Slaughter v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.

Decision Date18 May 2020
Docket NumberCase No. 19-cv-2920 (APM)
Citation460 F.Supp.3d 1
Parties Alyson SLAUGHTER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION d/b/a Amtrak, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Sophia Goren Gold, Jeffrey Kaliel, Kaliel PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Alison N. Davis, Lindsay Morgan Neinast, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Amit P. Mehta, United States District Judge

I.

Plaintiff Alyson Slaughter filed this putative class action against Defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak"), seeking to compel Amtrak to make its mobile website and mobile phone application accessible to individuals with visual impairments. Amtrak now moves to compel arbitration and dismiss the complaint, asserting that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate their disputes when she consented to the Terms and Conditions of multiple purchased rail tickets. Plaintiff does not deny that she acceded to the arbitration clause contained in Amtrak's ticketing Terms and Conditions. Her position is that the parties never agreed to arbitrate the particular claims made in this lawsuit, which only concern the accessibility of Amtrak's mobile application and mobile website. These claims, she maintains, are governed by two other agreements—Amtrak's mobile application End User License Agreement and website Web Notices & Site Terms of Use. These agreements vest "exclusive jurisdiction" to settle disputes in "any Federal court located in the District of Columbia."

The court sides with Plaintiff. The parties did not consent to arbitrate disputes that arose out of Plaintiff's use of the mobile application and mobile website; instead, they agreed to resolve such disputes in a federal court in the District of Columbia, which is where Plaintiff filed her action. The court therefore denies Amtrak's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss the Complaint.

II.
A.
1. Amtrak's Mobile Application and Website Agreements

Plaintiff Alyson Slaughter is visually impaired and must use an accessibility setting on her iPhone called Larger Dynamic Type. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 30. Larger Dynamic Type is an operating feature that allows a user to magnify the text displayed on their device screen. Id. Prior to October 2017, Plaintiff consistently used Larger Dynamic Type to access and navigate Amtrak's iOS mobile application. Id. ¶ 31.

In late October 2017, Amtrak launched a redesigned iOS mobile application that presented "multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people." Id. ¶¶ 32–33. Specifically, enabling Larger Dynamic Type in the redesigned application made text impossible to read: some large text overlay each other, while other functions were pushed off the screen entirely. Id. ¶ 34. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to access train arrival and departure information, or other content that is available to Amtrak customers who do not require auxiliary aids to access Amtrak's mobile application content. Id. ¶ 35. Nor was Plaintiff able to access Amtrak's website on her mobile device. Enabling Larger Dynamic Type on the mobile version of the website removed the drop-down box that would allow her to access website content, including webpages for purchasing tickets, checking train schedules and train statuses, modifying a trip, and contacting Amtrak. Id. ¶¶ 39–41.

Amtrak's mobile application is subject to an end user license agreement ("EULA"). Pl.’s Resp. in Opp'n to Def.’s Mot. to Compel Arbitration & Dismiss the Compl., ECF No. 9 [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp'n], at 6; Pl.’s Opp'n, Kaliel Decl., Ex. B, ECF No. 9-2 [hereinafter Ex. B]. By its terms, the EULA "is between [the user] and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (‘Amtrak’) for [the user's] use of this Amtrak application." Ex. B at 10. It also "govern[s] any upgrades provided by Amtrak that replace and/or supplement the original Product, unless such upgrade is accompanied by a separate license or superseding license." Id. And, importantly for purposes of this case, the EULA requires the user to "submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of any Federal court located in the District of Columbia, United States of America, and waive any jurisdictional, venue or inconvenient forum objections to such courts." Id. at 12.

The EULA also provides that, by virtue of using the mobile application, a user is "required to accept and be subject to the Amtrak Terms of Use (including the Privacy Policy) found at www.amtrak.com." Id. at 10. These Web Notices & Site Terms of Use ("Website Agreement") "govern the relationship between Amtrak and [the user] with respect to [the user's] use of the Site." Pl.’s Opp'n, Kaliel Decl., Ex. A, ECF No. 9-2 [hereinafter Ex. A], at 2. Among other things, the Website Agreement binds users to Amtrak's Code of Conduct and outlines Amtrak's copyright and trademark protections. And, like the mobile application's EULA, the Website Agreement requires users "to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of any Federal court located in the District of Columbia." Id. at 3–4, 5–6, 8. The Website Agreement also contains a merger clause: "This Agreement, including the Privacy Policy ... is the entire agreement between us relating to the subject matter herein and supersedes any and all prior or contemporaneous written or oral agreements between us with respect to such subject matter." Id. at 8.

2. Amtrak's Ticketing Terms & Conditions

Notwithstanding Plaintiff's difficulties accessing Amtrak's mobile application and mobile website, Plaintiff purchased rail tickets on several occasions. See Def.’s Mot. to Compel Arbitration & Dismiss the Compl., ECF No. 6, Tewari Decl., ECF No. 6-2 [hereinafter Tewari Decl.], ¶ 7. To purchase a ticket, whether by website, mobile application, or mobile website, a customer must click a box affirming that they "have read and agree to the terms and conditions, including the binding arbitration agreement." Id. ¶¶ 5–6. Plaintiff clicked the box at least nine times over four days, including on April 28, 2019, May 13, 2019, June 17, 2019, and June 23, 2019. Id. ¶ 7.

Amtrak's ticket Terms and Conditions ("Ticket Agreement") spans nearly twenty pages and covers various topics relating primarily to travel on Amtrak, including: Tickets and Passes, Baggage Information, Terms of Transportation, Accessible Travel Services, and Local Transportation. See generally Tewari Decl., Ex. A, ECF No. 6-2 [hereinafter Ticket Agreement]. The Ticket Agreement also includes a force majeure clause, a disclaimer of liability, and, as relevant here, an arbitration provision. Id. at 19–20. The arbitration agreement states:

This Arbitration Agreement is intended to be as broad as legally permissible, and, except as it otherwise provides, applies to all claims, disputes, or controversies, past, present, or future, that otherwise would be resolved in a court of law or before a forum other than arbitration.

The arbitration agreement underscores its breadth by defining the types of claims subject to arbitration:

Amtrak and Customer ... AGREE that this Arbitration Agreement applies, without limitation, to claims Amtrak may have against You and claims You may have against Amtrak ... based upon or related to: these Terms and Conditions, breach of contract, tort claims, common law claims, Your relationship with Amtrak, tickets, services and accommodations provided by Amtrak, carriage on Amtrak trains and equipment, any personal injuries ... and any claims for discrimination and failure to accommodate, shall be decided by a single arbitrator through binding arbitration and not by a judge or jury.

Id. at 19. The arbitration agreement also includes a delegation clause, which provides that "the arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the validity, applicability, enforceability, unconscionability or waiver of this Arbitration Agreement." Id. Finally, the Ticket Agreement includes a class action waiver. Id. at 20.

B.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on September 27, 2019, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act based on Amtrak's failure to make its mobile application and mobile website accessible to the visually impaired. Compl. ¶¶ 74–147. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 41–42.

Amtrak then moved to dismiss the case and compel arbitration. Def.’s Mot. to Compel Arbitration & Dismiss the Compl., ECF No. 6. Emphasizing the Federal Arbitration Act's liberal policy favoring arbitration, Amtrak argues that Plaintiff consented to the Ticket Agreement's arbitration clause each time she purchased a ticket, and that the broad terms of that clause cover this dispute because it reaches "all claims ... past, present, or future ... related to ... any claims for discrimination and failure to accommodate." See Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Compel Arbitration & Dismiss the Compl., ECF No. 6-1 [hereinafter Def.’s Mot.], at 4, 13 (citing Ticket Agreement at 19). Moreover, Amtrak contends, the arbitration agreement's delegation clause requires that an arbitrator and not this court decide any threshold question of arbitrability. Id. at 8–9.

Plaintiff, for her part, argues that the parties never agreed that the Ticket Agreement would govern this dispute; instead, the Website Agreement and the EULA, which include specific forum selection clauses and a merger clause, are controlling and reflect the parties’ intent to resolve disputes arising from those agreements in any federal court in the District of Columbia. Pl.’s Opp'n at 1–2. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues, the Ticket Agreement is illusory and unenforceable because it allows Amtrak to unilaterally modify any policy without notice. Pl.’s Opp'n at 2. Because the court agrees that the parties never intended to arbitrate Plaintiff's claims, it does not reach Plaintiff's argument that the Ticket Agreement is illusory.

III.

A. Motion to...

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