Sledge v. Superior Court

• Citation: 520 P.2d 412,113 Cal.Rptr. 28,11 Cal.3d 70
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Decision Date: 27 March 1974
• Parties: , 520 P.2d 412 Curtis Lee SLEDGE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. L.A. 30146.

Page 28

113 Cal.Rptr. 28

11 Cal.3d 70, 520 P.2d 412

Curtis Lee SLEDGE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent;

The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

L.A. 30146.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

March 27, 1974.

Andreasen, Thompson, Gore, Grosse & Wright and David R. Thompson, Oceanside, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Edwin L. Miller, Jr., Dist. Atty., Terry J. Knoepp and Anthony D. Samson, Deputy Dist. Attys., for real party in interest.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gloria F. DeHart and Rodney J. Blonien, Deputy Attys. Gen., as amici curiae on behalf of real party in interest.

MOSK, Justice.

This is a companion case to People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho), 11 Cal.3d 59, 113 Cal.Rptr. 21, 520 P.2d 405, also decided this day.

In On Tai Ho we hold that the decision to 'divert' a defendant into a pretrial rehabilitation program under Penal Code section 1000.2 is a judicial act which cannot be subjected to a prosecutorial veto without violating the constitutional requirement of separation of powers (Cal.Const., art. III, § 3). In the present case we consider whether the same analysis compels us to invalidate the authority of the district attorney under Penal Code section 1000 to make the preliminary determination of eligibility for diversion. ¹ We conclude that determination is not an exercise of judicial power, and hence the writ should be denied.

Defendant (petitioner herein) was charged with violations of former Health and Safety Code sections 11500 (possession of narcotics), 11530 (possession of marijuana), and 11556 (being in a place where narcotics are used). Prior to trial he asked to be considered for the diversion program. After reviewing defendant's file, the district attorney refused to initiate diversion proceedings. Defendant then moved the court for an order of referral notwithstanding the district attorney's refusal to act. The court declined to consider the motion on the ground that section 1000 gives the district attorney sole authority to determine eligibility for the program in the first instance. Defendant now seeks a writ of mandate to compel the court to entertain his motion or to require the district attorney to institute diversion proceedings.

The procedural steps set forth in the diversion statutes (Pen.Code, §§ 1000--1000.4) are discussed in detail in On Tai Ho. (Ante, pp. 23--24 of 113 Cal.Rptr., pp. 407--408 of 520 P.2d.) We there characterize the operation of section 100 as 'a preliminary screening for eligibility conducted by the district attorney under standards prescribed by the statute.' (Ante, p. 23 of 113 Cal.Rptr., p. 407 of 520 P.2d.) We further point out that if it appears the defendant may be eligible, 'the process of adjudication begins.' (Ibid.) We now hold what we there imply, i.e., that the district attorney's determination of eligibility under section 1000 is not a judicial act.

Our conclusion is predicated on the nature of the information required in order to determine eligibility under section 1000. The four numbered subsections of subdivision (a) of the statute (fn. 1, Ante) prescribe the factual showing necessary to support the initiation of diversion proceedings: the defendant must have no prior narcotics conviction (subsec. (1)) and no probation or parole violations (subsec. (4)); the ofense charged must not involve actual or threatened violence (subsec. (2)); and there must be no evidence of his commission of a narcotics offense other than those listed in the statute (subsec. (3)).

We examine first the source of this information. Whether the defendant has prior narcotics convictions or probation or parole violations can be determined only by examination of various records of his personal history maintained by such agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the California Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, the Department of Corrections, and local law enforcement organizations. Whether the present offense involved actual or threatened violence, and whether there is evidence of the commission of a narcotics offense other than those listed in section 1000, can be established only by consideration of oral or written reports on the defendant's current conduct by such persons as investigating officers, arresting officers, victims, witnesses, accomplices, and possibly the defendant himself. Much of this information eventually may be imparted to the court, either in the testimony taken at the trial or in the probation report prepared after conviction. But none of it is known to the court at the time here relevant, i.e., before the trial, when the defendant seeks to invoke the diversion process. At that time the necessary documents and reports are in the district attorney's possession, or can be obtained by him. Indeed, subdivision (b) of section 1000 specifically directs the district attorney to 'review his file' to determine the existence Vel non of these facts. As defendant states in his supplemental brief, 'the sole reason the district attorney was selected as a screening agent in the initial processing of Penal Code (section) 1000 applicants was because he was the Only public official in receipt of the information needed to so refer.'

Secondly, we note the manner in which this information is used. In On Tai Ho (ante, pp. 26--27 of 113 Cal.Rptr., pp. 410--411 of 520 P.2d) we emphasize that at the formal diversion hearing mandated by section 1000.2 the trial court is called upon to 'consider' the evidence submitted--i.e., to weigh its materiality, relevance, credibility, and persuasiveness, and to decide whether, in the judgment of the court, the evidence justifies the conclusion that the defendant would be benefited by diversion into a program of education, treatment, or rehabilitation. These, we hold, are judicial acts. (Ante, p. 26 of 113 Cal.Rptr., p. 410 of 520 P.2d.) by contrast, in discharging his duties under section 1000 the district attorney need not decide what facts are material and relevant to eligibility, as the Legislature has specified them in the statute. Credibility is not an issue when the information is obtained from official records and reports. And the statute leaves no room for weighing the effect of the facts: if for example the defendant has a prior narcotics conviction, subsection (1) of subdivision (a) of the statute automatically excludes him from the program. There is no provision here, as there was in the statutes considered in People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248, 102 Cal.Rptr. 137, 497 P.2d 481, and People v. Clay (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 964, 96 Cal.Rptr. 213, for the exercise of judicial discretion to admit an otherwise ineligible defendant to the program 'in the interests of justice,' and therefore no risk of arbitrary prosecutorial refusal to concur in that decision.

Defendant contends, however, that subsection (3) of subdivision (a) vests the district attorney with a broad discretion not found in the other three subsections of the statute (fn. 1, Ante). It is argued that in determining whether there is 'evidence' of the commission of a narcotics offense other than simple possession the district attorney can rely on a mere suspicion of illegal activity, and that his determination of ineligibility on that ground is not subject to judicial review. Neither point is well taken. Subsection (3) is intended by the Legislature to render ineligible for the diversion program a relatively limited class of persons, i.e., those who are dealing in illegal narcotics but whoh ave never previously been convicted of any drug offense ² and whom the district attorney cannot or does not choose to charge with trafficking. ³ The statute specifies there must be 'evidence' that the defendant is a member of that class before he can be excluded. 'Evidence,' of course, means more than mere suspicion or rumor; it means, in this context, reports of actual instances of trafficking or other information showing that the defendant has probably committed narcotics offenses in addition to those listed in the statute. ⁴

Defendant complains that portions of such evidence are hearsay. In this screening process, however, the district attorney's inquiry need not be limited to information admissible at a full-fledged criminal trial. The files of the district attorney ordinarily include relevant hearsay information derived from investigations into criminal activity; yet as noted above, subdivision (b) of the statute expressly directs him to consult that source in determining eligibility for diversion.

Secondly, the decision of the district attorney that a defendant is ineligible on this ground is subject to judicial review at the proper time. A...