Smalis v. City of Pittsburgh Sch. Dist.
Decision Date | 25 August 2016 |
Docket Number | 16cv0693 |
Citation | 556 B.R. 703 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Parties | Ernest Smalis, Appellant, v. City of Pittsburgh School District, Allegheny County Board of Property Assessment Appeals & Review, City of Pittsburgh Law Department and Allegheny County Law Department, Appellees. |
Ernest Smalis, Pittsburgh, PA, pro se.
M. J. Burkardt, Weiss Burkardt Kramer, David J. Montgomery, Montgomery Law Firm LLC, Adam S. Rosenthal, City of Pittsburgh Department of Law, Lee M. Dellecker, Allegheny County Law Department, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellees.
Arthur J. Schwab
, United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM ORDERBefore the Court is an appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania filed by pro se Appellant, Ernest Smalis (hereafter, “Smalis”). See Doc. No.1. Smalis, the former spouse of Debtor Despina Smalis (hereafter, “Debtor”), initiated Adversary Action No. 15–2182 against the City of Pittsburgh School District, the Allegheny County Board of Property Assessment Appeals & Review, the City of Pittsburgh Law Department, and the Allegheny County Law Department (collectively, “Appellees”) for recoupment of certain real estate taxes and to redress the alleged violation of his federal due process rights. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the adversary action on April 25, 2016 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Smalis then filed a motion for reconsideration, followed by a motion to strike the April 25 Order of dismissal. The Bankruptcy Court denied these motions on May 11 and May 19, 2016, respectively.
This appeal followed. For the reasons set forth below, this Court will affirm the April 25, May 11, and May 19, 2016 Orders of the Bankruptcy Court.
This Court has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)
. A district court sits as an appellate court in bankruptcy proceedings. In re Michael , 699 F.3d 305, 308 n. 2 (3d Cir.2012) ; see also
In re Professional Management , 285 F.3d 268 (3d Cir.2002) ( ).
On appeal from a final order entered by a bankruptcy court, the district court applies the following standards of review:
First, the court reviews a bankruptcy court's findings of fact under a “clearly erroneous” standard. See Am. Flint Glass Workers Union v. Anchor Resolution Corp. , 197 F.3d 76, 80 (3d Cir.1999)
. A factual finding is “clearly erroneous” if the reviewing court is “left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re W.R. Grace & Co. , 729 F.3d 311, 319, n. 14 (3d Cir.2013) ; see also
Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp. , 423 F.3d 184, 201 (3d Cir.2005). Under this standard, the reviewing court must “accept ultimate factual determinations of the factfinder “unless that determination is either (1) completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility or (2) bears no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.” DiFederico v. Rolm Co. , 201 F.3d 200, 208 (3d Cir.2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Second, the court exercises plenary, or de novo , review over any legal conclusions reached by the bankruptcy court. In re Ruitenberg , 745 F.3d 647, 650 (3d Cir.2014)
; see also
Am. Flint Glass Workers , 197 F.3d at 80.
Third, if a bankruptcy court's decision is a mixed question of law and fact, the district court must break down the determination and apply the appropriate standard of review to each. In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp. , 326 F.3d 383, 387 (3d Cir.2003)
. The court should “apply a clearly erroneous standard to integral facts, but exercise plenary review of the [bankruptcy] court's interpretation and application of those facts to legal precepts.” In re Nortel Networks, Inc. , 669 F.3d 128, 137 (3d Cir.2011) (citation omitted).
Fourth, a bankruptcy court's exercise of discretion is reviewed for abuse. In re Friedman's Inc. , 738 F.3d 547, 552 (3d Cir.2013)
. A bankruptcy court abuses its discretion when its ruling rests upon an error of law or a misapplication of law to the facts. In re O'Brien Environmental Energy, Inc. , 188 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir.1999).
Pertinent aspects of the underlying bankruptcy proceedings were aptly summarized as follows by the Bankruptcy Court in its April 25, 2016 Memorandum Opinion:
Doc. No. 1-10 at pp. 2-4 (internal footnotes omitted).
The instant adversarial proceeding arises from Smalis' complaint that, during the time period 2000 to 2009, while Smalis was serving a prison sentence, the relevant taxing authorities failed to send him assessment notices for the Boulevard of the Allies Property and the Liberty Avenue Property and thereby denied him an opportunity to challenge those assessments as provided by Pennsylvania law. (See Doc. No. 3 at p.10 of 28; see also Doc. Nos. 3–2 and 3–3. The record shows that, upon his release from prison in 2010, Smalis successfully challenged the assessment of the Liberty Avenue Property relative to tax year 2010. See Doc. 3-5. Smalis then attempted, unsuccessfully, to challenge the assessment for the years 2000 through 2009, nunc pro tunc. The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas denied his request, and the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed on the ground that Smalis had failed to act with reasonable diligence. See Smalis v. Allegheny Cty. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, No. 74 C.D. 2012, 2013 WL 3946234, at *3 (Pa.Commw.Ct. Feb. 22, 2013)
. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently denied allocatur. See
Smalis did not pursue his Pennsylvania action further by attempting to appeal the denial of allocatur to the United States Supreme Court. Instead, he filed a civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in which he alleged that the taxing authorities violated his equal protection and due process rights by failing to give him notice of the tax assessments. See Smalis v. Allegheny Cty. Bd. of Property Assessment, Appeal & Review, et al . , Case No. 13–1646, 2014 WL 2039964
(. ) On consideration of the defendants' various motions to dismiss, Magistrate Judge Kelly dismissed the case for lack of subject...
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