Slaughter v. Grand Lodge

• Decision Date: 16 April 1915
• Docket Number: 792
• Citation: 68 So. 367,192 Ala. 301
• Parties: SLAUGHTER v. GRAND LODGE et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

68 So. 367

192 Ala. 301

SLAUGHTER v. GRAND LODGE et al.

No. 792

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 16, 1915

Appeal from Law and Equity Court, Morgan County; W.H. Simpson Judge.

Bill by Rena Slaughter against Grand Lodge, etc., and others. Decree dismissing the bill and dissolving an injunction pendente lite, and complainant appeals. Affirmed.

W.H Long, Jr., of Decatur, for appellant.

Wert &amp Lynne, of Decatur, for appellees.

McCLELLAN J.

This appeal brings under review the conclusion of the chancellor that the amended bill, filed by appellant against the appellees, is without equity, and in consequence, the propriety of his action in dissolving the injunction issued pendente lite, in the sustaining of the demurrer to the bill and in dismissing the bill without qualification. The bill states this case: Complainant's husband, Phillip Slaughter, now deceased, had a subsisting life insurance policy or benefit in the mutual fraternal order named as defendant, appellee. In it originally his wife was named as the beneficiary. By agreement made between J.A. Jackson and Phillip Slaughter, the latter conveyed to Jackson 20 acres of land owned by him, and had the insurance policy so changed as to make J.A. Jackson's wife, Temple, the beneficiary therein. According to the agreement, Jackson paid one small premium on the policy after the agreement was made and before Slaughter died. The consideration purporting to move from Jackson to Slaughter was Jackson's promise "to take care of said Phillip Slaughter and his wife, Rena Slaughter [the complainant] for the balance of their natural life [lives]." It is averted that Jackson failed, in violation of his agreement, to take care of Phillip during the time he lived after the agreement was made, and to take care of Rena, the wife, at any time since the agreement was made. It appears from the amended bill that the complainant is the sole heir of the estate of Phillip Slaughter deceased.

It is to be noted that the bill is deficient in failing to set forth the date of the policy, provisions of the charter of the order pertinent to the naming and changing of the name of beneficiaries, and provisions of the by-laws thereof touching the naming and changing of the names of beneficiaries in policies issued by the order. As is apparent, the consideration of the bill's equity is much embarrassed by the failure to include appropriate allegations in respect of the matters mentioned.

As amended, the bill's special prayer is that the agreement be canceled, avoiding the change made in the policy of insurance, and that the fraternal order be enjoined from paying the amount of the insurance that has accrued on the policy to Temple Jackson, and that its payment to complainant be compelled. There is also a general prayer for relief. It has been written into generally accepted rule that, as respects beneficiaries under ordinary policies of life insurance and beneficiaries under policies or certificates of life insurance issued to members of fraternal benefit societies or associations, important differences exist, notwithstanding outward appearances indicate little, if any, dissimilarity. Niblack on Benefit Societies, § 212; Thomas v. Grand Lodge, 12 Wash. 500, 41 P. 882; 1 Bacon on Benefit Societies and Life Insurance, § 289; Cade v. W.O.W., 27 Wash. 218, 67 P. 603; Presbyterian Mutual Assur. Fund v. Allen, 106 Ind. 593, 7 N.E. 317; Warner v. Modern Woodmen, 67 Neb. 233, 93 N.W. 397, 61 L.R.A. 603, 108 Am.St.Rep. 634, 2 Ann.Cas. 660-664.

In the absence of restrictions laid upon the right of one insured in such societies--by statute, by charter or by-law provision of the society or association, or in the contract of insurance--to change the beneficiary named in the certificate or policy, the insured has the right to do so without the consent of the then named beneficiary. Authorities supra; 29 Cyc. pp. 125 et seq. Unless there is controlling provision of law, of rule, or of contract to the contrary, the beneficiary named in such policies or certificates has no vested interest therein or thereunder until the happening of the contingency on which the insurance is payable. Hoeft v. K. of H., 113 Cal. 91, 45 P. 185, 33 L.R.A. 174; 4 Cooley's Briefs on Insur., pp. 3756 et seq.; authorities supra. Under those circumstances a beneficiary has an expectancy only; the contract being between the insured and the society or association. Authorities supra. While a beneficiary without a vested interest as stated may invoke judicial action to adjudge the want of mental capacity in the insured to change the beneficiary (Grand Lodge, etc., v Frank, 133 Mich. 232, 94 N.W. 731), thus questioning the power of the insured to engage with the society or association, for the disposition, upon the death of the insured, of the proceeds of the insured's bounty, yet such a beneficiary cannot invoke the courts to annul the change of beneficiary made by the insured during his...