Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Maxwell

• Decision Date: 17 March 1925
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 362
• Citation: 20 Ala.App. 588,104 So. 841
• Parties: SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO. v. MAXWELL.
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

104 So. 841

20 Ala.App. 588

SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO. v. MAXWELL.

6 Div. 362

Court of Appeals of Alabama

March 17, 1925

Rehearing Denied April 21, 1925

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; C.B. Smith, Judge.

Action for breach of contract by J.W. Maxwell against the Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Company. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Certiorari denied by Supreme Court in Ex parte Sloss-Sheffield Steel &amp Iron Company, 104 So. 843.

Bradley Baldwin, All & White, and T.A. McFarland, all of Birmingham for appellant.

Black, Harris & Foster, of Birmingham, for appellee.

RICE J.

This is an action by the appellee (plaintiff in the court below) against the appellant (defendant in the court below) for damages for a breach of contract. There were two counts in the complaint, each averring that a contract was entered into between plaintiff and defendant by which, in consideration of the collection by defendant of $1 a month from plaintiff's wages, defendant agreed to furnish the plaintiff with medical attention if he became sick while in its employment. There was verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

Appellant's counsel in their rather comprehensive brief filed on this appeal seem to misconceive the nature of the cause of action relied upon by the appellee. They cite, and appear to rely with some confidence upon, the case of Parsons v. Yolande Coal & Coke Co., 206 Ala. 642, 91 So. 493, the holding in which we do not think at all here applicable.

Neither count of the complaint in the instant case bases liability against the defendant on account of malpractice, negligence, or other wrongs of the doctor of the defendant. It is distinctly alleged in both counts of the complaint, and the evidence introduced by the plaintiff tends to show, that the plaintiff's cause of action as relied on was a contract alleged to be entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant whereby, for a valuable consideration paid to the defendant by way of a collection of $1 a month from plaintiff's wages, defendant agreed to furnish the plaintiff with medical attention if he became sick while employed by the defendant.

The evidence shows substantially that, after appellee began to work for appellant, some time about May, 1920, and perhaps before that time, he had been subject to occasional spells of rheumatism; that on or about September 1, 1920, he had a severe attack of rheumatism, and called the defendant's physician; that he was treated by the said physician up until about the latter part of April or the 1st of May, 1921. It was contended by the plaintiff, and he introduced evidence which had a tendency to show, that upon the occasion of his last treatment by the said physician at the time just next above mentioned he was told by the said physician to return (to the physician's office where the treatment was administered) in two or three weeks, but that he went back home and got to where he could not walk, and that he sent for the said physician, or sent word to him to come, more than once on or about May 23, 1921, and that as the result of the said physician's failing or refusing to furnish or administer to him further treatment during the said month of May, 1921, he suffered the injuries sued for.

The defendant contended that it was under no duty to furnish, through its said physician, any treatment to the plaintiff during the said month of May, 1921, by reason of the fact that the $1 per month which the plaintiff was due to pay under his contract had not been actually paid for the said month.

Appellant's first and second assignments of error challenge the correctness of the trial court's action in overruling its demurrers to counts one and two of the complaint. So far as we are able to see, there is no substantial variance between the allegations contained in each of the said counts and those contained in the count held valid by the Supreme Court in the case of Thomas v. Tenn. Coal Iron & R.R. Company, 178 Ala. 580, 59 So. 627. We therefore hold that there was no error in overruling appellant's demurrers to the complaint, or to either count thereof.

It seems to be generally recognized that, when an employer makes a valid contract with an employee to furnish medical attention in case of sickness or injury, and fails to do so, there is a liability on the part of the employer to the employee for the damages resulting from such failure. The principle has been fully recognized in at least two cases in our state; one a decision by our Supreme Court (Thomas v. T.C.I. & R.R. Co., supra), and the other decision by this court (Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Taylor, 16 Ala.App. 241, 77 So. 79), and the holding in each of the cases seems to be amply supported by authorities from other jurisdictions (Scanlon v. Galveston R.R. [[Tex.Civ.App.] 86 S.W. 930; Railway Co. v. Goodman [[Tex.Civ.App.] 189 S.W. 326; Galveston R. Co. v. Rubio [Tex.Civ.App.] 65 S.W. 1126; Morse v. Powers, 45 Vt. 300; Liliopoulus v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co., 87 Wash. 396, 151 P. 818; Gulf v. Harney [Tex.Civ.App.] 54 S.W. 791; Harding v. Ostrander, 64 Wash. 224, 116 P. 635; Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry Co., 262 Mo. 560, 172 S.W. 43, L.R.A.1915C, 789, Ann.Cas.1915D, note 509; Ry. Co. v. Hennegan, 33 Tex.Civ.App. 314, 76 S.W. 452; Jackson v. Milk Co., 61 Or. 158, 120 P. 1, 44 L.R.A.[N.S.] 757; So. Pac. Co. v. Mauldin, 19 Tex.Civ.App. 166, 46 S.W. 650; Kain v. Arizona Copper Co., 14 Ariz. 566, 133 P. 412, 37 L.R.A.[N.S.] 757; Am. Tin Plate Co. v. Guy, 25 Ind.App. 588, 58 N.E. 738; Ill. Cent. v. Gheen, 112 Ky. 695, 66 S.W. 639, 68 S.W. 1087).

The question decided in the case of Parsons v. Yolande Coal &amp Coke Co., supra, is not to be confused with this principle, and, while it may be true that there was a more or less ironical reference to the Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Taylor Case, supra, contained in the opinion by the learned justice writing for the Supreme Court in the Parsons Case, yet we do not apprehend and understand that...