Sledzianowski Unemployment Compensation Case
| Decision Date | 16 November 1950 |
| Citation | 76 A.2d 666,168 Pa.Super. 37 |
| Parties | SLEDZIANOWSKI v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Argued September 28, 1950.
Appeal, No. 189, Oct. T., 1950, by claimant, Mieceslaw J Sledzianowski, from decision of Unemployment Compensation Board of Review dated April 27, 1950, Decision No. B-20891 reversing decision of referee disallowing claims.
Joseph Patrick Gorham, for appellant.
William L. Hammond, Special Deputy Attorney General, with him Richard H. Wagner, Associate Counsel and Charles J. Margiotti, Attorney General, for appellee.
OPINION
Claimant applied for benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law. The Referee in reversing the Bureau denied the claim on the ground that claimant voluntarily left his work without good cause under § 402(b), as amended by the Act of May 23, 1949, P.L. 1738, 43 PS § 802. The Board on appeal affirmed the Referee's order of disallowance.
We are unable to find any serious dispute as to the facts. Claimant had been employed by Yale and Towne Manufacturing Company as a stockroom clerk or storekeeper for seven and one-half years. As storekeeper his assignment involved the keeping of records of materials and his duties were largely supervisory and clerical although they involved some manual work. He previously had been employed by Sears and Roebuck as a stock clerk for 15 years. On April 18, 1949, he was given the lower classification of checker in the stock room with a reduction in wages from $ 1.32 to $ 1.16 per hour. The demotion was due entirely to a falling off in the employer's business which made it necessary to reduce the number of workmen in various departments. Claimant's services were always satisfactory. Because of a further recession in the employer's business no work was available to claimant in that classification after June 17, 1949, and his employment in the stockkeeping department terminated on that date. Claimant's foreman, representing the employer, then offered him a job of spray painting rough castings and stores, at a further reduction in wages to $ 1.09 per hour. Claimant refused the proffered employment as a paint sprayer because of his apprehension that it would be detrimental to his health. He gave that as the controlling reason although he also demurred to the change in his work classification.
The appeal from the decision of the Bureau was heard by the Referee on October 4, 1949. At the hearing the employer was represented by counsel but claimant was not. He nevertheless brought with him to the hearing a certificate signed by his physician to this effect: . This statement was admitted in evidence by the referee without objection from the employer's counsel. And since the doctor's certificate was admitted without objection it is competent evidence, undisputed in this record, of the statement of facts contained in it. The same principles have application here as in proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Law. A rule of evidence not invoked must be regarded as waived. "Inadmissible evidence including hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, is not a nullity or void of probative force, but is to be given its natural probative effect as if it was in law admissible": Poluski v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 286 Pa. 473, 133
A 819. It is conceded that the certificate of claimant's physician "was accepted" by the Board. The testimony of a medical witness even though uncontradicted is not binding on the Board. Stufflet v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 164 Pa.Super. 473, 65 A.2d 443. But there is nothing either in the decision of the Referee or of the Board to indicate that it was...
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