Small v. Pangle
| Decision Date | 24 March 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 46725,46725 |
| Citation | Small v. Pangle, 328 N.E.2d 285, 60 Ill.2d 510 (Ill. 1975) |
| Parties | Len H. SMALL et al., Trustees, Appellees, v. Charles L. PANGLE, County Treasurer, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
The basic issue presented is whether the property is exempt from taxation under section 6 of article IX of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, S.H.A., and under the provisions of section 19.7 of the Revenue Act of 1939, as amended, which implements the constitutional provision.Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 120, par. 500.7.
The plaintiffs are trustees of a charitable trust.The trust owns and operates an old people's home called the Heritage House, which was constructed in 1970.Its value was set at about $1,155,000.Initial furnishing costs totaled approximately $100,000.Roughly $850,000 of the initial construction and furnishing costs were provided from the trust fund.The balance of the funds came from a first mortgage in the amount of $400,000.Since then additional junior mortgages, totaling $160,000 have been taken out, and a total of approximately $40,000 has been paid off against all of the mortgages.
As of the end of 1972, the trust for the operation of the Heritage House had $57,000 in current assets and $1,342,000 in property and equipment, after depreciation.Liabilities totaled $631,000.The operating income for the year 1972 totaled $465,000 and the operating expenses were $432,000.
There are 68 rooms in the Heritage House.Fifty-two rooms are provided for 'residents' who are retired persons.Sixteen rooms are provided for 'nursing residents,' who require nursing care.
During 1972 the charges to 'residents' ranged from $325 per month for an unfurnished semi-private one-room apartment to $615 per month for a furnished two-room private apartment.The charges to 'nursing residents' varied from $560 per month to $1975 per month.These charges included meals but excluded medication, certain nursing supplies, and other personal items.The average charge to an ambulatory resident totaled $425.36 per month, and the average charge to a nursing resident totaled $680.31.
The Heritage House is self-sustaining.There is an admissions committee, but the requirements of admission are not disclosed by the records.It appears, however, that the residents must meet health requirements, and they must be able to make the monthly payment requirements.None of the patients is a public charge or in any special category of old-age or nursing assistance insofar as government funding is concerned.The situation has never arisen where a person who has applied for admission has been unable to make the monthly payments.Two families did move out because of the rate.
The agreement for residency is entered into between the trustees of the trust, the applicant, and a 'responsible party.'The latter may be either the applicant or a third party who agrees to pay the monthly and other charges imposed.At the inception of the agreement, such party must pay the first month's payment in advance and a deposit equal to two months' charges.The agreement provides that admission to the Heritage House will be on a nonsectarian basis, without distinction because of race, color or creed.It also provides that the management has the right to refuse admission or to discharge a resident without giving any reason or cause.
Section 19.7 of the Revenue Act of 1939, as amended, provides, in part:
'All property of institutions of public charity, all property of beneficent and charitable organizations, whether incorporated in this or any other state of the United States, and all property of old people's homes, when such property is actually and exclusively used for such charitable or beneficent purposes, and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit; and all free public libraries.The words Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 120, par. 500.7.
The right of the legislature to exempt real property from taxation arises under section 6 of article IX of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.This provides:
The above is clearly nothing more than a rephrasing of a similar provision contained in section 3 of article IX of the Illinois Constitution of 1870.Those cases interpreting the permissive legislative exemptions under the Constitution of 1870 are equally relevant to the limits of exemption now constitutionally permitted.
The basic premise, that statutes providing exemption from taxation shall be strictly construed because article IX of the Constitution subjects all property to taxation (seeWesley Willows v. Munson(1969), 43 Ill.2d 203, 207, 251 N.E.2d 249), remains valid.Also seePeople ex rel. Nordlund v. Winnebago Home for the Aged(1968), 40 Ill.2d 91, 237 N.E.2d 533.
Three recent cases are dispositive of the issues presented in this case.In Methodist Old Peoples Home v. Korzen(1968), 39 Ill.2d 149, 233 N.E.2d 537, this court was presented with the identical basic issue.In Korzen, among other factors, applicants to the old people's home were required to submit detailed statements of their health, financial condition and personal history.They also were required to pay an entrance fee and monthly service charge, both of which were based upon the size and location of the quarters to which they were to be assigned.While the entrance fee varied from $6,000 to $25,000, the monthly charge ranged from $175 to $375.Nearly all of the funds were provided from the entrance and monthly service fees.The home was not required to continue to provide care and shelter for any resident who became unmanageable because of illness or unable to meet his monthly charge.Likewise there was no requirement to admit applicants who were unable to meet the typical charges imposed.It was not disputed that the plaintiff, a not-for-profit corporation, was operating a not-for-profit old people's home licensed by the State of Illinois under the auspices of a religious organization.
We observed, in Korzen, that while this appears to fit the definition of 'old people's home' as used in the statute, the statute could be no broader than permitted by the Constitution.The statute could not declare such property as being used exclusively for charitable purposes.It is the province of the court to make that determination.(39 Ill.2d 149, 155--156, 233 N.E.2d 537.)We thus concluded that section 19.7 of the Revenue Act of 1939 did not intend to state that old people's homes would be exempt from taxation without being used exclusively for charitable purposes.Korzen then furnished guidelines to determine if the uses to which property was being put were charitable.It was stated that a charitable use is one for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons; that its funds are derived mainly from public and private charity; that charity is dispensed to all who need and apply for it and without obstacles placed in the way of those who need and would avail themselves of the charitable benefits dispensed; and finally, that the term 'exclusively used' means the primary purpose for which property is used and not any secondary or...
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...having an operating income derived almost entirely from contractual charges goes against a charitable identity (Small v. Pangle, 60 Ill.2d 510, 517, 328 N.E.2d 285, 288-89 (1975)), but this factor, by itself, is not dispositive (American College, 36 Ill.2d at 348, 224 N.E.2d at 11). c. Prov......
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...The present case fits within the holdings of Wyndemere and Alivio, which followed our supreme court's precedent in Small v. Pangle, 60 Ill.2d 510, 328 N.E.2d 285 (1975), where the court held that an old people's home was not entitled to a charitable exemption, in part because its “greatest ......
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