Slaughter v. Bass Pro, Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 6:22-cv-03174-RK |
| Parties | KENT SLAUGHTER, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED; Plaintiff, v. BASS PRO, INC., BPS DIRECT, LLC, BASS PRO OUTDOOR WORLD, LLC, BASS PRO GROUP, LLC, GREAT AMERICAN OUTDOORS GROUP, LLC, GREAT OUTDOORS GROUP, LLC, AMERICAN SPORTSMAN HOLDINGS CO., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's class action complaint. (Doc. 18.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 19, 31, 41.) After careful consideration and for the reasons explained below, the motion is DENIED.
Defendants[2]manufacture, market distribute, and sell “Redhead Lifetime Guarantee All-Purpose Wool Socks” (“the Socks”). (Doc. 8 at ¶¶ 1, 2.) The Socks are sold with a “lifetime guarantee” or a lifetime warranty meaning that purchasers can return them to be replaced at no cost. (Id. at ¶ 3.) The Socks are advertised as “The Last Sock You'll Ever Need to Buy,” and that “[i]f they ever wear out, just return them for a FREE replacement.” (Id. at ¶ 13.) A Nashville, Tennessee, Bass Pro store manager specifically promoted the Socks in this way:
(Id. at ¶ 13) (third alteration added).[3]
In early 2021, Defendants began replacing the Socks under the lifetime warranty with wool socks that only have a 60-day warranty (“60-Day Socks”). Plaintiff does not allege the 60-Day Socks are materially different from the Socks, other than having only a 60-day warranty and a “distinctive stripe pattern.” (Doc. 8 at ¶ 4.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges that (1) Defendants' representations about the lifetime warranty for the Socks are false and the lifetime guarantee is a “hollow promise,” and, alternatively, (2) Defendants breached the lifetime warranty for the Socks by replacing the Socks under the lifetime warranty with 60-Day Socks (rather than a new pair of Socks).
Plaintiff Kent Slaughter alleges that between 2014 and 2021 he purchased approximately twelve pairs of the Socks. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges that the lifetime warranty was a “material part” of his decision to purchase them and that he “understood the terms of the Lifetime Warranty to mean that whenever the Socks became worn, they would be replaced with a new pair of Socks.” (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 18.) Beginning in approximately 2015, Plaintiff periodically returned two to four pairs of the Socks at a time. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Plaintiff states that “[o]n multiple occasions,” Defendants replaced the Socks under the lifetime warranty by exchanging them for another pair of the Socks (i.e., such that the replacement socks themselves came with the same lifetime warranty as the originally purchased socks). (Id.) In early 2021, however, Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to return four pairs of the Socks but was told by the store's customer service department that he would only be provided with the 60-Day Socks in the exchange under the Socks' lifetime warranty. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that on June 29, 2022, he purchased a pair of the Socks online for $11.99, and that the Socks he received were delivered without any packaging “reflecting the applicability of a Lifetime Warranty in connection with those Socks,” despite having purchased the Socks after becoming aware of an advertisement by Defendants to sell the Socks. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Plaintiff also alleges that he was “deceived by the fraudulent and misleading representations of [Defendants] that the [Redhead Lifetime Guarantee All-Purpose Wool] Socks come with a Lifetime Warranty,” a “material factor in [Plaintiff's] decision to purchase” the Socks. (Id. at ¶ 8.)
Plaintiff filed an amended class action complaint on July 20, 2022, asserting the following five claims both individually and on behalf of a proposed class: Count I - violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”); Count II - breach of express warranty; Count III -violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; Count IV - unjust enrichment; and Count V -fraud. (Id. at 10-16.) Plaintiff seeks inter alia actual and statutory damages, disgorgement or other equitable monetary relief, punitive damages, and injunctive relief. (Id. at 16-17.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff's amended complaint must be dismissed under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
A party may move to dismiss a claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the rules governing civil actions in federal courts. One component of a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction is what is known as a plaintiff's Article III standing. Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2016). The doctrine of Article III standing is “rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy,” and “limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (citations omitted). To cross the threshold into federal court, Article III standing requires that plaintiffs - including any named plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit[4] - must demonstrate the following three things: “(1) an injury-in-fact that (2) is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision in court.” Carlsen, 833 F.3d at 908 (cleaned up). These three things (injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability) make up the “‘irreducible constitutional minimum of [Article III] standing.'” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Specifically, as to the first element of Article III standing, “[a]n injury-in-fact exists where the plaintiff has sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining, a concrete and particularized harm that is actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Atl. Specialty Ins. Co., No. 6:20-CV-03065-MDH, 2020 WL 4819949, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 19, 2020) (quotation marks omitted).
To satisfy the federal jurisdictional requirement at this early stage, Plaintiff must plead or allege facts (whether specific or general) demonstrating these three elements of Article III standing are satisfied. See Young Am. Corp. v. Affiliated Computer Servs. (ACS), Inc., 424 F.3d 840, 843 (8th Cir. 2005) () (citation omitted). In Lujan the Supreme Court recognized that “general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice” to demonstrate Article III standing at the early pleading stage. 504 U.S. at 561 (citation and quotation marks omitted).[5]In determining whether a plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the elements of Article III standing, the Court “must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Young Am. Corp., 424 F.3d at 843 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561) (other citation omitted).
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed because he does not allege any harm or injury to the extent Plaintiff does not state, for example, that he has tried to return any pair of socks (whether the Socks or 60-Day Socks) and has been denied a replacement. (Doc. 19 at 11.) For the reasons explained below, the Court considers this argument in the context of Rule 12(b)(1) as raising a question of Plaintiff's Article III standing and thus the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction.
In making this argument to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint, Defendants rely on Eighth Circuit caselaw analyzing Article III standing in products liability cases in which plaintiffs seek to recover only based on economic injuries or harm. In these cases - including cases seeking relief under various state-law consumer protection and common law claims based on an asserted defect in a product and seeking recovery only for economic injury - the Eighth Circuit has held that Article III standing ( the injury-in-fact requirement) is satisfied only so long as there is a “manifest defect” in the product the plaintiff purchased. See, e.g., Johannessohn v Polaris Indus Inc., 9 F.4th 981, 988 (8th Cir. 2021); In re Polaris Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., 9 F.4th 793, 796-97 (8th Cir. 2021); Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 747 F.3d 1025, 1030 (8th Cir. 2014). In practice, then, a products-liability plaintiff asserting only a pecuniary or financial or economic injury (rather than physical injury) can only satisfy Article III's standing requirement so long as the plaintiff alleges (and later proves at subsequent stages in the litigation as appropriate) that the product he or she purchased had the defect on which their claims for relief are ultimately based. See Wallace, 747 F.3d at 1030 () (quoting In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 616 (8th Cir. 2011)) (emphasis...
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