Sloan v. Hardee
Decision Date | 08 January 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 26242.,26242. |
Citation | 640 S.E.2d 457 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | Edward D. SLOAN, Jr., individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and the South Carolina Public Interest Foundation, Petitioner, v. John N. HARDEE, Robert W. Harrell, John Moultrie "Moot" Truluck, Respondents. |
James G. Carpenter, of Greenville, for Petitioner.
A. Camden Lewis, Keith M. Babcock, Ariail E. King, and Linda C. McDonald, all of Columbia, E. LeRoy Nettles, Sr., and Marian D. Nettles, of Lake City, Gedney M. Howe, III, of Charleston, Keith D. Munson, of Greenville, and S. Jahue Moore, of W. Columbia, for Respondents.
We accepted this matter in our original jurisdiction to address whether Respondents, Commissioners for the South Carolina Department of Transportation (DOT), were appointed in violation of S.C.Code Ann. § 57-1-330(A)(2006).
Hardee, Harrell and Truluck are DOT Commissioners. Hardee was appointed to a four-year term, to be served from February 18, 1998 to February 15, 2002. In June 2001, his legislative delegation re-elected him to serve a second term, from February 2002 until August 2002. Thereafter, in May 2002, his legislative delegation re-elected him to serve as DOT Commissioner from August 15, 2002 to August 15, 2006. In January 2005, Hardee was re-elected to serve from August 2006 until August 2010.
Harrell was elected in May 1999 to serve as DOT Commissioner from February 2000 until February 15, 2004. He has been re-elected to serve from February 15, 2004 through February 15, 2008.
Truluck was elected to serve his first term as DOT Commissioner from February 15, 1998 until February 15, 2002. He served in a hold-over capacity until May 15, 2002, at which time he was re-elected to serve from May 15, 2002 through May 15, 2006.
Petitioners, Sloan and the South Carolina Public Interest Foundation, instituted this complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, contending the Commissioners were serving in violation of SC Code Ann. §§ 57-1-320(B) and 57-1-330(A). We accepted the matter in our original jurisdiction.1
Title 57 of the South Carolina Code establishes the DOT and sets up transportation districts in accord with state congressional districts. S.C.Code Ann. § 57-1-310 (2006) requires the DOT Commission to be composed of one member from each transportation district elected by the delegations of each congressional district, and one at-large member appointed by the Governor. This section further requires that "[s]uch elections or appointment, as the case may be, shall take into account race and gender so as to represent, to the greatest extent possible, all segments of the population of the State." S.C.Code Ann. § 57-1-320 (2006), entitled, "County divided among two or more districts; consecutive terms limited; limit on commissioners from same county," states, in pertinent part:
(B) No county within a Department of Transportation district shall have a resident commission member for more than one consecutive term and in no event shall any two persons from the same county serve as a commission member simultaneously except as provided hereinafter.
(Emphasis supplied). Section 57-1-330 provides:
All commission members must serve for a term of office of four years which expires on February fifteenth of the appropriate year. Commissioners shall continue to serve until their successors are elected and qualify, provided that a commissioner may only serve in a hold over capacity for a period not to exceed six months.... No person is eligible to serve as a commission member who is not a resident of that district at the time of his appointment except that the at large commission member may be appointed from any county in the State regardless of whether another commissioner is serving from that county.
Sloan and the SC Public Interest Foundation contend Hardee, Harrell, and Truluck are serving in violation of the above provisions, as they are currently serving in a second or subsequent "consecutive term." We agree.
The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). When a statute's terms are clear and unambiguous on their face, there is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according to its literal meaning. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. City of Bennettsville, 314 S.C. 137, 139, 442 S.E.2d 177, 179 (1994). Words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. Bryant v. City of Charleston, 295 S.C. 408, 368 S.E.2d 899 (1988); State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 273, 403 S.E.2d 660, 662 (1991).
"Consecutive" is defined as "successive; succeeding one another in regular order; to follow in uninterrupted succession." Black's Law Dictionary, 276 (5th Ed. 1979). The plain and unambiguous meaning of the phrase "more than one consecutive term" is that a DOT commissioner may serve one term and may not serve a succeeding, consecutive term.
Respondents contend the term "consecutive," permits a commissioner to serve one term, consecutive to a first term such that the commissioners may actually serve two successive terms. We disagree. Such a construction would produce an absurd result, clearly not intended by the Legislature.
There are numerous statutes which permit certain commissioners or board members to serve "two consecutive terms." See e.g. S.C.Code Ann. § 1-13-40 ( ); S.C.Code Ann. § 1-15-10 ( ); S.C.Code Ann. § 40-61-20 ( ); S.C.Code Ann. § 44-7-180 ( ); S.C.Code Ann. § 55-11-320 ( ). To construe the phrase "consecutive" as meaning a...
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