Sluder v. The National Americans

• Decision Date: 07 July 1917
• Docket Number: 20,939
• Citation: 166 P. 482,101 Kan. 320
• Parties: ELIZABETH SLUDER, Appellee, v. THE NATIONAL AMERICANS, Appellant
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

166 P. 482

101 Kan. 320

ELIZABETH SLUDER, Appellee, v. THE NATIONAL AMERICANS, Appellant

No. 20,939

Supreme Court of Kansas

July 7, 1917

Decided July, 1917.

Appeal from Reno district court; FRANK F. PRIGG, judge.

Judgment affirmed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. FRATERNAL INSURANCE--Right of Insured to Change Beneficiary. A member of a fraternal beneficiary association may ordinarily change the beneficiary or the terms of his contract regardless of the wishes or the consent of his beneficiary, but if a change is attempted when the member does not have mental capacity to transact business or make contracts the original certificate and contract will remain in force.

2. SAME--Beneficiary May Raise the Question of Mental Capacity of Insured to Change Beneficiary. Upon the death of a member the inchoate right of a beneficiary ripens into a contract right and he may then raise the question that the member was mentally incompetent when he attempted to change or surrender the contract of insurance, and if that fact is established the beneficiary is entitled to recover the benefit the same as if no attempt had been made to change the original contract.

W. G Fairchild, H. S. Lewis, both of Hutchinson, and Solon T. Gilmore, of Kansas City, Mo., for the appellant.

C. M. Williams, and D. C. Martindell, both of Hutchinson, for the appellee.

OPINION

JOHNSTON, C. J.:

This was an action by Elizabeth Sluder against the National Americans, a fraternal beneficiary association, to recover installments due her as beneficiary under a certificate issued to her sister, Alvena Craig. Plaintiff recovered judgment upon the verdict of a jury and the defendant appeals.

The certificate provided that upon the death of Alvena Craig the beneficiary should receive an annuity of $ 200 for a period of ten years, payable quarterly beginning on the first month after the order was informed of the death of the insured. Shortly before her death Alvena Craig, who was then in the last stages of tuberculosis, wrote to the defendant asking that some arrangement be made whereby she might receive some benefit under the certificate if she would surrender it to the defendant. Accordingly a representative of the defendant called upon her and a contract was drawn up and signed by her which provided that in consideration of monthly payments of twenty dollars to be continued not to exceed twenty-four months she should surrender her certificate to the defendant and release it from all further liability; and it was further agreed that if her death should occur prior to the expiration of twenty-four months all liability of the defendant should cease at that time. The certificate was accordingly surrendered and one twenty-dollar payment was made under the contract and she died a month later. No further payments were made by the defendant under the certificate and when plaintiff notified defendant of the death of Alvena Craig it denied any liability to plaintiff. The only reason assigned for not recognizing its liability upon the certificate was the execution of the new contract and the payment made under it. In plaintiff's petition it was alleged that the contract was void because Alvena Craig was mentally incapable of understanding its terms at the time it was executed. There was also an allegation of fraud practiced by the defendant's representative upon the deceased, but this issue was eliminated by the trial court in its instructions to the jury. Testimony was offered to the effect that the deceased was given morphine at certain intervals during the day for a considerable time before she died which produced hallucinations and temporary mental derangement and that her mind was also affected by her disease and general condition. Defendant introduced no evidence. The findings of the jury were to the effect that deceased had hallucinations on the day the contract was made; that her mental condition was such as to render her incapable of understanding the contract; and that the condition was caused partly by the morphine. In accordance with the prayer of plaintiff's petition the certificate was adjudged to be in full force and effect and judgment was rendered in her favor for the amount then due under it.

It is insisted that the plaintiff had no such interest in the insurance as to warrant her in challenging the validity of the change in the contract, or the surrender of the original certificate....