Slocum v. Devezin

Decision Date03 June 2013
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 12–1915.
Citation948 F.Supp.2d 661
PartiesJoy Walker SLOCUM v. Armand DEVEZIN, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Joy Walker Slocum, New Orleans, LA, pro se.

John Karl Etter, Rodney & Etter, LLC, New Orleans, LA, Veronica Jean Lam, Koerner Law Firm, Houma, LA, for Armand Devezin, et al.

ORDER AND REASONS

NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants Armand Devezin, Rosalynne Dennis, Darryl Kilbert, and Charlotte Matthew's (collectively, Defendants) Motion for Dismissal,1wherein Defendants seek the dismissal of Plaintiff Joy Walker Slocum's (Plaintiff) claims with prejudice. After considering the complaint, the pending motion, the memorandum in support, the opposition, the reply, the record, and the applicable law, the Court will grant the pending motion and dismiss Plaintiff's federal claims for religious discrimination with prejudice; and further, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any of Plaintiff's potential state law claims, and thus will dismiss those claims without prejudice.

I. Background
A. Factual Background

In August of 2008, Plaintiff was hired by the Orleans Parish School Board, and in September of 2011 she was assigned as a special education teacher at Ben Franklin Elementary School.2 Sometime between August 29, 2011 and September 2, 2011, Plaintiff spoke with her principal, Charlotte Matthew (“Matthew”) regarding her desire to observe her religious Sabbath from 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday until 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday each week.3 Plaintiff was absent from teaching on September 6, September 13, September 20, and September 27 of 2011 to either consult with her spiritual advisor or observe her Sabbath.4 Plaintiff claims to have submitted a written request for a reasonable accommodation for her religious observance to her principal, Matthew, on September 19, 2011. Plaintiff alleges that her request was granted on September 20, 2011 and September 27, 2011.5 However, on September 30, 2011, after a number of conversations and email correspondence, Plaintiff received a letter from the Executive Director of Human Resources, Armand Devezin (“Devezin”), denying her request for time off each week.6 On October 3, 2011, she also received a letter from the Superintendent, Darryl Kilbert (“Kilbert”), although Plaintiff claims the letter “never addresse[d] [her] Civil Rights for [her] religious practices as far as approving or disapproving [her] request.” 7

B. Procedural Background

On October 13, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination (“EEOC charge”) with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against the Orleans Parish School Board.8 After receiving a “right to sue” notice from the EEOC dated June 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Louisiana on July 24, 2012, which alleged religious discrimination by Defendants in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 but did not name the Orleans Parish School Board as a defendant.9 In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks: (1) a court order permitting Plaintiff to take off from work each week for her “Religious Sabbath period;” (2) “financial retribution for mental anguish of $50,000, since [she] was forced to go against [her] religious convictions;” (3) “to be free from any retaliation from [her] employer as a result of filing this case;” and (4) that her “children are free of any repercussions as a result of this case, since they are enrolled in schools governed by Orleans Parish School Board.” 10 On September 10, 2012, Defendantsfiled the instant motion to dismiss. 11 On October 4, 2012, Plaintiff requested additional time to respond to the pending motion, and the Court granted this request.12 After receiving an extension of time to respond, Plaintiff filed an opposition on November 29, 2012.13 On May 9, 2013, Defendants filed a reply. 14

II. Parties' Arguments

Defendants' move the Court for dismissal of all of Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), claiming that Plaintiff's complaint “does not allege sufficient facts to overcome Defendants' qualified immunity under federal and state law jurisprudence, and does not contain sufficient facts to state a cause of action for employment-related emotional distress.” 15 Defendants contend that [q]ualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” 16 However, Defendants suggest that [t]he court need never decide whether the plaintiff's claim ... in fact has merit,” because Plaintiff bears the burden to first show that the right allegedly violated was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation.17

Defendants argue that their conduct, as alleged in the Complaint, was objectively reasonable because Defendants' denial of plaintiff's request to not work on Tuesdays and report for work late every Wednesday are supported by and consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court, Fifth Circuit, and Eastern District of Louisiana decisions on employee requests for leave to observe the Sabbath.” 18 First, Defendants rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook,19 to claim that a school board is not required to accommodate a teacher's request to miss six school days per year to attend a religious holiday celebration, even where the teacher offered to pay the cost of a substitute,20 because such an accommodation is an “undue hardship” and would “result[ ] in more than a de minimis cost to the employer.” 21 Defendants also rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,22 where “an airline was not required to accommodate an employee whose religious beliefs prohibited the employee from working on Saturdays, where the employee worked in a maintenance shop that operated 24 hours a day, seven days a week.” 23 According to Defendants, the Supreme Court reasoned that it would be anomalous to conclude that “reasonable accommodation” required an employer to “deny the shift and job preferences of some employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or prefer the religiousneeds of others, and [the Court] conclude[d] that Title VII does not require an employer to go that far.” 24 Defendants also rely on two Fifth Circuit cases, Eversley v. MBank Dallas25 and Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital,26 where the employers were found to be subject to an “undue hardship” if an employee took time off from work every week to observe their Sabbaths.27 Therefore, Defendants contend that the potential impact of Plaintiff's requested weekly absences on the students in her special education classes imposes an undue hardship, and Defendants note that courts have found such considerations appropriate.28 As such, Defendants aver that they “are entitled to dismissal based on qualified immunity, because their decisions were consistent with U.S. Supreme Court, Fifth Circuit and Louisiana cases holding that Sabbath leaves during scheduled working hours impose an undue burden on schools and other employees.” 29

Next, Defendants interpret pro se Plaintiff's request for “financial retribution for mental anguish of $50,000 since I was forced to go against my religious convictions,” as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and contend that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state such a claim.30 Defendants claim that this Court should apply Louisiana law to determine if Plaintiff has stated a claim for emotional distress.31 According to Defendants, to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff must allege facts establishing: (1) that the conduct of the defendant was extreme and outrageous, (2) that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe; and (3) that the defendant desired to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that severe emotional distress would be certain or substantially certain to result from his conduct.” 32 Defendants aver that the complaint and its attachments do not allege any specific facts to support that: “1) defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous; 2) that Ms. Slocum suffered severe emotional distress; or 3) that defendants knew or should have known that their conduct would result in Ms. Slocum suffering emotional distress.” 33 Therefore, Defendants request dismissal of any Louisiana law monetary damages claims for mental anguish contained in the complaint.34

Finally, Defendants argue that they have qualified immunity from “tort liability for any state law claims pursuant to La. R.S. 17:1439.A,” 35 because the Complaint contains no allegations that Defendants' statements, acts, or omissions were not within the course and scope of their duties or was outside of [Orleans Parish School Board] guidelines.” 36

In opposition to the pending motion, and after receiving an extension of time to respond, Plaintiff requests that her case “not be dismissed because [her] supervisors have discriminated against [her] in violation of Title VII Of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in regard to religious discrimination,” and requests “the opportunity to plead [her] case before [the Court].” 37 This is the entirety of her response to the pending motion.

In reply, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has still failed to demonstrate that Defendants “acted contrary to clearly established law in denying Ms. Slocum's request to be absent from her position as a special education teacher on Tuesdays and Wednesday mornings every week.” 38 Defendants note that Plaintiff's opposition provides “no additional factual allegations regarding defendants' conduct, contain[s] no new legal argument and cite[s] no law contrary to the many U.S. Supreme Court, Fifth Circuit,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Brady v. St. John the Baptist Parish Council
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
    • 27 October 2014
    ...novel arguments on behalf of a pro se plaintiff in theabsence of meaningful, albeit imperfect, briefing." Slocum v. Devezin, 948 F. Supp. 2d 661, 667 (E.D. La. June 3, 2013) (quoting Jackson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2010 WL 724108, *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2010)) (internal quotation mark......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT