Slaughter v. Torres
| Citation | 592 F.Supp.3d 515 |
| Decision Date | 22 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-362-JWD-EWD |
| Parties | Adrian SLAUGHTER v. Beauregard TORRES, III |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
Marion D. Floyd, Kenner, LA, for Adrian Slaughter.
Mary G. Erlingson, Catherine S. St. Pierre, Erlingson Banks, PLLC, Baton Rouge, LA, Robert J. David, Jr., Juneau David, APLC, Lafayette, LA, Sarah E. Stephens, Jeansonne & Remondet, Lafayette, LA, for Beauregard Torres, III.
RULING AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 44) filed by Defendant Beauregard Torres, III ("Defendant"). Plaintiff Adrian Slaughter ("Plaintiff") opposes the motion. (Doc. 46.) Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. 47.) Oral argument is not necessary. The Court has carefully considered the law, the facts in the record, and the arguments and submissions of the parties and is prepared to rule. For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the motion is denied without prejudice as to Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant in his official capacity. In all other respects, the motion is granted.
The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (Doc. 41.) They are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion. Thompson v. City of Waco , 764 F.3d 500, 502–03 (5th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff, an African American male and former employee of the Pointe Coupee Parish Sheriff's Office, initiated this lawsuit against Defendant, individually and in his official capacity, asserting violations of federal and state laws. (Doc. 41 at 1–2.) At all relevant times, Defendant was the Sheriff of Pointe Coupee Parish, Louisiana. (Id. )
Plaintiff began his employment with the Pointe Coupee Parish Sheriff's Office in 1988 as a road deputy. (Id. at 3.) His position changed about a year later when he started working patrol at the prison. (Id. ) In 2005, he left to work as a corrections officer for the East Baton Rouge Sheriff's Office. (Id. ) Plaintiff returned to the Pointe Coupee Sheriff's Office in 2008 to serve as Captain of Uniform Patrol. (Id. )
In early March 2017, shortly after learning of Plaintiff's interest in running for Sheriff, Defendant called Plaintiff into his office and accused him of stealing time. (Id. ) Specifically, Defendant accused Plaintiff of working "his regular 8-4 shift" and "serving a detail at the same time." (Id. at 4.) Despite Plaintiff's requests, Defendant would not provide documentation of these accusations. (Id. ) Instead, Defendant told Plaintiff that resignation was his only option, commenting that "this would all go away" if Plaintiff just resigned. (Id. ) Plaintiff refused. (Id. )
Defendant turned his alleged findings regarding Plaintiff's false pay records to the Attorney General's office for investigation. (Id. at 8.) On March 23, 2017, "Defendant arrested Plaintiff and charged him with sixteen counts of alleged payroll fraud and alleged malfeasance in office." (Id. at 4.) Prior to Plaintiff's arrest, Defendant "called a press conference and alerted local media channels that Plaintiff was going to be arrested." (Id. at 8.) As a result, Plaintiff's arrest received media coverage, which was seen by Plaintiff's family, both locally and nationally. (Id. ) On March 31, 2017, Plaintiff received a letter from the Pointe Coupee Sheriff's Office advising that his employment was terminated. (Id. at 4.)
Following Plaintiff's arrest, the District Attorney for Pointe Coupee Parish filed criminal charges against Plaintiff, for which he was ordered to appear before the 18th Judicial District Court. (Id. at 2, 4.) Plaintiff alleges that, "[e]ven though Defendant was the source of the arrest and media coverage," Defendant failed to advance the case by subsequently invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (Id. at 8.) The Attorney General declined to prosecute the case against Plaintiff, and the state court criminal proceedings were ultimately dismissed. (Id. )
Based on the foregoing events, Plaintiff claims that he was subjected to disparate treatment because of his race. (Id. at 3.) In particular, the Amended Complaint describes a similarly situated "white officer, employed in school resource" who "works straight days and takes vacation time to work at the same hospital that Plaintiff was accused of working at while on the clock with the Sheriff's Office." (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant neither questioned this white officer's ability to work the detail nor criminally accused him of stealing time. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff also generally alleges that similarly situated white officers "engaged in the very same conduct Plaintiff was accused of engaging in, but these white officers were not criminally charged." (Id. at 6.) Additionally, Plaintiff allegedly obtained a recording of a conversation among officers, during which they complained about Plaintiff serving as a commander "because he is Black/African American." (Id. at 5.) When Plaintiff brought this recording to Defendant's attention, "Defendant did absolutely nothing in response," according to the Amended Complaint. (Id. )
Plaintiff claims that Defendant's discriminatory employment practices violated his rights secured by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at 1, 7, 10.) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint also asserts causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") and defamation pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 2315. (Id. at 1.)
The Amended Complaint alleges three distinct counts: Count I is titled "Hostile Work Environment/Discrimination on the basis of Race and/or Color/Disparate Treatment in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 as amended" (id. at 5); Count II is unnamed but appears to assert claims for false arrest and IIED (id. at 6); and Count III is titled "Defamation" (id. at 8). Plaintiff further states that the continuous tort doctrine applies to all allegations set forth in his Amended Complaint. (Id. at 2, 7.) Regarding damages, Plaintiff alleges that he "is entitled to all legal and equitable remedies available under" Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including declaratory relief, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees, court costs, and interest. (Id. at 7, 9.)
Defendant moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 44.) In support of his motion, Defendant attaches as Exhibit A five pages of documents from Plaintiff's state court proceedings for the criminal charges, including the affidavit and warrant for Plaintiff's arrest. (Doc. 44-3.) Defendant argues that the Court may consider Exhibit A because these documents were incorporated into the Amended Complaint by reference and concern matters of which the Court may take judicial notice. (Doc. 44-2 at 3–4.) Plaintiff objects to consideration of Defendant's exhibit, ostensibly because the substance of Defendant's arguments that rely on Exhibit A are not referenced in the Amended Complaint, though Plaintiff's position is unclear from his opposition. (See Doc. 46 at 3.)
Plaintiff similarly attaches 119 pages of documents as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 to his opposition. (Doc. 46-1.) These exhibits include documents from the Attorney General's Office, such as responses to a public records request for file materials from its investigation of Plaintiff, correspondence with defense counsel, and a press release. (See id. ) Defendant does not object to Plaintiff's exhibits in his reply. (See Doc. 47.)
Preliminarily, the Court must determine whether to consider the parties’ respective exhibits. In general, pursuant to Rule 12(d), "[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) [,] ... matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ; see also United States v. Rogers Cartage Co. , 794 F.3d 854, 861 (7th Cir. 2015). There are some exceptions to this standard, however. On a motion to dismiss, the court may consider "the complaint, its proper attachments, ‘documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.’ " Innova Hosp. San Antonio, Ltd. P'ship v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc. , 892 F.3d 719, 726 (5th Cir. June 12, 2018) (quoting Wolcott v. Sebelius , 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) ).
As the Fifth Circuit has explained, "[i]f the district court does not rely on materials in the record, such as affidavits, it need not convert a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment." U.S. ex rel. Long v. GSDMIdea City, L.L.C. , 798 F.3d 265, 275 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Davis v. Bayless , 70 F.3d 367, 372 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) ). "[T]he mere submission [or service] of extraneous materials does not by itself convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment." Id. (). A district court, moreover, enjoys broad discretion in deciding whether to treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. See St. Paul Ins. Co. v. AFIA Worldwide Ins. Co. , 937 F.2d 274, 280 n.6 (5th Cir. 1991).
The Fifth Circuit has recognized a limited exception to the general rules under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) and related jurisprudence. The Fifth Circuit has approved district courts’ consideration of documents attached to a motion to dismiss, when such documents are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to the plaintiff's claim. See Werner v. Dept. of Homeland Sec. , 441 F. App'x 246, 248 (5th Cir. 2011) ; Scanlan v. Texas...
To continue reading
Request your trial