Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Foote

• Decision Date: 10 May 1934
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 487.
• Citation: 155 So. 629,229 Ala. 189
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO. v. FOOTE.

155 So. 629

229 Ala. 189

SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO. v. FOOTE.

6 Div. 487.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 10, 1934

Rehearing Denied June 28, 1934.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Romaine Boyd, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by J. H. Foote against the Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Company, to recover compensation on account of injuries arising out of employment. Judgment awarding compensation, and the employer brings certiorari.

Writ granted; reversed and remanded.

Bradley Baldwin, All & White and W. M. Neal, all of Birmingham, for appellant.

Harsh Harsh & Hare, of Birmingham, for appellee.

BOULDIN Justice.

This is a workmen's compensation case.

Without dispute, there was no written notice of the accidental injury for which compensation is claimed as required by Code, §§ 7568, 7569.

The one question presented is whether the employer had "actual knowledge" of the injury, within the meaning of the law.

The trial court's finding of facts is in these words:

"Petitioner J. H. Foote, now 64 years of age, was employed by defendant on July 28, 1932, and for more than 30 years prior thereto as a carpenter and while engaged on the afternoon of July 26, 1932, repairing the floor of one of defendant's houses in Birmingham, Jefferson County, Alabama, some foreign substance was accidentally driven in his right eye. The following day he reported to the company surgeon and physician for treatment, and informed him of his eye being injured and the circumstances under which said injury was received. Petitioner had been instructed by defendant, and it was customary for defendant's employees, to report the fact of accidental injuries to said surgeon and physician, who customarily reported same to defendant-said surgeon and physician examined petitioner's eye and sent him for treatment to an eye specialist in said city.

"Petitioner accordingly reported to said specialist for treatment of said eye and was treated by him off and on until January, 1933, when he removed plaintiff's said eye."

It will be seen there is no express finding of actual knowledge, but we assume the trial court deemed the facts found to be equivalent thereto.

A bill of exceptions is presented setting out all the evidence. This is allowable where the court's finding is too general or omissive, or to show an entire want of evidence tending to prove an essential fact.

Without dispute, it appears the eye specialist had no connection with the employer in receiving or communicating notice or knowledge of injuries to employees. The trouble causing the loss of the eye was glaucoma, which may result from many causes. The only knowledge imputable to the employer in this case was that coming to the company physician, whose duty was to report same.

This physician denies any report of an accident to him; testifies he was under obligation to treat employees for ailments whether arising from accident or otherwise; that, not being an eye specialist, arrangements were made with one to treat such patients; that plaintiff merely reported to him that he had trouble with his eye. No record was made, as was his duty in accident cases, and no report made to the company.

We take it, however, that in course of examination the plaintiff did give evidence tending to show he gave verbal notice to the company physician that he "received a specified injury in the course of his employment on or about a specified time at or near a certain place specified." Code, § 7569. These are the essential facts of a...