Smeekens v. Bertrand, 574S103
Decision Date | 23 May 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 574S103,574S103 |
Citation | 262 Ind. 50,311 N.E.2d 431 |
Parties | John P. SMEEKENS, Jr., and Ariene L. Smeekens, Appellants (Defendants Below), v. Helen S. BERTRAND and Edmour H. Bertrand, Appellees (Plaintiffs Below), and The Wolverine Insurance Company, Appellee (Defendant Below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Ralph R. Blume, Blume, Wyneken, Levine & Clifford, Fort Wayne, for appellants.
Wilson E. Shoup, Angola, for appellees.
OPINION ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
Litigation between the parties involved in this case began some fourteen years ago when the Smeekens, as vendors of certain motel property, brought an action in ejectment to declare forfeiture of a land sale contract with the Bertrands as vendees.
In 1956, the appellants, Smeekens (vendors), executed a conditional sales contract with the appellees, Bertrands (vendees), for certain real estate upon which a motel was situated. From then until 1960, the Bertrands paid to the Smeekens $85,000 plus $16,426.50 in interest pursuant to that sales contract. In 1960 a dispute arose between the parties and the Smeekens instituted an action for ejectment and cancellation of the contract pursuant to the forfeiture clause in the contract. 1 The Smeekens then obtained immediate pre-judgment possession of the premises on February 19, 1960, by invoking Indiana's statutory bonding procedure IC 1971, 32--6--1--3 (Ind.Ann.Stat. § 3--1306 (1968 Repl. 7)). The taking of possession by this procedure was described by the Court of Appeals as follows:
Thus, from that date until now, the appellants, Smeekens, have retained possession of the property and all monies paid by the Bertrands ($101,426.50).
The original ejectment action, which was filed by the Smeekens in 1960, was finally settled in January of 1967, when the Steuben Circuit Court entered judgment against the Smeekens. There it was held that the vendor's attempt to declare a forfeiture would fail because the vendors had not given proper notice of their intention to declare forfeiture. It was held that the Smeekens were not entitled to possession of the property at the time they commenced their ejectment action. The litigation of this first action took seven years and during that time the Bertrands, who ultimately prevailed, were out of possession.
In 1967, the case from which the present appeal has arisen was filed by the Bertrands in Steuben Circuit Court and later venued to the Whitley Circuit Court. (This case was filed within one month of the trial court's decision against the Smeekens in the above-described ejectment action.) The Bertrands' complaint was in two paragraphs. Paragraph I sought to recover damages for wrongful ejectment. Paragraph II of the complaint sought rescission of the sales contract. The trial court found for the Bertrands only on their second paragraph. While it was the Bertrands who sought rescission of the contract by filing this action in February, 1967, the trial court concluded that it was the Smeekens who had rescinded the contract by their 'wrongful' actions in February, 1960. The trial court entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
(emphasis added)
The Smeekens perfected an appeal from the judgment of the trial court. The Court of Appeals for the Third District in an opinion by Judge Sharp, with Hoffman, C.J., concurring and Staton, J., dissenting, affirmed the judgment. The majority held, inter alia, that Smeekens' improper declaration of forfeiture and repossession of the property, pursuant to the aforementioned statutory bonding procedure, was tantamount to an election by the appellants to terminate/rescind the contract. The Court of Appeals further concluded that the trial court had properly exercised its equity power by returning the parties to their respective financial positions prior to the consummation of the contract.
We have granted transfer in order to clarify a most confusing situation and to delineate the nature and extent of the remedies available to the parties.
In February, 1960, the Smeekens (as plaintiffs) filed a three-paragraph complaint requesting the following relief: (1) repossession of the land and personal property; (2) cancellation of the conditional land sale contract; and (3) title quieted in their name. F. Kenneth Dempsey, sitting as Special Judge in the Steuben Circuit Court, rendered judgment against the Smeekens on all three paragraphs. Judge Dempsey filed a written memorandum wherein he stated the grounds for his decision. The concluding paragraph of that memorandum reads as follows:
'The inescapable conclusion must be that the plaintiffs were without right to declare a forfeiture on January 23, 1960; that the attempted declaration was null and void; that the plaintiffs were not entitled to possession of the real and personal property at the time of the commencement of this action on February 2, 1960, and, as of this date, they were not entitled to have title quieted as against the interest of the defendants.' (emphasis added)
The Then Appellate Court subsequently affirmed the judgment of the trial court in Smeekens v. Bertrand (1969), 144 Ind.App. 656, 248 N.E.2d 48, and this Court denied transfer October 29, 1969.
The judgment entered by Judge Dempsey conclusively established that the Smeekens' actions did not result in termination of the contract; on the contrary, Judge Dempsey specifically found that the Smeekens were not entitled to possession as of February 2, 1960, nor to have title quieted in their name. This finding can only lead one to the conclusion that Judge Dempsey adjudged the contract to be in full force and effect. It seems only logical that the vendors would have been granted the right of possession as of February 2, 1960, and title quieted in their name had Judge Dempsey (and the Appellate Court) construed their attempt to enforce the forfeiture clause as a rescission of the contract.
As hereinabove stated, the Whitley Circuit Court in the case at bar concluded that the Smeekens terminated (rescinded) the contract at the time they sought enforcement of the forfeiture clause and repossessed the property pursuant to the statutory bonding procedure sanctioned by IC 1971, 32--6--1--3 (Ind.Ann.Stat. § 3--1306 (1968 Repl.)). We believe that the Whitley Circuit Court, irrespective of the merit of Judge Dempsey's findings and conclusions, was collaterally estopped from adjudicating the question of the Smeekens' alleged rescission as of February, 1960. That issue was once litigated and duly adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, thereby foreclosing any relitigation of that particular issue as between the Smeekens and the Bertrands. The authorities are legion in their adherence to the proposition that finality of adjudication is essential to an orderly, predictable legal system. Unfortunately, in this case, neither the Whitley Circuit Court nor the Court of Appeals was sensitive to this venerable principle.
We hold, consistent with the principles of res judicata, that the Smeekens' actions did not terminate the contract as of February, 1960. However, this is not to say that the Bertrands were not entitled to rescind the contract as of January, 1967--the date of the first judgment. Judge Dempsey at that time determined, in effect, that the Smeekens' possession of the property between February, 1960 and January, 1967, had been wrongful. We believe this wrongful dispossession to be sufficient grounds to justify the...
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