Smart & Golee, Inc. v. Delany
Decision Date | 18 November 1965 |
Docket Number | Gen. No. 49628 |
Citation | 65 Ill.App.2d 60,213 N.E.2d 27 |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Parties | SMART & GOLEE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank J. DELANY and Anne Delany, Defendants-Appellants. |
Marshall E. LeSueur, Chicago, for defendants-appellants.
Ashcraft, Olson, Beach, Alexander & Edmonds, Chicago, William H. Alexander, Chicago, of counsel, for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendants appeal from a judgment for $3150, being the amount of the commission claimed by plaintiff for the sale of the defendants' home in Evanston, Illinois. Plaintiff acted throughout by its president Orville Daily and an employee, James Kreiser. The amended complaint, upon which relief was granted, is based on the theory of an implied agency growing out of dealings between the parties which allegedly resulted in the sale. Defendants contend that no contract with Smart & Golee can be implied because that firm's only connection with the property was as a subagent of Quinlan & Tyson (Quinlan) with whom the defendants had a written contract which had terminated two months before the sale.
Plaintiff's original statement of claim was based on the written contract dated July 28, 1959, which granted an exclusive power of sale to Quinlan. Under this contract, the defendants were entitled to cooperative listing of the property and to the sales efforts of the cooperating members of the Evanston-North Shore Board of Realtors, of which both Quinlan and the plaintiff were members. Had the plaintiff been able to bring about a sale of the property as a subagent pursuant to the contract, it would have received fifty percent of the commission, with the other fifty percent going to Quinlan. This contract also provided that the agency arrangement might be terminated upon thirty days notice, except as to prospective buyers who had been shown the property before the termination became effective, in which case the agreement was to remain in effect for an additional three months.
On November 9, 1959, the Delanys gave notice of termination of the exclusive selling arrangement with Quinlan which, under the contract, would become effective on December 10, 1959, except as to prospects who had seen the house on or before that date. A sale to one in the latter class at any time between December 10, 1959 and March 10, 1960 would still have come within the provisions of the written contract, entitling each broker to fifty percent of the commission.
The purchasers were Gerald and June Becker, with whom the defendants made an oral agreement of sale on May 2, 1960. The Beckers were first shown the property by the plaintiff, Smart & Golee, on November 30, 1959, which at that time was operating as a subagent under the cooperative provision in the written contract with Quinlan. On December 20, 1959, there was a meeting at the Delany home attended by Daily and Kreiser representing Smart & Golee, the Beckers, their lawyer, the Delanys, and some relatives of the Beckers. Although Quinlan was not personally represented, plaintiff acknowledges that the meeting was arranged with that firm's approval, in accordance with a provision in the constitution of the Evanston-North Shore Board of Realtors that
The negotiations between the buyer and the seller concerned both time and price. The Delanys wanted to complete the sale and move their family, which included school children, to Washington, D. C. by midsemester of the school year, which was at the end of January. The Beckers did not want to move into the house until the end of the school term in June. There was also a difference of approximately $2000 in the price. The Delanys testified that they considered the matter of possession the more important. Replying to the Beckers' demand for a June sale,...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Business Development Services, Inc. v. Field Container Corp., 80-1382
...controls so that plaintiff cannot escape, on a theory of implied contract, the provision of the limitation. (Smart & Golee, Inc. v. Delany (1965), 65 Ill.App.2d 60, 213 N.E.2d 27.) Nevertheless, a plaintiff may recover under quantum meruit where he fails to establish the express contract bu......
-
Panorama of Homes, Inc. v. Catholic Foreign Mission Soc., Inc.
...The rights of a cooperating broker are defined by the agreement between the seller and the listing broker. (Smart & Golee Inc. v. Delany (1965), 65 Ill.App.2d 60, 213 N.E.2d 27; Van C. Argiris Co. v. Caine Steel Co. (1974), 20 Ill.App.3d 315 at 319, 314 N.E.2d 361 at 364. The language and i......
-
Van C. Argiris Co. v. Caine Steel Co.
...prior notice of termination. Plaintiff, as a cooperating broker, was bound by the terms of that agreement. (Smart & Golee, Inc. v. Delany, 65 Ill.App.2d 60, 213 N.E.2d 27.) However, it appears that plaintiff's theory of the case was not that plaintiff, in its capacity as a cooperating broke......
-
Eisele v. Rice
...efforts and legitimate expectations arising after the written contract expired. Adkins, 892 P.2d at 131; Smart & Golee, Inc. v. Delany, 65 Ill.App.2d 60, 213 N.E.2d 27, 30 (1965). In Eisele's affidavit submitted for the purpose of opposing summary judgment, he On or about May 7, 1994, after......