Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Yancey
| Decision Date | 17 January 1918 |
| Docket Number | 6 Div. 688 |
| Citation | 77 So. 726,201 Ala. 200 |
| Parties | SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO. v. YANCEY. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Hugh A. Locke, Judge.
Bill in equity to quiet title by G.W. Yancey, trustee, against the Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Company. Decree for plaintiff and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Tillman Bradley & Morrow, of Birmingham, for appellant.
London Yancey & Brower, of Birmingham, for appellee.
On July 25, 1913, the appellee filed a bill against the appellant to quiet the title to certain lands in Jefferson county. This bill conformed in all respects, it seems, to the directions of the statutes set forth in chapter 127 of the Code of 1907 (section 5443 et seq.) for the constitution of a proper bill in such cases. A trial by jury was demanded. Code, § 5446. On August 23, 1913, the respondent, appellant, filed its answer to the statutory bill, and propounded its claim of absolute title to the land described in the original bill. In reciting in its answer the chain of title upon which reliance was placed the respondent, appellant, referred to a deed conveying the land in question to its predecessor of date December 16, 1895, from William Reid and wife. On May 24, 1915, a paper was filed with the register which was addressed and captioned in these words:
As appears from dates, this paper was filed about 20 months after the respondent's answer to the original, statutory bill was filed. Following the caption quoted, the paper contained two paragraphs, numbered 6 and 7, and the prayer to be stated. The sixth paragraph alleged that the complainant was advised and believed, and upon such information and belief averred, that respondent claimed an interest or title to the property in question under and by virtue of the Reid deed, of date December 16, 1895. The seventh paragraph alleged that at the time said Reid and wife executed the deed of December 16, 1895, "were told by the respondent. that said conveyance included only the N.E. 1/4 of the S.E. 1/4 of section 21, and that the said William Reid and his wife did not read said conveyance, and did not sell or agree to sell" the property described in paragraph 2 of the original bill. The prayer therein was that said deed should be declared null and void in so far as it applied to property described in paragraph 2 of the original bill, and for "such other, further, and different relief as your complainant may be entitled to under the pleading and proof of this cause." It thus appears that the substance of the matter set forth in the paper filed May 24, 1915, was with a view to averting and avoiding that feature of the answer wherein the respondent set forth the deed of December 16, 1895, as a link in its chain of asserted title. 16 Cyc. pp. 341, 342. On May 26, 1915, two days after the filing of the paper just referred to the respondent, through its solicitor, filed demurrer, containing eight grounds, captioned in this language:
"Now comes the respondent, the Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Company, and after the amendment to the bill of complaint in the above cause files the following demurrers. ***"
Subsequently, presumably about March 23, 1917, it was "ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court that a jury be impaneled to try the proceedings at issue in this cause," and on March 23, 1917, the jury returned a verdict affirming that:
"The complainant is now and was at the time of the filing of this bill in this cause, in quiet and peaceful possession of property as described in bill of complaint."
As of the date March 27, 1917, the minute entry recites:
"This cause, coming on to be heard, was submitted for final decree upon the verdict rendered by the jury on the 23d day of March, 1917."
The following "final decree" was filed in office March 27, 1917:
In response to motion by the respondent to amend this decree nunc pro tunc by striking out the four words above italicized therein ("although having filed plea"), the court so amended the decree and struck those words therefrom, leaving the decree to affirm, in that particular connection, that "the respondent offering no proof." It is to be noted there is no recital in the minute entries, as disclosed by this record, that either the respondent or its solicitor was present when the jury was impaneled, when the testimony was taken, when the verdict of the jury was returned, or when the cause was submitted for final decree on March 23, 1917. It is to be further noted that nowhere in the final decree was account taken of any amendment of the original bill. On the
contrary, the allusions to initial pleading in the final decree appear to be to the original bill, without regard to any amendment of it. It is to be further noted that no decree pro confesso with respect to the matters averred in the paper filed May 24, 1915, was taken.
The subject-matter of the sixth and seventh paragraphs, together with the prayer borne by the paper filed May 24, 1915, may have, doubtless did, introduce confusion of equitable rights and remedies into the complainant's pleadings, provided the matter set forth in that paper became by amendment a part of complainant's bill; but, according to the analogy afforded by the decision of this court in Smith v. Gordon, 136 Ala. 495, 34 So. 838, it cannot be affirmed that a departure from the original cause would be wrought if the amendment was effective as such.
The appellant insists that error underlies the final decree for that the cause was not at issue at the...
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