Slavin v. American Medical Response of Massachusetts, 102819 MASUP, BRCV201900388
|Opinion Judge:||Renee P. Dupuis Justice of the Superior Court|
|Party Name:||Kathleen Slavin, Individually and as Personal Representative v. American Medical Response of Massachusetts et al.|
|Judge Panel:||Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Dupuis, Renee P., J.|
|Case Date:||October 28, 2019|
|Court:||Superior Court of Massachusetts|
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Dupuis, Renee P., J.
ORDER ON THE DEFENDANT CITY OF TAUNTON’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Renee P. Dupuis Justice of the Superior Court
Kathleen Slavin, individually, and as personal representative of the Estate of Patricia Slavin and Kathleen Slavin (the "plaintiffs"), bring claims against the City of Taunton (the "defendant") for wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional distress (the "negligence claims"), and violations of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, based on allegations that the defendant negligently responded to a stabbing at the plaintiffs’ home. The defendant moves to dismiss the claims pursuant to MassR.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). After hearing and review, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED .
First, the defendant argues that the plaintiffs’ presentment letter pursuant to G.L.c. 258, § 4 is insufficient. The Court disagrees. The presentment letter, which was attached to the complaint, see Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 432 Mass. 474, 477 (2000) (exhibits attached to complaint may be considered on motion to dismiss), provides factual details regarding the defendant’s alleged negligent response to the plaintiffs’ 911 call. The presentment letter’s failure to explicitly state specific negligence theories does not render it insufficient. Cf. Murray v. Hudson, 472 Mass. 376, 384-85 (2015) (presentment letter gave town adequate notice of negligence claim, without limitation to any specific negligence theory, as town could reasonably investigate circumstances and determine liability under tort claims act).
The defendant also argues that it is immune from liability under both G.L.c. 258, § § 10(b) and 10(j) on the negligence claims. The Court disagrees. As to immunity under G.L.c. 258, § 10(b), the Court does not have an adequate record to determine whether dispatch services is a discretionary function of the defendant. See Graham v. Worcester, 2017 Mass.App.Unpub. LEXIS 957 at...
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