Sligh v. People
| Decision Date | 05 April 1882 |
| Citation | 48 Mich. 54,11 N.W. 782 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | SLIGH v. PEOPLE. |
The police court act of Grand Rapids provides that in case of the "absence, inability or disability" of the police judge the assistant justice may act in his place. Held that where a complaint was made before the judge and the depositions of witnesses were taken before the assistant, and the judge afterwards certified that defendants waived further examination and committed them for trial, the proceeding might be sustained, especially as a commitment may be made where examination is waived.
Witnesses in civil cases are not required by any constitutional rule to be produced in open court, and in equity the prevailing practice is against it, depositions being taken when witnesses cannot be present. But the constitution does not permit this to be done in criminal cases.
A verdict in a criminal case cannot properly rest on a mere preponderance of conflicting evidence, but should be based on proof that leaves no reasonable doubt of guilt.
The testimony of a witness in the trial of a criminal case, may be reproduced, if necessary, upon, a later trial, if the witness has meanwhile died; but it must be placed before the jury as nearly as possible as the witness would have placed it.
Stenographer's minutes of former testimony cannot be received to supply the testimony of an absent witness if they are not shown to be correct.
The refusal of specific requests to charge is not error if the charge given brings out the same points clearly and definitely.
Where defendants in a criminal case are charged as joint wrong-doers, the jury must be cautioned that the conviction of one is not to be considered in dealing with the other.
Where more than one person is concerned in the original guilty purpose of committing larceny from the person, all who are present, aiding and abetting, are principals. But one who afterwards receives the stolen property without being in anywise concerned in the original purpose, is guilty of the larceny alone.
Error to the superior court of Grand Rapids.
S.D. Clay and E.S. Eggleston, for plaintiff in error.
J.J Van Riper, for the people.
This case comes up on error from the superior court of Grand Rapids, where Sligh was convicted of larency from the person of one Leonard Tisdale, and sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison. He was jointly informed against with one Frank Jones, but tried separately. A motion to quash was made on the ground that the parties charged had never had any preliminary examination, and also because the witnesses on the examination as returned by the police justice of Grand Rapids were sworn before John W. Holcomb, the assistant police justice, while the commitment was made by John M Harris, the police justice. The complaint appears to have been made before Harris in February, 1880. The depositions all appear to have been taken in January, 1881, before Holcomb. But on the twenty-fifth of January, 1881, Harris certified that defendants waived further examination, and he committed them for trial.
Under the police court act of Grand Rapids the assistant justice is empowered to act in case of the "absence, inability or disability" of the police justice. Laws 1879, p. 70, � 12. By section 6 of the police court act, the "police court" is given exclusive jurisdiction of examinations. There is certainly some incongruity in having one justice act on depositions taken before another, but there is also difficulty under this statute in allowing one justice to act when the other is present and capable. We are inclined to think the examinations should be treated as properly conducted, although both took consecutive parts in it. But inasmuch as there was an express waiver of any further examination before the police judge himself, and inasmuch as a commitment may be made where examination is waived, the difficulty suggested does not seem to arise, and the objection cannot stand. On the trial the prosecuting attorney proposed to prove the death of Tisdale and to show by one Isaac Dement what Tisdale swore to on a former trial and also the statement of the respondent on that trial, and that he expected to contradict that statement by other witnesses. Respondent objected that the testimony was incompetent, and that he was entitled to be confronted with the witness in person. The objection was overruled.
Before any testimony was given, however, the witness was asked: "Will you tell this jury just what was said by Mr. Tisdale on direct and cross-examination, and the whole of it given on that trial?" To which the witness answered: "I cannot do it without I can read it from my notes taken on that trial." He was then allowed to read his stenographic notes with no further explanation. While the authorities are very much in conflict concerning the right to prove on a second criminal trial the testimony given by a deceased witness on a former trial, and with a good many dicta there are not many cases where the question can be said to have been decided by authority, yet we think the prevailing opinion is that this constitutes one of the exceptions to the rule requiring witnesses in such cases to be confronted with the prisoner before the trial jury.
The exception, if justified at all, can only be maintained on the ground of necessity, and to prevent a failure of justice. The cases which sustain it on the ground of necessity, aim to prevent a failure of justice. The cases which sustain it on the ground that the rules of civil and criminal evidence are identical, are not, in our opinion, correct. There is no constitutional rule requiring the production of witnesses in open court in civil cases. In equity cases the prevailing practice is against it. The practice has always allowed the depositions of absent witnesses to be taken on either side in civil controversies. It cannot be claimed that this could be done under our constitution in criminal cases. In the...
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