Sloan v. Wilkins, 25933.

Decision Date28 January 2005
Docket NumberNo. 25933.,25933.
Citation362 S.C. 430,608 S.E.2d 579
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesEdward D. SLOAN, Jr., individually, and as a Citizen, Resident, Taxpayer and Registered Elector of South Carolina, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Petitioners, v. David H. WILKINS, in his officially capacity as Speaker of the S.C. House of Representatives, R. Andre Bauer in his official capacity as Lt. Governor and President of the S.C. Senate, and the State of South Carolina, Respondents. Glenn F. McConnell, in his capacity as President Pro Tempore of the South Carolina Senate, Intervenor.

James G. Carpenter and Jennifer J. Miller, both of the Carpenter Law Firm, P.C., of Greenville, for Petitioners.

Attorney General Henry D. McMaster, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Robert D. Cook, and Assistant Deputy Attorney General J. Emory Smith, Jr., all of Columbia, for Respondent State of South Carolina.

Michael R. Hitchcock, S. Phillip Lenski, Jennifer L. Parrish, all of Columbia, for Respondent State of South Carolina Senate and Intervenor.

Charles F. Reid, Robert R. Smith, II, Benjamin P. Mustain and Patrick G. Dennis, all of Columbia, for Respondent South Carolina House of Representatives.

Dwight F. Drake, William C. Hubbard, C. Mitchell Brown, all of Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, of Columbia,; and Keith D. Munson and Heather Ruth, both of Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, P.L.L.C., of Greenville, for Amicus Curiae.

Justice WALLER:

This matter is before us in our original jurisdiction to determine whether Act No. 187, 2004 Acts (the Act), violates the one subject requirement of Article III, section 17, of the South Carolina Constitution.1

FACTS

On March 17, 2004, the General Assembly enacted Act No. 187, 2004 Acts (commonly referred to as the Life Sciences Act). The Act is comprised of twenty-one separate sections, and includes a Life Sciences Act, the Venture Capital Investment Act, the South Carolina Research University Infrastructure Act, an act relating to Public Institutions of Higher Learning, and numerous other subjects as will be discussed below. In passing Act No. 187, the Legislature overrode the Governor's veto.2 Sloan filed a petition in this Court's original jurisdiction seeking a declaration that Act 187 violates Article III, § 17 (the one subject provision) of the South Carolina Constitution. We granted the petition.3

ISSUES
1. Does Sloan have standing to challenge Act No. 187?
2. Does Act No. 187 violate Article III, § 17 and, if so, are the offending provisions severable?
1. STANDING

Respondents assert Sloan is without standing to proceed with this action.4 We disagree.

As a general principle, a private individual may not invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative act unless the private individual can show that, as a result of that action, a direct injury has been sustained, or that there is immediate danger a direct injury will be sustained. Joytime Distribs. & Amusement Co., Inc. v. State, 338 S.C. 634, 639, 528 S.E.2d 647, 649-650 (1999). However, "the rule [of standing] is not an inflexible one." Thompson v. South Carolina Comm'n on Alcohol & Drug Abuse, 267 S.C. 463, 467, 229 S.E.2d 718, 719 (1976). Standing may be conferred upon a party "when an issue is of such public importance as to require its resolution for future guidance." Baird v. Charleston County, 333 S.C. 519, 531, 511 S.E.2d 69, 75 (1999). Recently, both this Court and the Court of Appeals have granted standing in cases of important public interest. See Sloan v. Sanford, 357 S.C. 431, 593 S.E.2d 470 (2004)

(standing to challenge governor's commission as an officer in the Air Force reserve); Sloan v. Greenville County, 356 S.C. 531, 548, 590 S.E.2d 338, 347 (Ct.App.2003) (standing to bring declaratory judgment action alleging county failed to comply with ordinances governing procurement of construction services on design-build public works projects).

In light of the great public importance of this matter, we find Sloan has standing to maintain this action.

2. ONE SUBJECT/ SEVERABILITY

Sloan asserts Act 187 violates the one subject requirement of Article III, section 17. We agree.

Act No. 187 contains the following provisions:

1. The Life Sciences Act (§§ 1-4) (§ 1 setting forth definitions, etc.; § 2 regarding Depreciation Allowances; § 3 providing for Economic Development Projects and Bonds;5 and § 4 reporting requirements)
2. The Venture Capital Investment Act (§§ 5-7)
3. Public Institutions of Higher Learning relating to bonuses for employees, fee waivers for students, grant positions and health insurance and, in particular, vesting public institutions of higher learning with the power of eminent domain (§ 8)
4. The South Carolina Research University Infrastructure Act (§ 9)
5. An Act defining Permanent Improvement Project (§ 10)
6. Use of funds by research universities (§ 11)
7. Creation of a Four-Year Culinary Curriculum Program at Trident Technical College (§ 12)
8. Authorization of a Four-year degree program at University of South Carolina-Sumter (§ 13)
9. A requirement of prior authorization for campus closing for USC (§ 14)
10. A requirement of annual reports of the number of out-of-state undergraduate students at any public institution of higher learning (§ 15) 11. Eligibility requirements for Life Scholarship recipients (§ 16) (and §§ 17-18 defining eligible institutions and grade point averages)
12. A Law School Feasibility Study for South Carolina State University (§ 19)
13. Section 20 (provisions not to be construed as an appropriation of funds)
14. Severability Clause (§ 21)

S.C. Constitution, Art. III, § 17 provides that "every Act or resolution having the force of law shall relate to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." The purpose of Article III, § 17 is (1) to apprise the members of the General Assembly of the contents of an act by reading the title, (2) prevent legislative log-rolling and (3) inform the people of the state of the matters with which the General Assembly concerns itself. South Carolina Public Svc. Authority v. Citizens and Southern Nat'l Bank, 300 S.C. 142, 386 S.E.2d 775 (1989). See also Keyserling v. Beasley, 322 S.C. 83, 470 S.E.2d 100 (1996)

. Article III, § 17 is to be liberally construed so as to uphold an Act if practicable. McCollum v. Snipes, 213 S.C. 254, 49 S.E.2d 12 (1948). Doubtful or close cases are to be resolved in favor of upholding an Act's validity. Alley v. Daniel, 153 S.C. 217, 150 S.E. 691 (1929). Article III, § 17 does not preclude the legislature from dealing with several branches of one general subject in a single act. It is complied with if the title of an act expresses a general subject and the body provides the means to facilitate accomplishment of the general purpose. Keyserling, supra. However, Article III, section 17 requires "the topics in the body of the act [be] kindred in nature and hav[e] a legitimate and natural association with the subject of the title," and that the title conveys "reasonable notice of the subject matter to the legislature and the public." Hercules, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 274 S.C. 137, 141, 262 S.E.2d 45, 47 (1980).

It is patent that the myriad provisions comprising Act 187 simply do not comprise one subject.6 On the contrary, the Act is teeming with subjects, from life sciences provisions to the establishment of a culinary arts institute. In our view, Act 187 is obviously violative of Article III, § 17. However, notwithstanding this violation, we must address whether portions of the Act may be read to express one subject and, if so, whether the offending provisions may be severed. We find that they may.

As noted previously, Section 21 of Act 187 contains a very detailed severability clause, as follows:

If any section, subsection, paragraph, subparagraph, sentence, clause, phrase, or word of this act is for any reason held to be unconstitutional or invalid, such holding shall not affect the constitutionality or validity of the remaining portions of this act, the General Assembly hereby declaring that it would have passed this act, and each and every section, subsection, paragraph, subparagraph, sentence, clause, phrase, and word thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one or more other sections, subsections, paragraphs, subparagraphs, sentences, clauses, phrases, or words hereof may be declared to be unconstitutional, invalid, or otherwise ineffective.

We recently addressed severability in Joytime Distribs. & Amusement Co. v. State, 338 S.C. 634, 649, 528 S.E.2d 647, 654 (1999), stating:

The test for severability is whether the constitutional portion of the statute remains complete in itself, wholly independent of that which is rejected, and is of such a character that it may fairly be presumed that the legislature would have passed it independent of that which conflicts with the constitution. "When the residue of an Act, sans that portion found to be unconstitutional, is capable of being executed in accordance with the Legislative intent, independent of the rejected portion, the Act as a whole should not be stricken as being in violation of a Constitutional Provision."

We find the offending portions of Act 187 are severable. From a reading of the entire Act, it is evident that its underlying purpose was to foster economic growth in this state through development of the life sciences industry. Accordingly, we find the "one subject" of the Act is that of life sciences. Further, we find several provisions of the Act are so intertwined with the provision and growth of the life sciences field that they can reasonably be deemed to fall within that subject.

The Life Sciences Act, section 1 of the Act, has the purpose of fostering economic development and encouraging the creation of high-paying jobs in the life sciences industry.7 Section 2 captioned "Depreciation Allowances," sets forth a 20%...

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