Smelsey v. Safety Inv. Corp.

• Decision Date: 20 February 1945
• Docket Number: No. 28.,28.
• Citation: 310 Mich. 686,17 N.W.2d 868
• Parties: SMELSEY v. SAFETY INV. CORPORATION et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

310 Mich. 686

17 N.W.2d 868

SMELSEY

v.SAFETY INV. CORPORATION et al.

No. 28.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Feb. 20, 1945.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County; Guy A. Miller, judge.

Action in ejectment by Meyer Smelsey against the Safety Investment Corporation and others to recover possession of certain real estate. From a judgment for defendants, the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Before the Entire Bench.

Meyer Weisenfeld, of Detroit, for appellant.

Schmier, Karbel & Eiges, of Detroit, for appellees.

BOYLES, Justice.

This is an action in ejectment to recover possession of certain real estate in Detroit. The chain of title on which plaintiff relies begins with record title in one Margaret Graff in 1891. In 1917 Margaret Graff died testate and her will was admitted to probate in Wayne county, by which the property in question was devised to one Josephine Stackpoole, now Josephine Stackpoole Curran. On May 4, 1943, plaintiff acquired, and on May 5th recorded, a quitclaim deed from Josephine Stackpoole Curran covering the property in question, and on May 20th filed the instant proceedings in ejectment against the defendants in possession. The defendants resisted ejectment on the ground that they held title and right of possession under certain tax conveyances. For reasons hereinafter referred to, the circuit judge denied plaintiff the relief sought, and from the judgment entered for defendants the plaintiff appeals.

‘It is elementary that to prevail in an ejectment proceedings the plaintiff must rely upon the strength of his own title not on the weakness of defendant's title. Ridgeley v. Roma, 282 Mich. 682, 276 N.W. 872. Clearly in such case a plaintiff could not prevail if defendant had a prior valid title. It follows that the burden of proof of the invalidity of defendant's alleged prior title when established by a prima facie case is upon the plaintiff in ejectment. ‘Where a party seeks to avoid a tax deed by direct proceedings for that purpose, it is for him to substantiate the charge of its invalidity.’ Morrison v. Semer, 164 Mich. 208, 214, 129 N.W. 1, 3.' Briggs v. Prevost, 293 Mich. 677, 679, 292 N.W. 527, 528.

The situation disclosed by the record is as follows:

Josephine Stackpoole (Curran) was admittedly the owner of the record title in 1917. She had not otherwise conveyed her title before she executed and delivered to plaintiff the quitclaim deed under which plaintiff claims title. The taxes for the years 1926 and 1927 had been allowed to become delinquent. The property in question was sold by the county treasurer in 1929 for the delinquent 1926 taxes, and again sold in 1930 for the delinquent 1927 taxes. One C. E. Merriman became the purchaser at both tax sales. On August 30, 1932, the auditor general of the State, in pursuance of these two tax sales, conveyed the property in question by two auditor general's tax deeds to one C. E. Merriman. There is no proof that defendants ever acquired any title or interest in the property from Merriman or any one claiming under him, or that these two tax deeds were ever put on record, or that Merriman ever went into possession of the property. Nor is there any proof that the plaintiff, prior to the time he acquired title by quitclaim deed from Josephine Stackpoole Curran, ever had any notice or knowledge of the Merriman tax deeds, or of any facts or circumstances indicating that either Merriman or any one claiming under him might have any interest in the premises. Under such circumstances, plaintiff was a subsequent purchaser in good faith and the conveyances to Merriman were void as against plaintiff's subsequently acquired title. 3 Comp.Laws 1929, § 13304 (Stat.Ann. § 26.547).

However, the fact that the lower court may have reached the wrong conclusion as to the effect of the Merriman tax deeds will not change the result if the court reached the right conclusion on other grounds. In 1936 the defendant Safety Investment Corporation acquired a 99-year lease of this property from the city of Detroit by virtue of a tax sale by the city for unpaid delinquent city taxes for 1926. This being a lease for a term exceeding three years, it is a conveyance of an interest in real estate within the express declaration of the statute law of the State. 3 Comp.Laws 1929, § 13309 (Stat.Ann. § 26.552); Crouse v. Michell, 130 Mich. 347, 90 N.W. 32,97 Am.St.Rep. 479;Walker & Co. v. Davis, 257 Mich. 316, 241 N.W. 169. Plaintiff challenges the validity of this tax sale on several grounds, the one of importance being that there was no publication of the legal description of the property prior to sale. Notice of the tax sale was published as required by the city charter and it is a sufficient answer to this objection that the city charter in effect at that time did not require publication of descriptions. As to other objections, we find that the requirements of the city charter then in effect were adequately followed. The conveyance of the property for a term of 99 years discloses on the face of the instrument that the laws relative to assessment and...