Sloan v. United States

• Decision Date: 12 February 1923
• Docket Number: 5713.
• Citation: 287 F. 91
• Parties: SLOAN v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

287 F. 91

SLOAN v. UNITED STATES.

No. 5713.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

February 12, 1923

Chase Morsey, of St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiff in error.

Eustace C. Wheeler, Asst. U.S. Atty., of St. Louis, Mo. (James E Carroll, U.S. Atty., of St. Louis, Mo., on the brief), for the United States.

Before LEWIS, Circuit Judge, and TRIEBER and BOOTH, District Judges.

TRIEBER District Judge.

The defendant having been convicted on an indictment charging him with violation of the White Slave Traffic Act of June 25 1910 (Comp. St. Secs. 8812 to 8819), removed the case to this court on a writ of error, and upon a hearing the judgment of conviction was by this court affirmed. 279 F. 562. A motion for rehearing was granted.

The contention of counsel for plaintiff in error that transportation of a woman from one state to another for immoral purposes in an automobile is not a violation of the Mann Act of Congress of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 825 (8813 U.S.Comp.St. 1916), is untenable. There is nothing in section 2 of the act, which is the section he is charged with having violated, limiting the transportation to a common carrier, engaged in interstate commerce, as insisted on by counsel. The language of section 2 makes it an offense to 'transport or cause to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce any woman or girl for an immoral purpose ' Conveying a person in an automobile is as much transportation as if by rail, steamboat, stagecoach, or any other common carrier. The fact that sections 3 and 4 (Comp. St. Secs. 8814, 8815) limit the commission of acts of the accused to transportation by 'a common carrier in interstate commerce,' while section 2 of the act does not contain this limitation, is convincing that Congress did not intend to apply it to a violation of section 2. If defendant's contention is correct, the word 'transports' is meaningless, for the railway or other common carriers who transport the woman cannot be charged with transporting or causing her to be transported for immoral purposes, the act sought to be prohibited by this section of the act.

Did the court err in denying the defendant's request to direct a verdict of not guilty? The constitutionality of the act involved has been upheld as a proper exercise of the powers of Congress, solely under the commerce clause of the national Constitution (article 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3). Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320, 33 Sup.Ct. 281, 57 L.Ed. 523, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 906, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 905. Therefore, in order to constitute the offense charged, there must be substantial evidence that the intention to transport the woman for immoral purposes must have been formed by the parties before they reached the foreign state, to which the woman is being transported. If it did not exist then, but was only formed after reaching the state in which the immorality is committed, it is clearly insufficient to warrant a conviction under the act. The immoral act itself is exclusively within the police power of the state where it is committed. The mere fact that the journey from one state to another, if followed by such intercourse, when the journey was not for that purpose formed in the state from which the transportation was made, cannot be regarded as a violation within the meaning of the act. Van Pelt v. United States, 240 F. 346, 349, 153 C.C.A. 272, L.R.A. 1917E, 1135; Fisher v. United States, 266 F. 667, 670 (4th C.C.A.). The only evidence as to what took place in the state of Illinois concerning the trip to St. Louis in the state of Missouri, which is the basis of the indictment, is that of the woman Martha Jerden, hereinafter referred to as Martha, and the defendant.

A motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of all the evidence having been denied by the court, and proper exceptions saved, it is the duty of an appellate court, when reviewing the denial of such a motion, to give to the testimony of the prosecution the strongest probative effect and if there is any substantial testimony which would warrant a verdict of guilty, the denial of the motion will not be cause for reversal. Disregarding entirely the testimony of the defendant, and giving the testimony of Martha full effect, as the jury evidently did, does her evidence warrant a finding that the journey by the parties from...