Sliman v. Aluminum Co. of America

• Decision Date: 24 November 1986
• Docket Number: No. 15883,15883
• Citation: 731 P.2d 1267,112 Idaho 277
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11,242 David SLIMAN and Carolyn Sliman, husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Respondents/Cross-Appellants, v. ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA, a Pennsylvania corporation, Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Respondent, and Seven-Up U.S.A., a Missouri corporation; Noel Canning Corporation, a foreign corporation; 7-Up Bottling Company of Twin Falls, Idaho, an Idaho corporation; Safeway Stores Incorporated, a Maryland corporation, Defendants.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 1267

731 P.2d 1267

112 Idaho 277, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11,242

David SLIMAN and Carolyn Sliman, husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Respondents/Cross-Appellants, v. ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA, a Pennsylvania corporation, Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Respondent, and Seven-Up U.S.A., a Missouri corporation; Noel Canning Corporation, a foreign corporation; 7-Up Bottling Company of Twin Falls, Idaho, an Idaho corporation; Safeway Stores Incorporated, a Maryland corporation, Defendants.

No. 15883.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Nov. 24, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 31, 1986.

Louis F. Racine, Jr. (argued), of Racine, Olson, Nye, Cooper & Budge, Pocatello, and Larry D. Ottaway (argued), G. David Ross, of Foliart, Huff, Ottaway & Caldwell, Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendant/appellant/cross-respondent.

Wilbur T. Nelson (argued), of Nelson, Westberg & McCabe, Chartered, and Joseph M. Imhoff, Jr., of Imhoff & Lynch, Boise, for plaintiffs/respondents/cross-appellants.

BISTLINE, Justice.

Plaintiff Carolyn Sliman suffered complete loss of sight in her left eye as a result of an aluminum twist-off cap having forcibly ejected from a 7-Up soft drink bottle. Plaintiffs sued the defendant-appellant Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA), Seven-Up U.S.A. Inc., Noel Canning (Seven-Up U.S.A.'s bottler), and various other defendants. After trial a jury found plaintiff Carolyn Sliman 25 percent at fault, defendant Seven-Up U.S.A. 45 percent at fault, ALCOA 30 percent at fault, and apportioned no fault to the rest of the defendants. The jury found the plaintiffs' damages to amount to $100,000 and further assessed punitive damages against defendant Seven-Up U.S.A. of $200,000 and against ALCOA $100,000. ALCOA appeals from that judgment. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 9, 1979 Carolyn Sliman prepared to open a two-liter plastic bottle of 7-Up. The bottle was capped with an aluminum twist-off closure with an aluminum band around its bottom known as a "pilfer-proof band." Neither the cap nor the bottle bore any warnings concerning the cap blowing off, or any instructions of how to remove the cap. Believing that the pilfer-proof band must be removed before removing the twist-off cap itself, she pulled at the band with a pair of pliers. At this point, the cap exploded from the bottle and struck her in the left eye. The impact caused permanent injury including the complete loss of sight in her eye.

Plaintiffs recount the following facts developed at trial:

1. ALCOA designed and presented to the industry the system for closure of soft drink bottles with aluminum caps.

2. ALCOA designed, patented, and marketed the closure involved in the instant accident, known as a "top side pilfer-proof closure."

3. From the beginning of its design, manufacture, and marketing of the caps ALCOA recognized a potential for forceful blow-off.

4. ALCOA increased the manufacture and marketing of these caps and of machines to apply the caps from 1967 to the date of the accident in 1979 despite receiving notification (generally by claims or lawsuits) of 229 injuries to consumers due to blow-offs of these caps. ALCOA was aware that the rate of injuries to consumers increased in proportion to the number of closures sold. ALCOA further was aware that the forceful blow-off of closures could occur for a variety of reasons, including misapplication of its caps by the bottlers, mishandling by consumers, and so-called "tail-end blow-offs" which could occur after usual and customary handling by consumers. ALCOA knew that premature blow-offs could never be entirely eliminated.

5. During the period from 1967-79, ALCOA made only one change in its specifications for threads on the manufactured bottles (called the "bottle finish"). This change did not reduce incidents of blow-offs or injuries to consumers.

6. From 1967 to 1979, ALCOA took no action to warn consumers or to recommend or require that soft drink franchisers or bottlers who purchased its product do so. Nor had ALCOA effectively modified its product or restricted or terminated its marketing.

7. As early as 1973 ALCOA's senior packaging engineer was aware of a proposed bottle finish which might prevent premature blow-off by use of vertical slots to safely vent carbon dioxide gas pressure before the cap was released. Nevertheless, ALCOA made no effort prior to the date of the accident to implement such a change in the bottle finish, even though plastic bottles of the type involved in this case were amenable to the new bottle finish and had been in use for at least two years prior to the accident.

ALCOA presents an additional set of facts:

1. At the time the cap left the possession of ALCOA, it was a cylindrical shell without threads and without defect.

2. The bottler applies the unthreaded shell to the bottle with a capping machine that creates a seal and a fit.

3. When the shell is properly applied, in the manner recommended by Seven-Up U.S.A. and ALCOA, the product can be opened safely.

4. In this case, there was no defect in the shell or other components of the soft drink package until Carolyn Sliman applied pliers to the cap.

5. In its agreement with its bottling companies, Seven-Up U.S.A. has strict and absolute control over all package shapes, components, labels, and graphics.

6. ALCOA never had possession or control of the beverage, bottle, or final soft drink package involved in the instant accident. Nor did ALCOA have any right or opportunity to direct the assembly or manufacturing process.

7. Prior to the instant accident, ALCOA advised Seven-Up U.S.A. and its bottling company that personal injury could result if a closure was improperly applied.

On appeal, ALCOA raises three issues which we now address.

II.

ALCOA initially contends that the case should not have been submitted to the jury, because ALCOA had no duty to warn Carolyn Sliman. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Bakes comprehensively discussed the standard of review appropriate to this issue:

Our task on appeal from a jury verdict is to determine if there was substantial, competent evidence to support the verdict. ... The substantial evidence test also applies to an appeal from a denial of a motion for judgment n.o.v. ... In reviewing the evidence, we must view it in a light most favorable to the respondent. ... Only when the findings of the trier of fact are clearly erroneous will the verdict be set aside. ... A finding of the trier of fact will be set aside only if there is no substantial evidence to support it.

Spanbauer v. J.R. Simplot Co., 107 Idaho 42, 44, 685 P.2d 271, 273 (1984) (citations omitted).

In the context of both negligence and strict liability, a supplier in some situations has the duty to warn of risks from its products. In an action based on negligence, this Court has held:

As a general rule, if any supplier, including the distributor, of a product knows or has reason to know that the product is likely to be unsafe when used for the purpose for which it is supplied, and has no reason to believe that the persons for whose use the product was supplied will realize its unsafe condition, then the supplier has a duty to exercise reasonable care adequately to warn them of the unsafe condition or of the facts which make the product likely to be dangerous.

Robinson v. Williamsen Idaho Equipment Co., 94 Idaho 819, 825, 498 P.2d 1292, 1298 (1973) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 388, 497) (footnote omitted).

This duty exists only where the manufacturer "knows or has reason to know the unsafe condition of the product when used for the purpose for which it was supplied." Id. at 826, 498 P.2d at 1299. The manufacturer is not absolved of its duty to warn if "the product might prove unsafe only to a few, foreseeable users." Id. "Even though a product is not inherently defective in design or manufacture, the supplier's duty to warn extends to risks of danger which arise during the known or foreseeable use of the product." Id. at 826-27, 498 P.2d at 1299-1300.

In the context of strict liability, "where the defendant has 'reason to anticipate that danger may result from a particular use' of his product and he fails to give adequate warnings of such a danger, 'a product sold without such warning is in a defective condition.' " Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 759, 519 P.2d 421, 428 (1974) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment h). As is apparent, there generally is little difference in the requirements and analysis of the duty to warn under either a negligence or strict liability theory, both of which the plaintiffs advanced. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374, 386 (1984) and cases cited therein; see generally, J. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.L.J. 825, 842 (1973). ¹

ALCOA contends that it had no duty to warn the ultimate purchaser of its product of the danger of the cap's blow-off. ALCOA bases its contention on two grounds. First, as the manufacturer of a component part in the ultimate product, ALCOA had no effective means to communicate such a warning directly to the ultimate purchaser. ALCOA did issue certain warnings concerning misapplication to the manufacturer, Seven-Up U.S.A., and to the bottler. Accordingly, argues ALCOA, the duty to warn rested exclusively with Seven-Up U.S.A., which controlled the labeling and which chose not to warn of blow-offs. Second, ALCOA had no duty to warn of risks which were not reasonably foreseeable. In ALCOA's view, Carolyn Sliman's manner of removing the cap was not reasonably foreseeable. We will address each of these grounds in turn.

The question of when a manufacturer of a component part has the duty to warn of risks associated with it is one of first impression before this Court. However, we take guidance from the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Texas, which addressed a similar question involving the same defendant in Alm v. Aluminum Company of America, 717 S.W.2d 588 (Te...