Smallwood v. Price
| Docket Number | 7:22-cv-00383 |
| Decision Date | 03 August 2023 |
| Parties | JEREMY LEE SMALLWOOD, Plaintiff, v. SHAWN PRICE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
Jeremy Lee Smallwood, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se filed this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Southwest Virginia Regional Jail Authority (“Jail Authority”) and two of its employees, Officer Shawn Price and Sergeant Elliott. The case is presently before the court on the Jail Authority's motion to dismiss, the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and Smallwood's motion for discovery. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motions, ECF Nos. 36 and 38 are GRANTED, and Smallwood's motion, ECF No. 52, is DENIED.
This action arises from events that allegedly occurred on May 11 2021, while Smallwood was incarcerated at a regional jail in Abingdon, Virginia, that is operated by the Jail Authority. On that day, Sergeant Elliott returned Smallwood to the medical unit in a wheelchair following a meeting with Major Kilgore and Captain Tatum. Am. Compl., ECF No. 17, at 4. Smallwood had recently undergone surgery on his amputated leg. Id. at 4-5.
Upon arriving at his cell, Smallwood noticed that the pillows and blankets issued by the hospital had been taken from the cell. Id. at 4. He refused to enter the cell until he spoke to Major Kilgore again. Id. He alleges that Sergeant Elliott then tried to push his wheelchair through the cell door, but Smallwood put his left foot on the wall to prevent being wheeled into the cell. Id. After denying another request to speak to Major Kilgore, Sergeant Elliott allegedly tried to choke Smallwood and dump him out of the wheelchair. Id. at 4-5.
Other officers, including Officer Price, arrived on the scene. Id. at 5. Smallwood alleges that Officer Price violently jerked him from the wheelchair and drug him into the cell. Id. Sergeant Elliott then struck his amputated leg. Id.
At the conclusion of the amended complaint, Smallwood alleges that the Jail Authority failed to “train employees on proper methods [for] dealing with disabled inmates” and failed to “implement policy minimizing the safety risk to . . . disabled inmates.” Id. He further alleges that the Jail Authority failed to “adhere to proper health and safety standards for serious medical conditions and disabled persons.” Id.
Smallwood commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 7, 2022. ECF No. 1. On November 3, 2022, Smallwood filed an amended complaint against the Jail Authority, Officer Price, and Sergeant Elliott. ECF No. 17. He seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages for the use of excessive force on May 11, 2021. Id. at 3-6.
The Jail Authority has moved to dismiss the claims against it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), ECF No. 36, and all three defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) on the basis that Smallwood failed to exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing suit, ECF No. 38. Smallwood has filed a series of responses in opposition to the defendants' motions. See ECF Nos. 40, 41, 46, 50, and 51.[1] He has also filed a motion for discovery under Rule 56(d). ECF No. 52.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff's allegations “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While a complaint does not need “detailed factual allegations,” merely offering “labels and conclusions,” “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012)). “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248- 49 (1986)). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. To survive summary judgment, there must be sufficient evidence from which a reasonable finder of fact could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor. Id. at 252. “Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice to oppose a properly supported motion for summary judgment, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence.” Matherly v. Andrews, 859 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Smallwood filed suit against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for those whose constitutional rights have been violated by state or local government actors. A local government entity, such as a regional jail authority, can be held liable under § 1983 only if the plaintiff shows that the entity's policy or custom was a “moving force” behind the constitutional violation. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)); see also Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) () (quoting Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999)). “And to get past the pleading stage, a complaint's description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.” Henderson v. Harris Cnty., 51 F.4th 125, 130 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Smallwood's amended complaint does not contain sufficient facts to state a claim for relief against the Jail Authority. He has not plausibly alleged that an official policy or custom was the moving force behind the alleged violation of a constitutional right. Although a policy or custom for which a municipal entity may be held liable can arise “through an omission, such as a failure to properly train officers,” Lytle, 326 F.3d at 471, Smallwood's conclusory allegations in this regard are insufficient to withstand dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See Henderson, 51 F.4th at 130-32; see also Litchfield v. Rinehart, No. 1:21-cv-02101, 2022 WL 3716525, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2022) (). Accordingly, the court will grant the Jail Authority's motion to dismiss.
The defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) on the basis that Smallwood failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Smallwood has filed responses in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. He has also filed a motion for discovery under Rule 56(d).
The court will first address Smallwood's motion for discovery under Rule 56(d). In the motion, Smallwood seeks to obtain discovery relevant to the merits of his claim of excessive force, including “video of [the] May 11, 2021 incident,” medical records, policies on the use of force, officer disciplinary records, and “any report of excessive force used by any officer at the jail.” Pl.'s Mot. Discovery, ECF No. 52, at 2. He argues that the requested discovery “will prove the nature of the excessive force used” by the officers and that it should be produced “prior to any ruling” on summary judgment. Id. at 1-2.
Rule 56(d) permits a court to defer consideration of a motion for summary judgment and allow time for discovery “[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). Relief under Rule 56(d) is “broadly favored and should be liberally granted in order to protect nonmoving parties from premature summary judgment motions.” Pledger v. Lynch, 5 F.4th 511, 526 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In Pledger, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit “held that it is appropriate to excuse ‘technical compliance' with Rule 56(d), especially with pro se plaintiffs where the district court is put on ‘fair notice of a potential dispute as to the sufficiency of the summary judgment record.'” Firewalker-Fields v. Lee, 58 F.4th 104, 123 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Pledger, 5 F.4th at 526); see also Goodman v. Diggs, 986 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 2021) (...
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