Sloan v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 20 December 1883
• Citation: 61 Md. 89
• Parties: DAVID SLOAN v. HENRY EDWARDS.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

61 Md. 89

DAVID SLOAN v. HENRY EDWARDS.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

December 20, 1883

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

First third, seventh and eighth exceptions stated in the opinion of the court.

Second Exception.--The plaintiff having stated that he had no means except from his own labor, was asked by his counsel, what family he had dependent on him for support, to which question the defendant objected, but the court (Lynch and Vinson JJ.,) overruled the objection and permitted the question to be asked. The defendant excepted.

Fourth Exception.--The plaintiff having rested, the defendant was called as a witness in his own behalf, and testified to the meeting between himself and the plaintiff, on the 19th of June, 1881, and stated that he had approached the plaintiff on that morning, to demand an explanation of a publication which Edwards (who was one of the firm of Edwards & Co.,) had caused to be published the day before in the newspaper printed at Lonaconing, where both parties then lived, which publication had greatly incensed and insulted the defendant who was a member of the firm of D. R. Sloan & Co., and which publication was offered in evidence without objection, and is as follows:

"What difference would it make to D. R. Sloan & Co. if Edwards & Co. has borrowed money; would they pay it? We have enough to do to attend to our own business, and if D. R. S. & Co. would do the same, they would, perhaps, be a little more respected.

Edwards & Co.

Lonaconing, Md., June 1, 1881."

The defendant then testified that he had not struck the plaintiff, but that after plaintiff had refused to give him any explanation, and had applied an abusive epithet to him, and raised his arm as if to strike defendant; he, the defendant, struck at plaintiff, but missed him, and that defendant then walked about eighteen or twenty feet, and lay down, and that then defendant walked away. The defendant's counsel then offered to ask him the following question: "Did you, or not, at the time this card appeared in the newspaper, know of any cause or reason for its publication?" to which question the plaintiff objected, and the court sustained said objection, and refused to allow said question to be asked. The defendant excepted.

Fifth Exception.--The defendant being still on the witness stand, his counsel offered to ask him the following question, viz., "At the time of this meeting between you and the plaintiff, had you, or not, any knowledge or information, except from the card itself, as to what it referred to, or meant?" to which question the plaintiff objected, and the court sustained the objection, and refused to permit such question to be asked. The defendant excepted.

Sixth Exception.--The defendant then called Dr. J. W. Williams, and amongst other things, offered to prove by him that on an occasion shortly before the encounter between plaintiff and defendant, he had seen the plaintiff have a fight or difficulty of some kind, with a party by the name of Hannon, and that on that occasion plaintiff had defiantly and publicly boasted of his strength and physical power, and of his skill as a pugilist; and offered to follow this up by proving that it had been communicated to the defendant before the encounter; but the plaintiff objected to said testimony, and the court sustained the objection, and refused to permit it to be given to the jury. The defendant excepted.

Ninth Exception.--The plaintiff offered the four following prayers:

1. That if the jury believe from the evidence in the cause that the defendant struck and beat the plaintiff and inflicted the injury upon him as detailed by the witnesses upon the stand produced for plaintiff, then in assessing their damages, they are to take into consideration the bodily suffering and pain of the plaintiff, his diminishing capacity to work and probable loss of health, his loss of time from the date of the assault until his restoration to health; if the jury find those facts to exist, his medical and other expenses, and they may take also into consideration the condition in life and pecuniary circumstances of the defendant.

2. That if the jury find from the evidence in the cause that the defendant inflicted the alleged injury upon the plaintiff, then, in estimating the damages, they are to consider not only the injury the plaintiff has sustained, but also the damages he is likely to sustain after this trial, as the natural consequence of said injury, and whether said injury is in its nature permanent, and how far it is calculated to disable the plaintiff from engaging in that occupation for which, in the absence of said injury, he would have been qualified, and the physical and mental suffering to which he was subjected by reason of said injury; and that the plaintiff is entitled to a fair and just compensation for the injury which he has thus sustained.

3. That if the jury believe from the evidence in the cause that the plaintiff was injured by the defendant as alleged by the plaintiff, and that the assault and battery was wanton, unprovoked and excessive in its nature, then they can inflict vindictive and punitive damages upon the defendant.

4. That the facts that the card offered in evidence in this cause, was published at the instance, or with the sanction of the plaintiff, and that said card, as published, was seen and read by the defendant, at or about six o'clock, p. m., on the Saturday preceding the Sunday on which the assault is alleged to have been made by the defendant on the plaintiff, do not constitute sufficient provocation for said assault to be considered by the jury in mitigation of damages in this cause.

And the defendant offered the twelve prayers following:

1. That if the jury find a verdict for the plaintiff, then, under the pleadings in this case, the damages to be considered by them are of two sorts-- compensatory and exemplary--the first being simple compensation for such injury as has been actually sustained by the plaintiff at the hands of the defendant on the occasion mentioned in the declaration, if any, and the second, such as may serve as an example to others, and to further instruct the jury that they cannot award any exemplary damages unless they shall find, from the evidence, that the defendant acted with malicious motives and intention, or under circumstances of outrage and wanton violence, nor can the jury award exemplary damages unless they find that there has been some injury sustained as aforesaid.

2. That if the jury find from the evidence that a collision occurred between the plaintiff and defendant, at the time mentioned in the declaration, but that the defendant inflicted no physical or bodily injury upon the plaintiff, then the jury are not to hold defendant responsible in damages for such injury, if any, as they may believe the plaintiff suffered by reason of fright, anger or any similar mental or nervous condition, on the occasion mentioned in the declaration.

3. That in estimating the damages in this case, if the jury find a verdict for the plaintiff, the possible or probable loss of a situation or appointment which they may believe the plaintiff now holds, is a damage too remote to be considered by them in making up their verdict.

4. That the jury are entitled to look into all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence, and at the conduct of both parties, and see where the blame is, and to determine whether any damages are due according to the way the parties conducted themselves on the occasion mentioned in the declaration.

5. That the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to make out his case, and to prove to their satisfaction by a preponderance of evidence that an assault was committed as charged in the declaration, and that the plaintiff sustained such damage thereby, as to entitle him to a verdict in his favor.

6. That under the pleadings in this case the plaintiff cannot recover damages for loss of time, if any, occasioned by the injury complained of, even if the jury find a verdict for the plaintiff.

7. That under the pleadings and evidence in this case, if the jury find a verdict for the plaintiff, they are not at liberty in estimating the damages, to take into consideration any injury done by the defendant to the plaintiff, except such as they may find from the evidence to consist of the actual striking, bruising and wounding of the plaintiff by the blows actually struck by the defendant, if any, and such injury as necessarily resulted from said blows.

8. That under the pleadings in this case, if the jury find a verdict for the plaintiff, they are not at liberty to take into consideration any continuing injury occasioned by the alleged assault, except down to the time of the bringing of this suit.

9. That even if the jury believe, from the evidence, that the defendant, on the 19th of June, 1881, assaulted and beat the plaintiff, and even if they believe that in said encounter the plaintiff was knocked down and his head injured, and even if the jury further believe that by means of said blow or blows and fall, and the injury received therefrom, the plaintiff was thrown into spasms, fits or convulsions of any nature, still the jury are not at liberty, under the pleadings in this cause, if they find a verdict for the plaintiff, to allow damages to the plaintiff, for or on account of such spasms, fits or convulsions.

10. That even if the jury believe, from the evidence, that the defendant, on the 19th of June, 1881, assaulted and beat the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was knocked down in said encounter, and in falling struck his head; and even if they further believe that by means of the blows inflicted by the defendant, or...