Sledge v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 06 August 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–cv–1888 KBJ
• Citation: 63 F.Supp.3d 1
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
• Parties: David H. Sledge, Plaintiff, v. District of Columbia, Defendant.

63 F.Supp.3d 1

David H. Sledge, Plaintiff
v.
District of Columbia, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 11–cv–1888 KBJ

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed August 6, 2014

63 F.Supp.3d 7

Donna Williams Rucker, Rucker & Associates, PC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Robert A. Deberardinis, Jr., Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, United States District Judge

Plaintiff David H. Sledge (“Plaintiff” or “Sledge”) is an African–American police officer in the District of Columbia's Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) who has high blood pressure and hypertension. Sledge brought the instant action against the District of Columbia (“Defendant” or “the District”), alleging that MPD officials subjected him to race discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and that the District is also liable under Section 1983 for violating his Fifth Amendment right to equal protection. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 64–121.) The gravamen of Sledge's complaint is that his supervisor, Assistant Chief of Police Diane Groomes, has long discriminated and retaliated against him on the basis of his race and medical condition—primarily by singling him out for heightened scrutiny and harsher discipline. (Id. ¶¶ 45–48, 66–81.) In addition, Sledge

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faults the District for failing to act on his prior complaints regarding Groomes's alleged acts of discrimination. (Id. ¶¶ 53–54.)

Before this Court at present is Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.'s Mot.”), ECF No. 24.) Defendant maintains that Sledge has failed to show that the District's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for disciplining Sledge is pretext for discrimination or retaliation, and that there is no record evidence to demonstrate either the causation necessary to sustain Sledge's retaliation claim or that Sledge was subjected to a hostile work environment. Additionally, Defendant argues that Sledge has failed to demonstrate a basis for municipal liability with respect to his Section 1983 claim. This Court agrees that the District is entitled to summary judgment on all of Sledge's claims; accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED . A separate order consistent with this opinion will follow.

I. BACKGROUND

This case primarily arises out of a series of events in February of 2009 involving Sledge and Groomes, which are recounted below and are undisputed unless otherwise noted.¹ As mentioned, Sledge is an African–American police officer who has worked as an officer of the MPD since 1985 and has held the rank of captain since 2007. (See Compl. ¶ 11; see also Dep. of David Sledge (“Def.'s Sledge Dep.”), ECF No. 25–1, at 5–6.)² Sledge's medical condition—hypertension and high blood pressure—has interfered with his ability to work at times, requiring him to take sick leave. (See Def.'s Sledge Dep. at 4.)

In April of 2008, Sledge's immediate supervisor, Commander Joel Maupin (“Maupin”), and his second-level supervisor, Groomes, appointed Sledge to serve as “administrative captain.” (Id. at 2; Def. District of Columbia's Stmt. of Material Facts as to which there is No Genuine Issue (“Def.'s Facts”), ECF No. 24, at 3–6, ¶ 3). In this capacity, Sledge was responsible for assigning officers to criminal investigations; monitoring the assignees' timeliness, progress, and completion of tasks; and reviewing administrative correspondence. (Role of Admin. Cpt., ECF No. 25–2, at 1; Pl.'s Sledge Dep., ECF No. 31–3, at 18.) At the time of the appointment,

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Sledge and Maupin worked at MPD's Seventh District headquarters in the Southeast quadrant of the District of Columbia, while Groomes was stationed in Northwest D.C. (Def.'s Facts ¶ 3.)

By all accounts, the administrative captain position involved a significant amount of extra work for Sledge. (See Pl.'s Sledge Dep. at 12–15.) In June of 2008, two months into his service as administrative captain, Sledge requested leave to attend a week-long training program, but Maupin denied the request on the ground that Sledge was too far behind on work-related tasks. (See Request for Training, ECF No. 26–1, at 1–2; Pl.'s Sledge Dep. at 25; see also Denial Letter, ECF No. 26–2, at 1.) According to the complaint, in the fall of that same year, Sledge “began to complain to management regarding the discrimination he believed he was being subjected to.” (Compl.¶ 21.)

Sledge's Neglect Of Duty Charge

While serving as administrative captain, Sledge briefly took on an additional role: Maupin assigned Sledge to serve as Acting Commander of the Seventh District for one week—from Wednesday, January 28, 2009, until Wednesday, February 4, 2009—while Maupin was out on leave. (Groomes Inv. Report, ECF No. 26–6, at 1.) Over the weekend during this assigned period, there were two shooting homicides and a stabbing incident in the Seventh District. (Id. at 1.) The precinct called Sledge at home and sent him emails directing him to return to work immediately in order to oversee the investigations. (Id . at 1–2.) Sledge did not respond to the calls or the emails, nor did he oversee the homicide and stabbing investigations, and he did not return to work until Monday, February 2nd. (Id. ) In addition, according to Groomes, Sledge was unable to apprise his supervisors sufficiently at a briefing session upon his return. (Id. at 2 (providing examples of specific questions that Sledge was unable to answer).) For his part, Sledge has admitted that he was absent over the weekend, but also has insisted that the captain who was on duty at the time should have been held responsible. (See Pl.'s Sledge Dep. at 75–76.) In addition, Sledge disputes Groomes's characterization of his briefing performance: Sledge maintains that he answered every question he was asked during the session, despite the fact that Groomes “scream[ed] and holler[ed] at [him], and just humiliated [him] in front of everybody” present. (Pl.'s Sledge Dep. at 79.)

At the end of the briefing session, Groomes assigned Sledge several tasks, including writing a report that was due the following day. (See Groomes Inv. Report at 2.) Shortly after the meeting, Groomes followed up with e-mails requesting the report even sooner—by later that same afternoon. (See Pl.'s Sledge Dep. at 79–80; Groomes Inv. Report at 2.) It is undisputed that Sledge did not complete the report or the other assigned tasks. Instead, he left the office after he began to feel ill, and went to the police officer's clinic, which placed him on sick leave due to hypertension-related symptoms. (Pl.'s Sledge Dep. 80–83; Groomes Inv. Report at 4–5.) Sledge did not tell Groomes that he was leaving the office, but he did speak with Maupin, who was out of town at the time. (See Groomes Inv. Report at 2–3.) In their brief phone call, Sledge told Maupin that he was leaving the office due to illness and asked Maupin to send in a replacement; Maupin denied the request. (See id. ; see also Pl.'s Sledge Dep. at 82–83.) The parties dispute whether Sledge told Maupin that he had pressing assignments due to Groomes. (Compare Groomes Inv. Report. at 2–3 (noting that Sledge never told Maupin about the outstanding reports), with Pl.'s Sledge Dep. at

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82–84 (contending that he told Maupin about the reports).) In any event, Sledge asked a lower-ranking officer to complete the tasks for him, and it is undisputed that the officer did not finish the work. Sledge did not return to the office until February 17, 2009; from Groomes's perspective, Sledge's sudden absence for fifteen days resulted in the failure to address “numerous issues and requested items [.]” (Groomes Inv. Report at 3.)

In the wake of Sledge's weekend absence, unexpected and generally unannounced departure from work during the following week, and incomplete assignments, Groomes initiated an administrative investigation into Sledge's conduct. (See id. ; see also EEOC Intake Questionnaire, ECF No. 25–5, at 6.) This investigation commenced on February 3, 2009, and concluded on February 21, 2009, and involved collecting statements from officers with knowledge of the pertinent events, such as Sledge, Maupin, and the lower-ranking officer Sledge asked to fill in for him. (Groomes Inv. Report at 4–9; EEOC Intake Questionnaire at 6.) Upon completing her investigation, Groomes issued a report recommending that Sledge be disciplined for neglect of duty. (See Groomes Inv. Report at 14 (recommending that Sledge “be cited for adverse action” but not suggesting a particular course of action).) The bases for the suggested disciplinary action were: (1) Sledge's failure to report to duty on Sunday, February 1st; (2) Sledge's failure to respond sufficiently to the homicide incidents and to prepare for the briefing session; (3) Sledge's failure to complete priority assignments or to ensure that they were otherwise completed; and (4) Sledge's failure to notify Groomes that he was leaving the office due to illness. (Id. at 13–14.)

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