Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Peinhardt
Decision Date | 14 March 1940 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 637. |
Citation | 199 So. 33,240 Ala. 207 |
Parties | SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO. v. PEINHARDT. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied April 11, 1940.
Further Rehearings Denied Oct. 17, and Nov. 12, 1940.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; C. B. Smith, Judge.
Action for damages to automobile truck resulting from collision between truck and train, by Fred W. Peinhardt against Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Court of Appeals under Code 1923, § 7326.
Reversed and remanded.
Kingman C. Shelburne and Bradley, Baldwin, All & White, all of Birmingham, for appellant.
Richard S. Riley and Coleman, Spain, Stewart & Davies, all of Birmingham, for appellee.
Counts of the complaint that went to the jury were the first and third counts of the complaint as last amended. To these counts there were interposed the plea of the general issue and some special pleas. The pleas that went to the jury other than the general issue, all set up contributory negligence on the part of Willingham, the employee of plaintiff, who was working for the plaintiff at the time of the alleged collision. A jury trial was had of the cause.
A motion for a new trial, verdict and judgment having been had in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, was overruled, to which ruling the defendant duly and legally excepted and prosecutes this appeal.
The first assignment of error is based on the refusal of the trial court to give the general affirmative charge requested in writing by defendant.
The rules governing the giving and refusing of the affirmative instruction are well understood and need not be repeated. McMillan v. Aiken, 205 Ala. 35, 40, 88 So. 135; Tobler v. Pioneer Min. & Mfg. Co., 166 Ala. 482, 52 So. 86; Dortch Baking Co. v. Schoel, Ala.Sup., 194 So. 807.
Certain undisputed facts are to be considered. The driver Willingham testified that he had good head lights and windshield wiper and "could see out in front;" that he "had seen this railroad on 25th Street before" and crossed over "on 25th Street before;" that it was drizzling rain and dark and the street was damp; that he did not hear a whistle or bell; that there was no crossing sign. The witness testified that the state highway was 26th Street and west of 25th Street; that he entered the city most of the time by 26th Street, traversed 26th Street two-thirds more times than he went over 25th Street and crossed over that railroad on 25th Street. Thus the driver knew the railroad crossings and knew also of the location of a street light on the corner.
The witness further testified of the locus in quo in reference to some map or drawing exhibited to him that he did not know there were any obstructions or houses on the other side of the street and that from the crossing 25th Street is straight for a block or two toward town; that he was not familiar with the street and had "never paid much attention to it;" that he "saw the light of another car coming on the other side of the railroad" crossing enough to realize it and that it shone in his windshield. That he "didn't know the railroad track was there and couldn't say how far it was back of the track going out of town" when he first saw the light of the other automobile, at which time "I was driving somewhere along fifteen or twenty miles an hour" and did not "hear a whistle or bell or see any light from the train," that as to whether there was anything to obstruct "my view from where I was over the railroad track and across up there I don't say there was after I passed the house." The witness further testified that it was level to the railroad track and that he came in contact with the tender of the engine, the first thing crossing the street; that he didn't have time to put on his brakes and didn't know positively whether he put his foot on the brakes or not; that it looked to him that the train was about a block away when it stopped, and that the headlight of the engine was on but there wasn't any light in the rear; that the train was going across the crossing at about the same speed he was going and the train hit "me and went on up to 26th Street before it stopped."
The witness further testified that he was an efficient automobile truck driver, his brakes were good that night and that he drove a ton and one-half Chevrolet Truck; that he didn't know exactly what distance it would take to stop when driving fifteen or twenty miles an hour after applying the brakes.
On redirect examination the witness further testified that he couldn't tell about when he made a trip over 25th Street before; that he saw the headlight on the engine after it was down there, that "the headlight was on the opposite end of the engine that was approaching me." That he was on the right hand side of the road near the curb and that he came from Cullman on 26th Street, crossing 25th Street on Fifth avenue down 26th Street to First Avenue and crossing over that to get down to the market. Such was his usual line of travel.
The witness Willingham, in his direct examination, stated as follows:
The testimony of this driver shows that before he entered upon the crossing, he had not observed the rule of "Stop, Look and Listen;" there were no obstructions to impair his view; the engine was backing across the crossing at 25th Street and the tender and a portion of the engine had cleared the crossing prior to the collision. The photographs in evidence show that a distance of about 200 feet from the crossing there was nothing to obstruct the driver's view. Yet, Willingham says he did not see the engine until just before the collision.
In Peters v. Southern Ry. Co., 135 Ala. 533, 33 So. 332, and Richards v. Sloss, Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 146 Ala. 254, 41 So. 288, it is held that notwithstanding the denials of the driver, if the established facts are to the contrary on the point at issue, such denial did not create a material conflict in the evidence which would require a submission of such facts to the jury. The rule of these cases was recently adverted to in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. James, 228 Ala. 383, 153 So. 759.
To the same effect is the ruling in Central of Georgia Ry. Co v. Graham, 220 Ala. 645, 647, 127 So. 213, 215, when the court declared: ...
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