Small v. Champeny

• Decision Date: 31 January 1899
• Citation: 102 Wis. 61,78 N.W. 407
• Parties: SMALL v. CHAMPENY.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

102 Wis. 61

78 N.W. 407

SMALL

v.CHAMPENY.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Jan. 31, 1899.

Syllabus by the Judge.

1. An adjudication of mental unsoundness per se is evidence only of the mental condition of the subject at the time of such adjudication, and thereafter upon the theory that a condition of mind once shown to exist is presumed to continue.

2. An instruction that an adjudication of mental unsoundness may relate back presumptively to a prior date, as evidence of the mental condition at such date, held error.

3. When the condition of mind of a person is shown to have been the same for a considerable period of time, an adjudication as to such condition at one date during the period is competent evidence when the act claimed to have been affected by such condition occurred at a prior date, upon the theory that it is reasonable to say that appearances determined at one time during the period to indicate insanity or incompetency, indicate the same at other times during such period, whether before or subsequent to the adjudication.

4. The admissions of an alleged defrauded party made long after the act sought to be avoided for fraud occurred, are not admissible as evidence to affect the title to property involved.

5. The giving of an instruction on a material point, susceptible of two constructions, one that condemns it and one that does not, where the jury may have adopted either construction, is reversible error.

6. In the submission to a jury of a cause of action predicated on circumstances which in law raise a presumption of fraud or undue influence, it is improper to say that the burden of proof is on the person charged, to disprove it. The true rule is that when circumstances are established from which, as a matter of law, a presumption of fraud or undue influence arises, then the burden of proof is on the party charged with being guilty thereof to show that he is innocent and that the alleged defrauded party acted voluntarily and of his own free will.

Appeal from circuit court, Waukesha county; James J. Dick, Judge.

Action by John R. Small, administrator of the estate of William Champeny, against Margaret Champeny. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

Action of replevin brought in the lifetime of William Champeny by his guardian to recover certain promissory notes claimed to have been obtained from him by the defendant by means of fraud and undue influence, before he was placed under guardianship. The guardian was appointed by reason of the old age and incompetency of Champeny to do business and take care of his property. The ward died before the action was brought. It was revived in the name of the administrator and was thereafter tried, the verdict and judgment being for the plaintiff. Defendant appealed.D. J. Hemlock and O'Connor, Hammel & Schmitz, for appellant.

Ryan & Merton, for respondent.

MARSHALL, J.

The right of plaintiff to recover depended on whether the deceased, William Champeny, was competent to transact his business at the time he parted with the property in controversy to the defendant. About 4 1/2 months after the transaction, there was an inquest before the county judge as to Champeny's mental condition. Such inquest was had on an application for the appointment of a guardian. As a part of the proceedings, Champeny's testimony was taken, and among other things he testified at length as to his business relations with the defendant, particularly in regard to the property in controversy in this case. The result of the inquest was that Champeny was adjudged incompetent to attend to his business affairs, and a guardian for him was accordingly appointed. The evidence of Champeny on the hearing and adjudication which followed, were, against defendant's objections, admitted as evidence for plaintiff on the trial in question, and that is assigned as error on this appeal.

The general rule is, that an adjudication as to mental soundness is direct evidence of the fact at the time of the adjudication, and presumptive evidence of the condition of the subject at a subsequent time, upon the theory that a condition of mind once shown to exist is presumed to continue. It is not evidence of itself of the mental soundness of the subject at any time prior to the adjudication. In the absence of independent evidence showing that the same condition of mind existed at the prior time as at the time of the adjudication and had been continuous in the meantime, it is not admissible at all in a controversy as to such conditionat such prior time. That is the state of the law as laid down in previous adjudications of this court, and no reason is perceived for departing from it. Such is the law also according to standard text writers and courts generally. It is often said, as in Burnham v. Mitchell, 34 Wis. 117, that an adjudication of insanity is not evidence of the condition of the person to whom it relates prior to its date. That is perfectly consistent with what has been said. True, it is said in Giles v. Hodge, 74 Wis. 360, 43 N. W. 163, that the result of the adjudication in Burnham v. Mitchell, was introduced to prove mental capacity reaching back many years, but the court did not say, certainly did not intend to say, that such evidence was proper per se. The admission of the evidence there was held not prejudicial because the court, by the charge, expressly limited its effect to the time when the adjudication was made. The evidence was likewise limited in Giles v. Hodge, the court saying, in substance, that the adjudication, though some days after the filing of the petition, was expressly of the date of the petition, and on such date the deeds were made the validity of which was challenged because of the incompetency of Giles to make them. The court said there is no doubt of the general principle that the adjudication cannot relate back to a prior time as evidence of incapacity, but when it is shown that the mental condition had been the same for a considerable length of time and was the same at the time of the act to be affected by it as when the adjudication was had, the adjudication is competent evidence. Although that was not strictly necessary to the decision of the case, because, as indicated, the court held that the adjudication, by its terms, included the very day on which the act, affected by the alleged insanity, took place, yet on the theory of the party challenging the competency of the adjudication as evidence, that is, that the transaction which was the subject of controversy took place a few days prior to such adjudication, the admissibility of it in connection with other evidence was a proper subject for discussion and decision. So what was said in that line must be considered the correct rule of law according to the deliberate judgment of this court then expressed, till some contra declaration shall have been made, and no reason is perceived now for departing from that rule. As before stated, however, that does not militate at all against the principle that such an adjudication, of itself, is not evidence of the condition of the party affected by it at any prior time. It tends that way only when the condition of the person is shown to have been the same for a considerable period of time, including the prior date and the adjudication. Then a decree of mental incompetency at one date during the period is evidence tending to show that the circumstances which indicated insanity at one time, indicated the same at other times during such period. That appeals to our reason and common sense as to what ought to be the law, and the decisions of courts elsewhere support it, as indicated in the citations found in the opinion in Giles v. Hodge, supra. In Ashcraft v. De Armond, 44 Iowa, 229, the mental condition of the subject was shown for a period of many...