Smart v. U.S. Dep't of Veteran Affairs

• Decision Date: 23 September 2010
• Docket Number: No. EP–10–CV–116–PRM.,EP–10–CV–116–PRM.
• Citation: 759 F.Supp.2d 867
• Parties: Michael C. SMART, Plaintiff,v.U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS; Erik K. Shinseki, Secretary of Veteran Affairs (official capacities); Joan Ricard, Director (official capacities); Dr. Loran Wilkenfeld, Chief of Mental Health (official capacities), Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

759 F.Supp.2d 867

Michael C. SMART, Plaintiff,

v.U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS; Erik K. Shinseki, Secretary of Veteran Affairs (official capacities); Joan Ricard, Director (official capacities); Dr. Loran Wilkenfeld, Chief of Mental Health (official capacities), Defendants.

No. EP–10–CV–116–PRM.

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, El Paso Division.

Sept. 23, 2010.

Michael C. Smart, El Paso, TX, pro se.Eduardo R. Castillo, Assistant United States Attorney, El Paso, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

PHILIP R. MARTINEZ, District Judge.

On this day, the Court considered Defendants U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs; Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs; Joan Ricard, Director, El Paso VA Medical Center; and Dr. Loren Wilkenfeld, Chief of Mental Health's (Defendants) “Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment” (Docket No. 36), filed on July 20, 2010, in the above-captioned cause. On July 26, 2010, Plaintiff responded with a “Motion Denying Defendant [sic] Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment.” Docket No. 37. After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Defendants' “Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment” (Docket No. 36), should be granted for the reasons that follow.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDA. Factual Background

On April 9, 2010, Plaintiff Michael C. Smart (Plaintiff), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint (Docket No. 3), asserting jurisdiction in the Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346 (2006), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006)), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), the United States Constitution, and “Texas State Law.” However, Plaintiff only asserts two causes of action against Defendants: (1) a claim alleging a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation of Plaintiff's right to participate in the Housing and Urban Development—Veteran Administration Supported Housing (HUD–VASH) program and (2) a claim alleging due process violations under the United States and Texas Constitutions. See Compl. 5–6.

Plaintiff states that he is a veteran of the United States military and claims that he applied for benefits under the HUD–VASH program at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in El Paso, Texas. In his Complaint, Plaintiff states that he was recently evicted from his residence following a rent dispute. Plaintiff further states that he informed a VA staff member that he had stayed at a homeless shelter for one night, but since that night, he has stayed with friends in their homes in El Paso and Mexico. Compl. 2.

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied benefits after the VA wrongfully concluded that he did not meet the statutory definition of “homeless” for the purpose of receiving HUD–VASH benefits. Compl. 2. Plaintiff further asserts that, on February 10, 2010, he filed an administrative claim under the “Federal Tort Claim Act” with the VA in order to challenge the denial of benefits. Compl. 3.

B. Procedural Background

On May 11, 2010, Plaintiff filed an “Emergency Motion for Mandatory Injunction” (Docket No. 6), which was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. Docket No. 12. Based on Plaintiff's pleadings and evidence introduced at the hearing, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief be denied because Plaintiff did not meet the controlling statutory definition of “homeless.” Docket No. 29.

II. LEGAL STANDARDA. Motions to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and therefore have power to adjudicate claims only when jurisdiction is conferred by statute or the Constitution. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994); Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir.1998). A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.1998).

Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim are appropriate when a defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quotations omitted). The complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” but must state “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

B. Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court should find summary judgment appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists only if there are “any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue for trial; it may do so by ‘point [ing] out the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case.’ ” Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 40 F.3d 698, 712 (5th Cir.1994) (quoting Latimer v. Smithkline & French Labs., 919 F.2d 301, 303 (5th Cir.1990)). If the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmovant must then come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). When a moving party requests that a court grant its motion for summary judgment, a court “will review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir.1986). While a court will resolve factual controversies or disputes in the non-movant's favor, it must do so “only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (emphasis added). A court should not, “in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.” Id. (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)).

C. Pro Se

A court reviews pro se pleadings under a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and such pleadings are entitled to a liberal construction that includes all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from them. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (explaining lower standard for pro se pleadings). At the same time, however, parties proceeding pro se are still required to provide sufficient facts in support of their claims. United States v. Pineda, 988 F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir.1993). Even under the rule of liberal construction, “mere conclusory allegations on a critical issue are insufficient.” Id. (citing United States v. Woods, 870 F.2d 285, 288 n. 3 (5th Cir.1989)).

“If dismissal of a pro se complaint is warranted, it should be without prejudice to allow [the plaintiff] to file an amended complaint.” Moawad v. Childs, 673 F.2d 850, 851 (5th Cir.1982). “At the same time, if the protections afforded public officials are not to ring hollow, plaintiffs cannot be allowed to continue to amend or supplement their pleadings until they stumble upon a formula that carries them over the threshold.” Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir.1986). Thus, a court may dismiss a pro se complaint with prejudice when the plaintiff “is fully apprised of [the] complaint's potential insufficiency and [has been] given [an] opportunity to correct any insufficiencies.” See Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir.1998); Jacquez, 801 F.2d at 790–92.

III. ANALYSISA. Claim 1

Plaintiff's first claim alleges a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation resulting from Defendants' failure to use the HUD–VASH definition of “homeless” under the McKinney Act in denying him HUD–VASH benefits. To the extent Plaintiff seeks relief under Section 1983 for Defendants' alleged failure to use the proper definition, his claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6). Section 1983 and the proper definition of “homeless” will be discussed in turn below.

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In order to state a valid claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must: (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against Defendants fails on the...