Slusser v. Vantage Builders, Inc.

Decision Date20 May 2013
Docket NumberNo. 31,087.,31,087.
Citation306 P.3d 524
PartiesDiane SLUSSER, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. VANTAGE BUILDERS, INC., Defendant–Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeals of New Mexico

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Narvaez Law Firm, P.A., Martin R. Esquivel, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

Rammelkamp, Muehlenweg & Cordova, P.A., Shari L. Cordova, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

HANISEE, Judge.

{1} Diane Slusser (Plaintiff) appeals the district court's order of summary judgment based on the expiration of the statute of limitations and Plaintiff's failure to meet her burden of persuasion for an age discrimination claim. Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations should not have commenced until she knew or should have known that a younger person had replaced her as an employee of Vantage Builders, Inc. (Defendant). In the alternative, Plaintiff contends that the statute should have been equitably tolled until she knew or should have known she was replaced by a younger person because Defendant misled her regarding the reason for her termination. We conclude that the statute began to run upon Plaintiff's termination, the circumstances of this case did not require the district court to equitably toll the statute, and Defendant's actions were not grounds for applying equitable estoppel. Because the district court properly concluded that the statute of limitations expired on Plaintiff's claim, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} Defendant employed Plaintiff for four years, beginning in 2002. Plaintiff held a managerial position in Defendant's accounting department. In November 2005, Plaintiff received her last employee annual review, which indicated that she generally met or exceeded company expectations as to her work quality, knowledge of the job, adherence to policy, and initiative, but fell below expectations with regard to her work attitude. On February 16, 2006, Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment. The termination letter stated that Defendant was “restructuring the Accounting and Purchasing Departments. [Plaintiff's] role as Manager is no longer needed within the [c]ompany. Effective immediately your position has been eliminated.” Plaintiff was forty-one years old at the time of her termination.

{3} In December 2006, almost ten months following her termination, Plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit under the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA), alleging that Defendant had improperly classified her as an exempt employee, failing to pay her the overtime that she had earned. Although that unsuccessful lawsuit is not at issue in this case, depositions taken during the FLSA suit led Plaintiff to file the complaint associated with the present appeal. Specifically, in the June 2007 deposition of her former supervisor, Scott Porter, Porter stated that Plaintiff's termination was performance related. When asked why the termination letter did not mention Plaintiff's deficient performance, Porter stated, “I personally like [Plaintiff] and I did not want to jeopardize anything as far as her being able to find another job.” From that deposition and from two ensuing depositions of employees who continued to work for Defendant after Plaintiff's departure, Plaintiff learned that a younger woman in her twenties named Karie Trahan, who was paid substantially less than Plaintiff, assumed some of Plaintiff's responsibilities after her termination. Plaintiff stated that Trahan “was also assigned ... Plaintiff's position as ‘Assistant Controller’ [and] .... had the same roles and performed the same job” as Plaintiff.

{4} On October 15, 2007, twenty months following her termination, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination under the New Mexico Human Rights Act with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging:

In February, 2006 I was laid off. On June 26, 2007, I discovered that a younger female in her [twenties] was placed in my position.... I believe that I have been discriminated against because of my age (41 at the time of the incident) in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. I believe that I have been retaliated against for complaining.

SeeNMSA 1978, § 28–1–7(A) (2004) (stating that under New Mexico's Human Rights Act, it is an unlawful discriminatory employment practice to discharge a person based on age); NMSA 1978, § 28–1–10 (2005) (stating the grievance procedure for Human Rights Act violations); Sabella v. Manor Care, Inc., 1996–NMSC–014, ¶¶ 12–13, 121 N.M. 596, 915 P.2d 901 (stating that the initial grievancecan be filed with and pursued through either the EEOC or New Mexico Human Rights Division). Plaintiff's case subsequently proceeded to district court, where Defendant made the motion for summary judgment at issue in this appeal, arguing that the claim was time-barred and asserting that Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of persuasion. The district court granted summary judgment on both grounds. Plaintiff now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

{5} Plaintiff asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment based on its conclusion that the statute of limitations unequivocally expired 300 days after Plaintiff was terminated from employment. See§ 28–1–10(A) (“All complaints shall be filed ... within three hundred days after the alleged act was committed.”). Plaintiff contends that the statute of limitations should only begin to run when she knows or should know that the employer's adverse action was discriminatory. Plaintiff also argues that the statute of limitations should have been equitably tolled because Defendant acted in a deceptive manner by concealing the reason for her termination.

{6} “In a motion for summary judgment, the party claiming that a statute of limitation should be tolled has the burden of alleging sufficient facts that if proven would toll the statute.” Ocana v. Am. Furniture Co., 2004–NMSC–018, ¶ 12, 135 N.M. 539, 91 P.3d 58 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Upon [the defendant] making [a] prima facie showing [that the statute of limitations ran], the burden then shifted to [the] claimant, who was required to show at least a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a genuine factual issue on tolling of the statute.” Hutcherson v. Dawn Trucking Co., 107 N.M. 358, 360, 758 P.2d 308, 310 (Ct.App.1988)overruled on other grounds by Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep't, 2013–NMSC–013, ¶ 27, ––– P.3d ––––, 2013 WL 1482949 (2013). “The determination of whether a claim is timely filed is a question of fact, and only becomes a question of law when there is no factual dispute.” Ocana, 2004–NMSC–018, ¶ 12, 135 N.M. 539, 91 P.3d 58. “Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998–NMSC–046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582. We review ... legal questions de novo.” Id.

{7} At the outset, we clarify three principles at play in Plaintiff's arguments regarding the statute of limitations: the discovery rule, equitable tolling, and equitable estoppel. The discovery rule dictates when the statute of limitations begins to run in a case. Gerke v. Romero, 2010–NMCA–060, ¶ 10, 148 N.M. 367, 237 P.3d 111. Equitable tolling, on the other hand, operates to suspend the statute of limitations in situations where circumstances beyond a plaintiff's control prevented the plaintiff from filing in a timely manner. Ocana, 2004–NMSC–018, ¶ 15, 135 N.M. 539, 91 P.3d 58. Lastly, equitable estoppel bars a defendant from raising the statute of limitations defense when the defendant actively prevents the plaintiff from filing within the period of limitation. Tomlinson v. George, 2005–NMSC–020, ¶ 13, 138 N.M. 34, 116 P.3d 105. We address each of Plaintiff's arguments in turn within the context of these principles.

A. The Statute of Limitations Ran From the Date of the Adverse Employment Action

{8} Plaintiff first argues that she filed within the statute of limitations because the statute should have commenced when she knew or should have known that the termination was motivated by discrimination. [U]nder the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins when the plaintiff acquires [or with reasonable diligence should have acquired] knowledge of facts, conditions, or circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to make an inquiry leading to the discovery of the concealed cause of action.” Gerke, 2010–NMCA–060, ¶ 10, 148 N.M. 367, 237 P.3d 111 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Williams v. Stewart, 2005–NMCA–061, ¶ 12, 137 N.M. 420, 112 P.3d 281 (stating that [t]he discovery rule provides that the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or with reasonable diligenceshould have discovered that a claim exists” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “The key consideration under the discovery rule is the factual, not the legal, basis for the cause of action. The action accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know the relevant facts, whether or not the plaintiff also knows that these facts are enough to establish a legal cause of action.” Christus St. Vincent Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Duarte–Afara, 2011–NMCA–112, ¶ 29, 267 P.3d 70 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. quashed,2012–NMCERT–005, 294 P.3d 447. With regard to the discovery rule, our case law thus plainly differentiates between discovering the existence of predicate facts to a cause of action and discerning the theory of law under which to proceed.

{9} There are two divergent applications of the discovery rule specific to age discrimination cases that assign differing values to a plaintiff's knowledge of his or her employer's discriminatory motive. Under the minority rule, “the limitations period does not start to run until the employee knows or should know that he or she has been or will be replaced by a person outside the protected age group.” Wheatley v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 418 Mass. 394, 636 N.E.2d 265, 268 (1994); see also Henry v. N.J. Dep't...

To continue reading

Request your trial
36 cases
  • Mormann v. Iowa Workforce Dev.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 15 Junio 2018
    ...United States , 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ; Weaver v. Firestone , 155 So.3d 952, 957 (Ala. 2013) ; Slusser v. Vantage Builders, Inc. , 306 P.3d 524, 531 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) ; In re Bonds , 165 Wash.2d 135, 196 P.3d 672, 677 (2008) (en banc).2. Overview of discovery rule. If there ......
  • JL ex rel. Thompson v. N.M. Dep't of Health
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
    • 24 Febrero 2016
    ...the attorneys who now represent Plaintiffs filed a complaint on behalf of a group of similarly-situated plaintiffs. See Slusser, 306 P.3d 524, 528 (N.M.Ct.App.2013) (explaining that the statute begins to run only when the plaintiff acquires, or with reasonable diligence should have acquired......
  • Herrera v. City of Espanola
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 27 Abril 2022
    ...claims timely. Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., Inc. , 627 F.2d 1036, 1041 n.4 (10th Cir. 1980) ; see also Slusser v. Vantage Builders, Inc. , 306 P.3d 524, 531–32 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (placing burden on plaintiff seeking to toll statute of limitations). In an effort to satisfy their burden, Ap......
  • Metz v. E. Associated Coal, LLC
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • 6 Abril 2017
    ...employer's unlawful motive does not delay the commencement of the statutory limitations period").Recently, in Slusser v. Vantage Builders, Inc. , 306 P.3d 524 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013), the appellate court recognized as the majority rule among the federal circuits and state courts that in age-ba......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT