Sleep v. Omni R.I., LLC
| Docket Number | C. A. 19-664WES |
| Decision Date | 20 July 2022 |
| Parties | MICHAEL SLEEP, Plaintiff, v. OMNI RHODE ISLAND, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On December 4, 2019, five days before Rhode Island's three-year statute of limitations, R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14(b), would have expired, Plaintiff Michael Sleep filed this personal injury action in Rhode Island State Court against Defendants Omni Rhode Island, LLC, Omni Hotels Management Corporation, Omni Hotels & Resorts and Omni Providence Hotel (collectively “Omni”) based on a serious injury caused by tripping over boxes on December 9 2016. ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 10-14.[1] The injury occurred while Plaintiff was working at premises that he alleged were owned and/or operated by Omni. Id. ¶¶ 3-6 10-28. On December 31, 2019, Omni answered, alleging inter alia, that it did not have ownership or control over the premises where Plaintiff's injury occurred. ECF No. 4 at 9. At the Rule 16 conference held on April 29, 2020, the parties advised the Court that early discovery had exposed a factual question whether Omni was legally responsible for the premises in issue but that their ability to investigate had been adversely impacted by the COVID pandemic, at that time in the early lockdown phase. Text Order of Apr. 29, 2020.
Finally, on December 6, 2021, almost five years after the injury and two years after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, with leave of Court,[2] Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint. ECF No. 32. It names and was served on a new Defendant not alleged to have any affiliation or relationship with Omni - the separate entity that allegedly is legally responsible for the residential portion of the building that is immediately adjacent to the building housing the hotel owned and operated by Omni: The Procaccianti Group a/k/a PRI XIX, LP, and/or PRI XVIII, LP (“Procaccianti”). In addition to continuing to claim that Omni is the responsible entity, the Amended Complaint pleads in the alternative that Plaintiff's injury occurred while Plaintiff was working on premises for which Procaccianti is legally responsible.
Now pending before the Court is Procaccianti's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 37) all claims against it pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) based on the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Procaccianti contends that this fatal deficiency is clearly revealed by the dates in the Amended Complaint and that the pleading is devoid of any allegations permitting the plausible inference that the doctrine of relation back in Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) might apply.
When reviewing a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept “well-pled facts in the complaint as true, and draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Gilbert v. City of Chicopee, 915 F.3d 74, 80 (1st Cir. 2019). To survive such a motion the complaint must give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and allege a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. Affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, may be raised in a motion to dismiss if the facts establishing the defense are clear on the face of the pleading. Trans-Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 2008). A plaintiff that adds a new defendant by amendment after the running of the statute of limitations “bears the burden of showing that the Rule 15(c) relation back doctrine applies,” although “[t]he precise nature of that burden is not entirely clear.” Graham v. Church, Civil No. 14-cv-171-LM, 2015 WL 247910, at *4 (D.N.H. Jan. 20, 2015). The court “may grant a motion to dismiss based on a defendant's affirmative defense of a statute of limitations when the pleader's allegations leave no doubt that an asserted claim is time-barred.” Ornelas v. City of Manchester, Civil No. 14-cv-394-LM, 2017 WL 2423512, at *1 (D.N.H. June 5, 2017) (cleaned up).
Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part that:
While relation back is generally permitted where “the proper defendant is already before the court and the effect is merely to correct the name under which he is sued,” Wilson v. United States Gov't, 23 F.3d 559, 563 (1st Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted), it is well settled that relation back does not apply where there is simply “lack of knowledge of the proper party.” Id. (emphasis in original); see, e.g., Cruz v. Bos. Litig. Sol., Civil Action No. 13-11127-LTS, 2016 WL 3568254, at *11 (D. Mass. May 24, 2016) (); Bussell v. Rhode Island, C. A. No. 14-109 S, 2014 WL 3732096, at *2 (D.R.I. July 25, 2014) (); Ferreira v. City of Pawtucket, 365 F.Supp.2d 215, 217 (D.R.I. 2004) (). Rather, a “mistake for purposes of Rule 15(c) . . . only occurs when a plaintiff uses one name intending and thinking to sue one entity, when in fact he should have used a different name.” Cholopy v. City of Providence, 228 F.R.D. 412, 417 (D.R.I. 2005); see Phoenix v. Day One, C. A. No. 20-CV-152-WES-PAS, 2020 WL 7310498, at *4 (D.R.I. Dec. 11, 2020), adopted, 2021 WL 63517 (D.R.I. Jan. 7, 2021).
The relation back doctrine was clarified by the Supreme Court in Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538 (2010). In Krupski, the complaint clearly articulated the plaintiff's intent to sue the correct entity and the facts established that the entity sued in error was related to and had a nearly identical name as the correct defendant. Id. at 554-55. As the Court noted:
If the plaintiff sues party B instead of party A under these circumstances, she has made a “mistake concerning the proper party's identity” notwithstanding her knowledge of the existence of both parties. The only question under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), then, is whether party A knew or should have known that, absent some mistake, the action would have been brought against him.
Id. at 549. The Court held that summary judgment should not have been granted because the facts would permit the finding that the proper defendant (hypothetical “party A”) “should have known that” the plaintiff's failure to name it in the original complaint was due to a “mistake concerning the proper party's identity.” Id. at 557 (emphasis added).
Since Krupski, courts distinguish circumstances involving lack of knowledge of the correct name to use to identify a known defendant, which Krupski holds may amount to a qualifying “mistake,” but otherwise continue to hold that lack of knowledge of the correct defendant is not a mistake for purpose of relation back. For example, in General Linen Service, Inc. v. General Linen Service Co., Civil No. 12-cv-111-LM, 2015 WL 471011 (D.N.H. Feb. 4, 2015), the court distinguished Krupski as applicable when the claimant knows about and clearly describes the intended defendant in a timely pleading but mistakenly uses the name of a related entity. Id. at *3-5. By contrast, when the plaintiff simply omits any reference to a defendant in the original pleading based on lack of knowledge about that defendant, such lack of knowledge is not a “mistake concerning” identity under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). Phoenix, 2020 WL 7310498, at *5. Further, as Krupski makes clear, what is pivotal to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(C) is whether, during the Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) period, the correct defendant both had such notice of the action as to avoid prejudice and had actual or constructive knowledge that, but for the plaintiff's mistake, it would have been timely sued. Lacking those elements, relation back is not applicable. See Phoenix. 2020 WL 7310498, at *3-5.
Plaintiff does not dispute that the applicable statute of limitations is set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14(b), that the dates in the Amended Complaint establish that it had long since expired by the time Procaccianti was sued and that his claim against Procaccianti must be dismissed unless the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. See ECF No. 41 at 2. Plaintiff does not allege that Omni and Procaccianti are the same or even related entities, nor do they have the same attorney. Plaintiff has presented nothing that would permit the inference that Procaccianti had notice of the action at any time prior to the running of the statute of limitations or during the period for serving the original summons and complaint set by Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). Nor does Plaintiff point to any facts tending to show that, during the same time period, Procaccianti knew or should have known that, but for a mistake, it would have been named in the original complaint.
Despite these deficiencies, Plaintiff nevertheless contends that Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)'s doctrine of relation back is applicable because he made a “mistake . . . of...
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