Sley System Garages v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, Local 700

• Decision Date: 03 January 1962
• Docket Number: LOCAL,AFL-CI
• Citation: 406 Pa. 370,178 A.2d 560
• Parties: SLEY SYSTEM GARAGES, Appellant, v. TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA,700 and Robert E. Bailey.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 560

178 A.2d 560

406 Pa. 370

SLEY SYSTEM GARAGES, Appellant, v. TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 700 and Robert E. Bailey.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Jan. 3, 1962.

Rehearing Denied March 22, 1962.

Dilworth, Paxson, Kalish, Kohn & Dilks, Aaron M. Fine, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Eugene John Lewis, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, BOK, EAGEN, and ALPERN, JJ.

EAGEN, Justice.

The sole question in this case is: Whether a court's order, following the granting of a preliminary injunction in referring the question of an employee's discharge to an arbitrator who stated that the employee was to remain on the payroll until the determination, is to be considered part of a submission to the arbitrator?

William Washington, who was vice-president of Local 700, was discharged by Sley System Garages on March 1, 1961. On March 2, his fellow-employees went on a sympathetic strike and the company instituted an action in equity and secured a preliminary injunction. At a hearing on the following day, the preliminary injunction was continued with the following order: 'Further hearing to be held on April 3, 1961 in Room 'A', 10:00 A.M. Employee Washington to be continued on the payroll in the interval and removed off the premises. Case referred to arbitrator, Israel Ben Scheiber, no later April 3, 1961.'

A hearing was subsequently held on March 29, pursuant to the order of court and the following submission was signed by counsel for both parties: 'Did just and sufficient cause exist for the discharge of William Washington on March 1, 1961. If not, what shall the remedy be?' At the hearing before the American Arbitration Association, the arbitrator was granted by the lower court, via telephone, additional time until April 11, 1961, in which to file his award 'with the understanding that the grievant was not on the payroll from April 3rd.'

The arbitrator found that the appellant was the only one of sixteen garage and parking lot companies with which the appellee-union had had any disputes; that the appellant had discharged three shop stewards within a period of six months; that the appellant had been harassing Washington trying to, and in fact did, trap him into refusing to obey an order to do work, which under the contract, he wasn't required to do; that the appellant had refused to arbitrate what Washington's proper assignment should be, as A.A.A. had suggested in an earlier arbitration. However, the arbitrator also found that the work Washington was ordered to do, serving as cashier, did not endanger his safety or health and, therefore, he should have obeyed the order.

The award of the A.A.A. was as follows:

'I, the undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in accordance with the arbitration agreement entered into by the above named parties, and have duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above parties, Award as follows:

'a) That less than sufficient cause existed for the grievant's second discharge and that a suspension of one month, conditioned in the manner following is the proper remedy.

'b) As a condition to the grievant's return to his work with this Company he is directed, until it is determined by arbitration or by the agreement of the parties, that he need not do so, to continue to do cashier's work as he has heretofore been doing if told to do so by the Company.

'c) As further condition of his reinstatement, the grievant is directed, prior to his returning to work, to repay to the Company the monies paid to him by it from the day of his discharge, March 1, 1961, until April 3, 1961, during which time he did nothing to earn it.

'd) During the period of one month's disciplinary suspension without pay, the grievant is requested not to visit any place of business of the Sley System without the written permission of the Company.'

The appellee then filed a rule to show cause why paragraph (c) of the arbitrator's award should not be stricken. The lower court on May 15, 1961, made the rule absolute. These appeals followed.

The appellant makes a two-pronged attack: (1) That the lower court had no authority to vacate the arbitrator's award; (2) That the lower court had no authority to direct that Washington be kept on the payroll pending arbitration.

In Newspaper Guild of Greater Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Daily News, Inc., 401 Pa. 337, 346, 164 A.2d 215, 220 (1960), we stated, 'Unless they are restricted by the submission, ¹ the arbitrators are the final judges of both law...