Slice of Life, LLC v. Hamilton Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd.

• Decision Date: 26 April 2019
• Docket Number: No. 7 MAP 2018,7 MAP 2018
• Citation: 207 A.3d 886
• Parties: SLICE OF LIFE, LLC and Val Kleyman, Appellees v. HAMILTON TOWNSHIP ZONING HEARING BOARD and Hamilton Township, Appellants
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

207 A.3d 886

SLICE OF LIFE, LLC and Val Kleyman, Appellees

v.HAMILTON TOWNSHIP ZONING HEARING BOARD and Hamilton Township, Appellants

No. 7 MAP 2018

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: December 5, 2018

Decided: April 26, 2019

John B. Dunn, Esq., Monroe County Solicitor's Office, Gerard Joseph Geiger, Esq., Robert Joseph Kidwell III, Esq., Marc Richard Wolfe, Esq., Newman, Williams, Mishkin, Corveleyn, Wolfe & Fareri, P.C., Brett J. Riegel, Esq., Amori & Riegel, L.L.C., Stroudsburg, for Appellants.

James August Brando, Esq., Mountain Top, for Appellees.

Robert L. Byer, Esq., Duane Morris LLP, Pittsburgh, Meredith Ellen Carpenter, Esq., Duane Morris LLP, Philadelphia, Joshua A. Windham, Esq., for Appellee Amicus Curiae.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE

In this discretionary appeal, we must determine whether a zoning ordinance that defines "family" as requiring "a single housekeeping unit" permits the purely transient use of a property located in a residential zoning district. This question arises based on the increasingly popular concept of web-based rentals of single-family homes to vacationers and other transient users for a few days at a time. See 5 Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning § 81:11 (4th ed.) (2018). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that pursuant to this Court's prior decisions in Albert v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of N. Abington Twp. , 578 Pa. 439, 854 A.2d 401 (2004), and In re Appeal of Miller , 511 Pa. 631, 515 A.2d 904 (1986) (" Miller "), the purely transient use of a house is not a permitted use in a residential zoning district limiting use to single-family homes by "a single housekeeping unit." We therefore reverse the decision of the Commonwealth Court and reinstate the decision of the zoning hearing board, as affirmed by the common pleas court.

To properly frame the matter before us, some background regarding the underlying law is useful. A property owner has a constitutionally protected right to the enjoyment of his or her property. Pa. Const. art. I, § 1 (providing for the "inherent" right of "acquiring, possessing and protecting property"); Newtown Square E., L.P. v. Twp. of Newtown , 627 Pa. 398, 101 A.3d 37, 51 (2014). That right is permissibly limited by a zoning ordinance that is substantially related to the protection of the public health, safety, morality and welfare – commonly known as a municipality's "police power." In re Realen Valley Forge Greenes Assoc. , 576 Pa. 115, 838 A.2d 718, 728 (2003) (quoting C & M Developers, Inc. v. Bedminster Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd. , 573 Pa. 2, 820 A.2d 143, 150 (2002) ).

The establishment of residential zoning districts has long been recognized as a valid exercise of a municipality's police power. They serve to insulate areas intended for residential living from increased noise and traffic, protect children living there and their ability to utilize quiet, open spaces for play, and to maintain "the residential character of the neighborhood." Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co. , 272 U.S. 365, 394, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). Non-family uses, including fraternity houses and boarding houses, have been found to be antithetical to the "residential character," as "[m]ore people occupy a given space; more cars ... continuously pass by; more cars are parked; [and] noise travels with crowds." Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas , 416 U.S. 1, 9, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974). As the high Court explained,

A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. This goal is a permissible one within Berman v. Parker , [348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (discussing the broad concept of public welfare) ]. The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.

Id.

"Single housekeeping unit" is a phrase that is commonly used in the definition of "family" in zoning ordinances throughout the country. See Patricia E. Salkin, Family defined; unrelated persons , 1 Am. Law. Zoning § 9:30 (5th ed.); see, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre , 416 U.S. at 2, 94 S.Ct. 1536. It finds its roots in the beginnings of zoning once "the legitimacy of exclusive single-family districts was settled." Miller , 515 A.2d at 906. Early zoning ordinances, however, generally failed to define the term "family," requiring the judiciary to provide its meaning. Id. "[D]issatisfaction with reliance solely upon judicial interpretation for the definition of the term ‘family’ became increasingly apparent," prompting the drafters of zoning ordinances across the United States to include a definition within the ordinances themselves. Id. at 907. Based on the use of the phrase "single housekeeping unit" by leading commentators on zoning, ordinances began to use that language to define the term "family." Id. (citing E. Bassett, Zoning at 189 (1940) ).

Unfortunately, this did not achieve the desired result, as it served only to shift the focus of litigation relating to permissible uses in residential zoning districts from defining the word "family" to defining the phrase "single housekeeping unit." Id. In defining "single housekeeping unit," courts adopted a definition that required the occupants of a home to live and behave in a manner like that of a family in a character that is "permanent ... and not transitory." Washington Twp. v. Central Bergen Comm. Mental Health Ctr. , 156 N.J.Super. 388, 383 A.2d 1194, 1209 (1978). See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio , 431 U.S. 494, 515-19, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (recognizing that state decisions regarding residential zoning ordinances generally require, inter alia, "that a single-family home be occupied only by a ‘single housekeeping unit,’ " and for "such households to remain nontransient"); see, e.g., Northern Maine General Hosp. v. Ricker ; 572 A.2d 479 (Maine 1990) ; Commonwealth v. Jaffe , 398 Mass. 50, 494 N.E.2d 1342 (1986) ; Costley v. Caromin House, Inc. , 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1981) ; State ex rel. Region II Child and Family Services, Inc. v. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. , 187 Mont. 126, 609 P.2d 245 (1980) ; Crowley v. Knapp , 94 Wis.2d 421, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980) ; City of White Plains v. Ferraioli , 34 N.Y.2d 300, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 313 N.E.2d 756 (1974).

Miller was one such case. It involved a homeowner who began providing lodging, meals and care to physically and mentally disabled persons in her home. The home was located in a residential zoning district that permitted single-family detached dwelling use, but disallowed convalescent homes, nursing homes and boarding houses. Miller , 515 A.2d at 905. The zoning ordinance at issue defined "family" as "any number of persons living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit." Id. at 905. To determine whether the given use was permitted under the ordinance, this Court had to discern the definition of "single housekeeping unit," which was at the heart of the definition of "family." Id. at 906.

Examining cases from other jurisdictions, the Miller Court found that the focus was properly "on whether the unit functioned as a family unit, rather than on the respective relationships that existed between the members of the unit." Id. at 907 (citing City of Syracuse v. Snow , 123 Misc. 568, 205 N.Y.S. 785 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1924) ; Robertson v. Western Baptist Hospital , 267 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954) ; Boston-Edison Protective Ass'n v. Paulist Fathers , 306 Mich. 253, 10 N.W.2d 847 (1943) ). We agreed that whether the individuals living in the home were in fact related to each other was not dispositive of whether they were a "single housekeeping unit," and thus a "family." Instead, the Court stated that the analysis required was a "functional analysis" to determine whether the use of the residence was that of a family, citing cases from the Commonwealth Court that adhered to this principle. Id. at 907-08 (citing Children's Aid Society v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment , 44 Pa.Cmwlth. 123, 402 A.2d 1162 (1979) (use of a single family dwelling by a family with six foster children was a "family" even though not related "by blood, marriage or adoption" as required by the ordinance, as it was the functional equivalent of a "family"); Wengert v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Upper Merion Twp. , 51 Pa.Cmwlth. 79, 414 A.2d 148 (1980) (group home for foster children not permitted in residential district, as use was the functional equivalent of an institutional corrective setting, not a family dwelling) ).

Applying this "functional analysis" to the circumstances of the case before it, the Court in Miller observed that the individuals in question lived and cooked together; the activities and areas of the house were shared by everyone; all occupants had access to the entire house, including the single kitchen; meals were eaten together; and the group celebrated holidays together and attended social and religious functions together. Id. at 908. Further, the Court found that the use was not "transient," as "the residents usually remain substantial periods of time and move only for health reasons or personal preference."¹

Id. at 909. We therefore held that the use was permitted in the residential zoning district.

Nearly twenty years later, we decided Albert . We were faced with the question of whether the operation of a halfway house for recovering alcoholics and drug addicts was the functional equivalent of a single-family detached dwelling, a permitted use in the residential zoning district where the house was located. Albert , 854 A.2d at 402. The zoning ordinance in question did not define "family," and the Court therefore had to determine its meaning. Id. at 404. Observing that Miller 's definition of "single...