Slepski v. Williams Ford, Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 December 1975
• Citation: 170 Conn. 18,364 A.2d 175
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Lynda T. SLEPSKI v. WILLIAMS FORD, INC., et al.

Page 175

364 A.2d 175

170 Conn. 18

Lynda T. SLEPSKI v. WILLIAMS FORD, INC., et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Dec. 16, 1975.

Edward S. Ludorf, Hartford, for appellant (defendant Ford Motor co.).

Chester S. Sledzik, New Britain, for appellant (defendant Williams Ford, Inc.).

James M. Marinelli, New Britain, with whom, on the brief, was William V. Dworski, New Britain, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and BARBER, JJ.

LONGO, Associate Justice.

This appeal arises from an action brought by the plaintiff, Lynda T. Slepski, seeking without substantial change in the condition in automobile accident involving one car, which the plaintiff owned and was driving when the accident occurred. On a trial to the jury, a verdict was rendered against the two defendants, Williams Ford, Inc., a retail used car dealership from which the plaintiff had purchased the automobile, and Ford Motor Company, manufacturer of the automobile. The defendants have been permitted to join together for the purpose of taking this appeal from the judgment, claiming as error the refusal by the trial court to set aside the jury's verdict on the grounds that it was contrary to law and against the evidence. The defendants also claim as error the denial of their motion, made under Practice Book § 255, requesting that the verdict be set aside and that judgment be entered for the defendants in accordance with their motion for a directed verdict.

The jury was charged solely on the theory of strict liability in tort and all the parties agree that the only principles of law at issue in this appeal arise under the theory. This court is in accord with the rule in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts regarding strict liability. ¹ Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 289, 216 A.2d 189.

Under § 402A there are certain conditions precedent to recovery, including proof by the plaintiff that the product 'caused physical harm to the consumer or user or to his property' and that the product was 'in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property.' Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 561, 562,277 A.2d 418; annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1075. The defendants' appeal is based on their claims that the plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that a defect of the automobile was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries and that the automobile was in an 'unreasonably dangerous' condition. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the evidence introduced at the trial. The sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict is tested by the evidence as set out in narrative form in the briefs of the parties. See Practice Book §§ 631A and 632A.

In March of 1968, the plaintiff purchased a 1966 model Ford Mustang automobile at Williams Ford, Inc. There had been two previous owners and the odometer registered 41,000 miles at the time of purchase. The plaintiff testified that, while driving the automobile an additional 5000 miles in the four months prior to her accident, she had noticed a slight pull of the steering wheel toward the left, which she corrected by applying pressure on the wheel toward the right. On August 1968, as she began to accelerate after making a complete stop at a traffic yield sign, the plaintiff stated that it seemed as if someone had pulled the steering wheel out of her hands and she could not keep the car on the road. The automobile veered sharply to the left and collided with a pole on the left side of the road, injuring the plaintiff.

A witness who had owned the vehicle prior to its purchase by the plaintiff testified that the vehicle had a definite pull to the left, and one who previously had driven the automobile stated that he had noticed a slight wobble on its left side. A metallurgist testifying for the plaintiff had examined the five spot welds designed to hold together the steel strut rod assembly and the frame members of the automobile's left wheel suspension, and he concluded that the welds were defective. His opinion was that two of the spot welds had failed three to six months after the car had been put into service and that the three remaining had separated prior to the impact of the accident. An automotive mechanical engineer testified for the plaintiff that the failure of the two spot welds would place added stress on the remaining thee, causing their progressive failure. The witness explained that the failure of all five welds would allow relative motion between the parts the welds were intended to join, destroying the ability of the structure to operate as designed and causing the vehicle to veer toward the left. Conflicting testimony was offered by the defendant's expert, who stated that a complete failure of all five spot welds would, at most, cause a rattle.

Where the plaintiff has introduced evidence which removes the issue of proximate cause from the realm of mere speculation, that issue 'presents a question of fact for the trier.' Miranti v. Brookside Shopping Center Inc., 159 Conn. 24, 27, 28, 266 A.2d 370, 371. Terminal Taxi Co. v. Flynn, 156 Conn. 313, 316, 240 A.2d 881. The plaintiff is not required to show only one possible theory of causation, negating all others. Terminal Taxi...