Smallhouse v. Ky. & M. G. & S. M. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 January 1876
• Citation: 2 Mont. 443
• Parties: SMALLHOUSE, appellant, v. KENTUCKY AND M. G. AND S. M. Co., respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

2 Mont. 443

SMALLHOUSE, appellant,

v.KENTUCKY AND M. G. AND S. M. Co., respondent.

Supreme Court of the Territory of Montana.

January Term, 1876.

Appeal from First District, Madison County.

J. E. CALLAWAY and J. G. SPRATT, for appellants.

A corporation can only act through its agent. Appellant stood in the same relation to the corporation, and was entitled to same rights as a stranger or any other contractor doing work and furnishing supplies. Angell & Ames on Corp., § 233; Worcester Turnpike v. Willard, 5 Mass. 85;Gilmore v. Pope, Id. 491; Phillips on Liens, § 158.

The language of the statute is very broad, and extends to mechanics, builders, lumbermen, artisan, workman, laborer or “other person.” Such liens attach to the building, erection or improvement for which the materials were furnished or the work done. Cod. Sts., § 10, p. 511.

S. WORD, for respondent.

The allegations of the complaint show that plaintiff was superintendent for the corporation at a monthly salary to supervise the work of others. The statute was not intended to give a lien to such persons or for such services. Cod. Sts., § 1, p. 509; Phillips on Mech. Liens, §§ 156-7; Blakey v. Blakey, 27 Mo. 39.

A superintendent stands on same footing as member of the corporation. Phillips on Liens, § 39. He can contract with the corporation, but can have no lien on its property for his services. The case of 27 Mo. 39 is in point, being the construction given by the court to a statute identical with our own.

WADE, C. J.

This is an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien. The defendant, “The Kentucky and Montana Gold and Silver Mining Company,” is a corporation created under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Kentucky, doing business in the Territory, and having an office and place of business in the county of Madison. This defendant is in default, having made no appearance in the case. The defendant Elling appeared and filed a demurrer to the complaint, which was sustained, and thereupon judgment was rendered in his favor.

The plaintiff claims a lien upon a certain quartz mill, together with the engine, boiler, belting and other machinery belonging to and used in working the mill, also upon four dwelling-houses situate in the immediate vicinity of the mill, together with the land on which the mill and buildings stand, also upon Discovery claim, and claims numbered one, two, three, four and five, northeast from Discovery claim, and claims numbered one, two, three, four and five, south-west from Discovery claim, on the Rising Sun quartz lode, together with the privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging.

To bring himself within the statute giving a lien to mechanics, builders, lumbermen, artisans, workmen and laborers who shall perform work and labor upon any building, erection, mining claim, quartz lode, etc., the plaintiff alleges that on the 28th day of December, 1874, the aforesaid corporation hired the plaintiff as its agent, manager and superintendent to perform labor in and about the building, erection and completion of the mill and houses mentioned, and also in working the claims named on the quartz lode, at a salary of $250 per month.

Does this averment bring the plaintiff within the spirit and meaning of the mechanics' lien law?

The purpose of the legislature in enacting this statute undoubtedly was to secure to the persons therein named compensation for their labor upon the erections therein contemplated, and within the scope of the statute. Its provisions should be liberally construed. It was designed for the protection of workmen who, by their labor or materials furnished, have called property into being or added to its value, to the end that the property itself should be held liable for the labor and materials that produced it. But it is not every one who contributes to the erection of a building or structure that is entitled to a lien thereon. If the contribution was indirect, as if A should loan money to B for the purpose of enabling him to erect a building, and he should with the money thus loaned employ workmen, purchase materials and construct a building, A could not hold a mechanic's lien on the building for the money so loaned. In order to have the lien attach the labor or materials must have been expended on the building itself, and not upon something else that produced it as a result.

From the nature of the plaintiff's...