Slevin v. Bd. of Comm'rs for the Cnty. of Doña Ana

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
• Writing for the Court: MARTHA VAZQUEZ
• Citation: Slevin v. Bd. of Comm'rs for the Cnty. of Doña Ana, 934 F.Supp.2d 1282 (D. N.M. 2013)
• Decision Date: 08 January 2013
• Docket Number: Civil No. 08–cv–1185 MV/SMV.
• Parties: Stephen SLEVIN, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR the COUNTY OF DOÑA ANA, et al., Defendants.

934 F.Supp.2d 1282

Stephen SLEVIN, Plaintiff,

v.BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR the COUNTY OF DOÑA ANA, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 08–cv–1185 MV/SMV.

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

Jan. 8, 2013.

Jack Bennett Jacks, Law Office of J.B. Jacks, Matthew Coyte, Coyte Law, PC, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff.

John W. Caldwell, Fairacres, NM, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARTHA VAZQUEZ, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for New Trial Based on Nondisclosure of Attorney–Client Relationship Between Plaintiff's Counsel and Witness John Oates [Doc. 126]. The Court, having considered the motion, briefs, relevant law and being otherwise fully informed, finds that the Motion is not well-taken and will be denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Stephen Slevin commenced the instant action on December 28, 2008. See Doc. 1 (Complaint). Plaintiff had been arrested on state charges of driving while intoxicated and receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle, and was booked into the Doña Ana County Detention Center (the “Detention Center”) on August 24, 2005. Id. at 2. He remained at the Detention Center until June 25, 2007, when the charges against him were dismissed. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleged that, because of his mental illness, officials at the Detention Center kept him in administrative segregation for virtually the entire 22 months of his incarceration, without humane conditions of confinement or adequate medical care, and without periodic review of his confinement, causing his physical and mentaldeterioration. Id. at 2–4. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants violated his procedural due process and substantive due process rights and his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and committed the torts of false imprisonment and negligent maintenance of a building. Id. at 4–7.

On February 16, 2010, Matthew Coyte, Plaintiff's counsel, took the deposition of John Oates. See Doc. 133–1 (Deposition Tr. 1/16/10). At the time, Mr. Oates was confined at the Central New Mexico Correctional Facility in Los Lunas (“Los Lunas Level Two”), and the deposition was held there. Previously, Mr. Oates had been detained at the Detention Center from March 2003 to June 2006, where he was held in administrative segregation for the majority of his detention. Id. at 5–6. At the beginning of the deposition, Mr. Coyte advised Mr. Oates that neither he nor Mr. Caldwell, Defendants' counsel, represented his interests. Id. at 3. Both Mr. Coyte and Mr. Caldwell questioned Mr. Oates during the deposition. In response to the attorneys' questions, Mr. Oates testified about the conditions of administrative confinement at the Detention Center, and contrasted those conditions to those of the general population at the Detention Center. See id. at 7–13, 18–35, 39–44, 69–71.

At one point during the deposition, Mr. Oates indicated that he needed certain books that the prison would not provide in order to complete a class he was taking. See Doc. 133 (Affidavit of Mr. Coyte) ¶ 9. Mr. Caldwell offered to pay for Mr. Oates' books, and Mr. Coyte offered to pay for half the cost, if necessary. Id. ¶ 10. Ultimately, Mr. Caldwell was unable to arrange to pay for Mr. Oates' books, and sometime in 2010, Mr. Coyte communicated with Mr. Oates about Mr. Caldwell's unsuccessful efforts. Id. ¶¶ 17–18.

Approximately nine months after Mr. Oates' deposition, Mr. Coyte learned of allegations that Los Lunas Level Two had been using a form of sexual humiliation against the prisoners. Id. ¶ 19. In January 2011, Mr. Coyte, along with Jack Bennett Jacks (co-counsel for Plaintiff herein), visited Mr. Oates to ask about the allegations. Id. ¶ 21. Mr. Oates indicated that he had been one of the victims of the alleged sexual humiliation. Id. At that point, Mr. Coyte entered an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Oates as a potential class representative. Id. ¶ 22. In February 2011, Mr. Coyte filed a putative class action against the Deputy Director of Adult Prisons for the State of New Mexico, the Warden of Los Lunas Two, and unidentified correctional officers at Los Lunas Two, alleging civil rights violations based on the alleged sexual humiliation of prisoners. See J.O. v. Dorsey, No. 11–cv–254 (MCA/GBW), Doc. 1–1. The class action was removed to federal court in March 2011. See id., Doc. 1. Although originally identified as “J.O.” in order to protect against retaliation, Mr. Oates' full name was revealed in an amended complaint filed September 29, 2011. Doc. 133 ¶¶ 32, 44.

In connection with the instant case, Mr. Coyte provided Mr. Caldwell with the telephone numbers of the witnesses he intended to call at trial, including Mr. Oates. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff asserts, and Defendants do not deny, that Mr. Caldwell made no attempt to contact Mr. Oates prior to trial. Id.

Trial in the instant case commenced on January 17, 2012. During the trial, Plaintiff called Mr. Oates as a witness. Mr. Oates provided testimony consistent with his deposition testimony contrasting the conditions of administrative confinement with the conditions of the general population at the Detention Center. See Doc. 111 (Trial Tr. 1/19/12) at 58–62, 64–75, 80–81. In the course of cross examination, Mr. Caldwell made one inquiry of Mr. Oates as to his communications with Mr. Coyte, as follows: “Prior to your being deposed in 2010, you had spoken with Mr. Coyte on at least two occasions, had you not?” Id. at 93. Mr. Oates responded, “I spoke with him when I got a letter in the mail. I went to my case worker and called him to ask what the letter was about. And I spoke with him once in Los Lunas.” Id. at 93–94. Thereafter, on redirect examination, Mr. Coyte inquired: “The letter and the telephone conversation with me, Mr. Caldwell just referred to, did I tell you how to testify?” Id. at 94. Mr. Oates responded, “No, sir.” Id. Mr. Coyte then asked, “Did I put anything in your mind as to what—what to say?” Id. Mr. Oates again responded, “No, sir.” Id.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on all counts. See Doc. 96 (Special Verdict Form). Specifically, the jury found Defendants Board of County Commissioners (the “County”), Christopher Barela, Director of the Detention Center, and Daniel Zemek, Medical Director of the Detention Center, liable for depriving Plaintiff of his constitutional rights to humane conditions of confinement, adequate medical care, and procedural due process, and as a result of these constitutional deprivations, found that Plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages from the County, Barela, and Zemek, and to punitive damages from Barela and Zemek. Id. The jury awarded Plaintiff $3 million in punitive damages against Barela, and $3.5 million in punitive damages against Zemek. Id. The jury further found Defendant Barela liable for violating Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and as result of this violation, found that Plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages from Barela. Id. Next, the jury found the Detention Center liable for the torts of false imprisonment and negligent operation or maintenance of a building, and as a result of this liability, found that Plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages from the Detention Center. Id. Finally, the jury fixed the amount of compensatory damages at $15.5 million, to include $500,000 for each month that Plaintiff was incarcerated, plus an additional $1 million for each year since Plaintiff's release from custody. Id.

The Court entered a Final Judgment in favor of Plaintiff on February 17, 2012. Doc. 105 (Final Judgment). Thereafter, Defendants retained an investigator to interview the jurors. See Doc. 126–1 (Affidavit of Mr. Caldwell) ¶ 6. On March 8, 2012, the investigator informed Mr. Caldwell that he recognized Mr. Oates, witness in this case, as the lead plaintiff in the Dorsey class action, and that Mr. Coyte represented Mr. Oates in the Dorsey action. Id. ¶ 7. Mr. Caldwell sent Mr. Coyte an email message inquiring about his discovery. Id. ¶ 9. Mr. Coyte advised Mr. Caldwell that he did not believe that his representation of Mr. Oates was relevant to the present matter or required a specific disclosure. Id.

Thereafter, on April 4, 2012, Defendants filed the instant motion seeking a new trial based on the nondisclosure of the existence of an attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff's counsel and Mr. Oates. Doc. 126. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on April 20, 2012. Doc. 132. Defendants' reply followed on May 2, 2012. Doc. 138.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Relief under Rule 60(b) “is extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional circumstances.” Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir.2000). “Parties seeking relief under Rule 60(b) have a higher hurdle to overcome because such a motion is not a substitute for an appeal.” Cummings v. Gen. Motors Corp., 365 F.3d 944, 955 (10th Cir.2004).

Rule 60(b)(3), in particular, allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment based on “fraud ..., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3). “The burden is on the moving party, and they must show ‘clear and convincing proof’ of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct.” Cummings, 365 F.3d at 955 (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has interpreted this to require a showing that the opposing party “acted with an intent to deceive or defraud the court, by means of a deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme.” Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir.1999) (citation omitted); see also Zurich N. Am. v. Matrix Serv., Inc., 426 F.3d 1281, 1291–92 (10th Cir.2005) (articulating heightened standard applicable in Tenth Circuit to...