Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Greer

• Decision Date: 26 May 1927
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 894
• Citation: 216 Ala. 267,113 So. 271
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO. v. GREER.

113 So. 271

216 Ala. 267

SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO. v. GREER.

6 Div. 894

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 26, 1927

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Lillie Greer, for compensation for the death of Richard Greer, employee opposed by the Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Company employer. Judgment for claimant, and the employer brings certiorari. Writ awarded, judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

Bradley Baldwin, All & White, S.M. Bronaugh, and W.M. Neal, all of Birmingham, for appellant.

Charlton & Charlton, of Birmingham, for appellee.

THOMAS J.

A jury trial was had under the statute on the issue of willful misconduct vel non for a special finding of fact. Section 7571, Code of 1293.

When a jury trial on the issue of willful misconduct is had under the Compensation Act, the verdict of the jury is "subject to the usual powers of the court and in this court as to verdicts rendered contrary to the evidence or the law." Cont. Gin Co. v. Eaton, 214 Ala. 224, 107 So. 209.

There were conflicting tendencies of the evidence presenting a jury question, as to the cause and manner of the injury and as the basis of the issue submitted for the special finding of fact. And the trial court will not be put in error for overruling the motion for a new trial if the finding was not contrary to great weight of evidence--that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding. Cobb v. Malone, 92 Ala. 630, 9 So. 738; McMillan v. Aiken, 205 Ala. 35, 40, 88 So. 135.

The willful misconduct of the employee being set up by the answer of the employer, the burden of proof as to this is upon this pleader. Such is the effect of the statute. Code of 1923, §§ 7534, 7544; Ex parte Little Cahaba Coal Co., 213 Ala. 244, 104 So. 422. And a jury trial was had as provided (section 7571, Code of 1923) upon this defense, that resulted in adverse finding to the employer. The verdict on the issue was as follows:

"We, the jury impaneled to try the issue of willful misconduct of Richard Greer, deceased, in a willful breach of a reasonable rule or regulation of defendant or the willful failure or refusal to use safety appliances provided by defendant, make a special finding of facts as follows: We find that said Richard Greer, deceased, did not willfully contribute to the cause of the accident that involves this issue. From the evidence, we do not find that he was sitting on the rail at any time, and regardless of the fact that, if he had been sitting there in violation of any rule of the defendant, that adequate safety appliances were not provided by the defendant, and therefore he was liable to injury at any time."

It was in form as provided by statute. Ex parte Woodward Iron Co., 212 Ala. 220, 102 So. 103.

This court has recently defined willful misconduct. It is more than a mere negligent, inadvertent, unconscious, or involuntary act or violation of a known reasonable rule or regulation of the employer. In Ex parte Woodward Iron Co., 212 Ala. 200, 102 So. 103, it is said:

"We think that the phrase 'willful misconduct,' as used in the act, includes all conscious or intentional violations of definite law or definitely prescribed rules of conduct, as to which obedience is not discretionary, as contradistinguished from inadvertent, unconscious, or involuntary violations thereof;" that "mere violation of rules, when not willful or intentional, is not 'willful misconduct' within the meaning of the law;" that "violations not willful were not intended to exclude the employee from the class entitled to compensation."

The trial court instructed the jury on this issue, and held, as a matter of law, that the defendant had a reasonable rule forbidding employees to sit upon the fence separating the platform in front of the ovens from the way or track on which the "hot car" ran. It is shown without contradiction that this rule was well known to the deceased, and that signs to that effect were conspicuously posted at intervals on that fence containing the words, "Danger--lookout for hot cars--remain inside of the rail."

The question now presented for decision is insisted not to have been decided in this state. It is whether the intentional act of an employee, in violation of a known reasonable rule, with full appreciation of what that violation involved, was a willful misconduct within the meaning of sections 7534, 7544 Code of the Compensation Act, or whether it was required that the specific intent to violate the rule be shown. These are general authorities to the effect that the conscious and intentional act was sufficient, without regard to the specific intent to violate the known reasonable rule. See G.W. P. Co. v....