury found for the mortgagees only $11,812.50. Whereupon the mortgagees moved the Court for a new trial, on several grounds; among them because the verdict was contrary to equity, and contrary to evidence.
*The presiding Judge granted a new trial, and this is assigned as error.
Lyon & Irvin, and Davis, for plaintiff in error.
Strozier & Smith, for defendants.
By an assignment of error, upon the charge of the Judge before whom the case was tried, we are called upon to express an opinion, as to the constitutionality of an Ordinance of the Convention which assembled in November, 1865, to revise and amend the Constitution of Georgia. It is entitled, ''An Ordinance to make valid contracts entered into and executed during the war against the United States, and to authorize the Courts of this State to adjust the equities between parties to contracts made but not executed, and to authorize settlements of such contracts by persons acting in a fiduciary character."'
By the second Section thereof, it was ordained, "that all contracts made between the first day of June, 1861, and the first day of June, 1865, whether in writing, expressed or implied, or existing in parol, and not yet executed, shall receive an equitable construction, and either party, in any suit for the enforcement of any such contract, may, upon the trial, give in evidence the consideration and the value thereof at any time, and the intention of the parties as to the particular currency in which payment was to be made, and the value of such currency at any time and the verdict and judgment shall be on principles of equity."
It has been argued that this clause of the Ordinance is violative of that prohibition in the Constitution of the United States, which forbids any State from passing any law "impairing the obligation of contracts."
We cannot think this clause of the Ordinance obnoxious tothe objection. It does no more, really, than change a *rule regulating the admission of testimony in Courts of law: it removes the obstacles created by technical rules to a full enquiry into, and investigation of, executory contracts made within the periods of time mentioned. It is apprehended, that to have done this, was within the competency of the Legislative power, itself, at any time. Who is prepared to deny that the Legislature may not, at its discretion, alter and amend old rules of evidence, —establish new? Who, that it may not obliterate all distinction which now characterize modes of procedure in Courts of law and Courts of equity, and to command, if they so enact, that the broad and liberal principles upon which justice is administered on the Equity side of our Superior Courts, shall apply to and control the verdicts of juries on its law side?
The Ordinance was intended to do, in...
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Harris v. Murray
...effect absent an expressed contrary intention. Pritchard v. The Savannah Street, etc., Co., 87 Ga. 294, 13 S.E. 493 (1891); Slaughter v. Culpepper, 35 Ga. 25 (1866)." (Emphasis supplied.) Polito v. Holland, 258 Ga. at 55, 365 S.E.2d 273. The legislature expressed its intention that the 1997......
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Conyers v. Comm'rs Of Rd.S & Revenues Of Bartow County
...verdict is contrary to the evidence, and is grossly unjust, this court will reverse a judgment refusing to grant a new trial. Slaughter v. Culpepper, 35 Ga. 25; Field v. Leak, 36 Ga. 362. In Oliver v. Coleman, 36 Ga. 552, it was held that under the scaling ordinance juries should be allowed......
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Conyers v. Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Bartow County
...verdict is contrary to the evidence, and is grossly unjust, this court will reverse a judgment refusing to grant a new trial. Slaughter v. Culpepper, 35 Ga. 25; Field Leak, 36 Ga. 362. In Oliver v. Coleman, 36 Ga. 552, it was held that under the scaling ordinance juries should be allowed a ......
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Polito v. Holland, 45117
...effect absent an expressed contrary intention. Pritchard v. The Savannah Street & R. Co., 87 Ga. 294, 13 S.E. 493 (1891). Slaughter v. Culpepper, 35 Ga. 25 (1866). These rules guide us to the result required in this case once it is determined whether OCGA § 51-12-1(b) is procedural (evident......
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Trial Practice and Procedure - C. Frederick Overby, Jason Crawford, Teresa T. Abell, and Matthew E. Cook
...application only of a procedural law. Id. (citing Pritchard v. Savannah St. R.R. 87 Ga. 294, 13 S.E. 493 (1891); Slaughter v. Culpepper, 35 Ga. 25 (1866)). To rule otherwise would foreclose the legislature from ever determining when an enactment is to be prospective only, and when it is to ......