Sligh v. James Kirkwood

• Citation: 59 L.Ed. 835,35 S.Ct. 501,237 U.S. 52
• Decision Date: 05 April 1915
• Docket Number: No. 185,185
• Parties: S. J. SLIGH, Plff. in Err., v. JAMES A. KIRKWOOD, as Sheriff of Orange County, Florida
• Court: United States Supreme Court

237 U.S. 52

35 S.Ct. 501

59 L.Ed. 835

S. J. SLIGH, Plff. in Err.,

v JAMES A. KIRKWOOD, as Sheriff of Orange County, Florida.

No. 185.

Argued March 9 and 10, 1915.

Decided April 5, 1915.

Messrs. Charles B. Robinson and E. J. L'Engle for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 53 intentionally omitted] Mr. Charles B. Parkhill for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 54-56 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:

A statute of the state of Florida undertakes to make it unlawful for any one to sell, offer for sale, ship, or deliver for shipment, any citrus fruits which are immature or otherwise unfit for consumption.¹

Plaintiff in error, S. J. Sligh, was charged by information containing three counts in the criminal court of record in Orange county, Florida, with violation of this statute. One of the counts charged that Slight delivered to an agent of the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company, a common carrier, for shipment to Winecoff & Adams, Birmingham, Alabama, one car of oranges, which were citrus fruits, then and there immature and unfit for consumption. Upon petition for writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of Florida for Orange county, the court refused to order the release of Sligh, and remanded him to the custody of the sheriff. Upon writ of error to the supreme court of Florida, that judgment was affirmed (65 Fla. 123, 61 So. 185), and the case is brought here.

The single question is: Was it within the authority of the state of Florida to make it a criminal offense to deliver for shipment in interstate commerce citrus fruits,—oranges in this case,—then and there immature and unfit for consumption?

It will be observed that the oranges must not only be immature, but they must be in such condition as renders them unfit for consumption; that is, giving the words their ordinary signification, unfit to be used for food. Of course, fruits of this character, in that condition, may be deleterious to the public health, and, in the public interest, it may be highly desirable to prevent their shipment and sale. Not disputing this, the contention of the plaintiff in error is that the statute contravenes the Federal Constitution in that the legislature has undertaken to pass a law beyond the power of the state, because of the exclusive control of Congress over commerce among the states, under the Federal Constitution.

That Congress has the exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce is beyond question, and when that authority is exerted by the state, even in the just exercise of the police power, it may not interfere with the supreme authority of Congress over the subject; while this is true, this court from the beginning has recognized that there may be legitimate action by the state in the matter of local regulation, which the state may take until Congress exercises its authority upon the subject. This subject has been so frequently dealt with in decisions of this court that an extended review of the authorities is unnecessary. See the Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729.

While this proposition seems to be conceded, and the competency of the state to provide local measures in the interest of the safety and welfare of the people is not doubted, although such regulations incidentally and indirectly involve interstate commerce, the contention is that this statute is not a legitimate exercise of the police power, as it has the effect to protect the health of people in other states who may receive the fruits from Florida in a condition unfit for consumption; and however commendable it may be to protect the health of such foreign peoples, such purpose is not within the police power of the state.

The limitations upon the police power are hard to define and its far-reaching scope has been recognized in many decisions of this court. At an early day it was held to embrace every law or statute which concerns the whole or any part of the people, whether it related to their rights or duties, whether it respected them as men or citizens of the state, whether in their public or private relations, whether it related to the rights of persons or property of the public or any individual within the state. New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 139, 9 L. ed. 648, 662. The police power, in its broadest sense, includes all legislation and almost every function of civil government. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357. It is not subject to definite limitations, but is coextensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguards of public interest. Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518, 524, 42 L. ed. 260, 262, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 864. It embraces regulations designed to promote public convenience or the general prosperity or welfare, as well as those specifically intended to promote the public safety or the public health. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 592, 50 L. ed. 596, 609, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, 4 Ann. Cas. 1175. In one of the latest utterances of this court upon the subject, it was said: 'Whether it is a valid exercise of the police power is the question in the case, and that power we have defined, as far as it is capable of being defined by general words, a number of times. It is not susceptible of circumstantial precision. It extends, we have said, not only to regulations which promote the public health, morals, and safety, but to those which promote the public convenience or the general prosperity. . . . And further, 'It is the most essential of powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers of government." Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, 57 L. ed. 156, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1123, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 76, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 192.

The power of the state to prescribe regulations which shall prevent the production within its borders of impure foods, unfit for use, and such articles as would spread disease and pestilence, is well established. Such articles it has been declared by this court, are not the legitimate subject of trade or commerce, nor within the protection of the commerce clause of the Constitution. 'Such articles are not merchantable; they are not legitimate subjects of trade and commerce. They may be rightly outlawed as intrinsically and directly the immediate sources...