Smeltzley v. Nicholson Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 February 1977
• Docket Number: S.F. 23486
• Citation: 18 Cal.3d 932,136 Cal.Rptr. 269
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 559 P.2d 624, 85 A.L.R.3d 121 Larry SMELTZLEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NICHOLSON MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 269

136 Cal.Rptr. 269

18 Cal.3d 932, 559 P.2d 624, 85 A.L.R.3d 121

Larry SMELTZLEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NICHOLSON MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

S.F. 23486.

Supreme Court of California.

Feb. 8, 1977.

Eugene C. Treaster and David P. Mastagni, Sacramento, for plaintiff and appellant.

Memering, Stumbos, DeMers, Ford & Norris, John D. Stumbos, Jr., John R. Toy and Roberta Lee Franklin, Sacramento, for defendant and respondent.

TOBRINER, Acting Chief Justice.

Plaintiff's original complaint alleged injuries caused by his employers' failure to provide him a safe place to work; his amended complaint, filed after the statute of limitations had run, added a cause of action alleging that his injuries resulted from a defective machine manufactured by defendant Nicholson Manufacturing Company (hereinafter Nicholson). The trial court sustained Nicholson's demurrer without leave to amend, and entered judgment for Nicholson.

We reverse that judgment. In Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 15 Cal.Rptr. 817, 364 P.2d 681 and subsequent cases the California courts have established the rule that an amended complaint relates back to the filing of the original complaint, and thus avoids the bar of the statute of limitations, so long as recovery is sought in both pleadings on the same general set of facts. As we shall explain, since plaintiff's amended complaint seeks recovery for the same accident and injuries as the original complaint, it falls within the purview of the foregoing rule, and thus relates back to the date of filing of the original complaint. The trial court therefore erred in holding that plaintiff's cause of action against Nicholson was barred by the statute of limitations.

Plaintiff's leg was amputated as a result of injuries he sustained on March 24, 1971, while operating a debarking machine manufactured by defendant Nicholson. On March 24, 1972, he filed a complaint for personal injuries against his employers and several fictitiously named defendants. His first cause of action alleged that defendants were in control of the Sierra Mountain Mill, and owed plaintiff a duty to provide a safe place to work. Plaintiff asserts that 'the place of employment was unsafe, dangerous and defective, all of which was either known or should have been known to the defendants. Nonetheless defendants . . . directed the plaintiff to work at a place of employment which was dangerous, and through the negligence and carelessness of defendants . . . in failing to provide a safe place to work, caused the plaintiff's leg to be amputated.' Plaintiff's second cause of action added allegations that defendants recklessly disregarded plaintiff's safety, thus stating a cause of action under Labor Code section 3601. Both causes of action included a standard paragraph alleging that the true names and capacities of the fictitious defendants were unknown to plaintiff, but that each such defendant 'is responsible in some manner for the events and happenings herein referred to, and caused injuries and damages proximately brought to the plaintiff as herein alleged.'

On November 6, 1973, two and one-half years after the accident, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. Substituting defendant Nicholson for Doe I, plaintiff alleged in his first cause of action that Nicholson manufactured the debarking machine which injured plaintiff, that the machine was 'defective, dangerous and unsafe for its intended use,' and that plaintiff's injury was the proximate result of the defective machine. The second and third causes of action of the first amended complaint restated the causes of action against plaintiff's employers which appeared in the original complaint.

Nicholson demurred to the first amended complaint, asserting that plaintiff's cause of action against Nicholson was barred by the one-year limitation of Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision 3. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment for Nicholson. Plaintiff appeals from that judgment.

Plaintiff contends that his amended complaint relates back to the date of filing of the original complaint, and thus avoids the bar of the statute of limitations. The decision of this court in Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., supra, 56 Cal.2d 596, 15 Car.Rptr. 817, 364 P.2d 681 and subsequent decisions of the Courts of Appeal support that contention.

In Austin, plaintiff's original complaint charged that Pacific States Securities Corporation, its officers, and defendants sued under fictitious names refused to deliver securities and money received on behalf of plaintiff. The complaint alleged that defendants filed a 'surety bond in the sum of $5,000 for the faithful performance of its duties as a licensed broker.' (56 Cal.2d at p. 598, 15 Cal.Rptr. at p. 818, 364 P.2d at p. 682.) Plaintiff did not allege that defendants were surety on the bond or that plaintiff sought indemnification from the surety. The amended complaint, filed two years after the running of the statute of limitations, nevertheless substituted Massachusetts Bonding for one of the fictitiously named defendants, and asserted the liability of Massachusetts Bonding under its surety bond for the defalcations of Pacific's officers.

In an unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Gibson, we reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of Massachusetts Bonding. Reviewing the California cases, we rejected both the older cases which decided that any amendment that changed the legal theory of the complaint could not relate back, and the more recent cases which held that an amendment would not relate back if it set forth a wholly different cause of action. (See 56 Cal.2d at p. 601, 15 Cal.Rptr. 817, 364 P.2d 681.) 'The modern rule,' we explained, 'is that . . . where an amendment is sought after the statute of limitations has run, the amended complaint will be deemed filed as of the date of the original complaint provided recovery is sought in both pleadings on the Same general set of facts.' (56 Cal.2d at p. 600, 15 Cal.Rptr. at p. 819, 364 P.2d at p. 683.) (Italics added.)

The court then stated the rational foundation for its view in these words: 'This rule is the result of a development which, in furtherance of the policy that cases should be decided on their merits, gradually broadened the right of a party to amend a pleading without incurring the bar of the statute of limitations.' (Ibid.)

Applying the foregoing rule to that case, the court found that both complaints alleged the same misconduct by Pacific and its officers, which misconduct constituted the grounds for the action on the bond added by the amended complaint. We concluded that 'both pleadings are thus based on the same general set of facts . . .. Had Massachusetts Bonding been sued by its true name in the original complaint, the amendment changing the character of its obligation from that of a principal to that of a surety would have related back for purposes of the statute of limitations. The fact that it was initially designated by a fictitious name does not warrant a different result.' (P. 602, 15 Cal.Rptr. p. 820, 364 P.2d p. 684.)

Seven years later, in Garrett v. Crown Coach Corp. (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 647, 66 Cal.Rptr. 590, the Court of Appeal applied the principles established by Austin to a factual setting indistinguishable from the present case. Plaintiff Garrett's original complaint asserted that the named defendants and Does one through five negligently maintained and operated a school bus, causing the bus to strike plaintiff's vehicle and injure plaintiff. Garrett's second amended complaint, filed after the running of the statute of limitations, substituted Crown Coach Corporation for Doe One and alleged that Crown negligently designed and manufactured the bus. The trial court sustained Crown's demurrer without leave to amend.

Relying on Austin, the Court of Appeal reversed the court below. Justice Files wrote that 'plaintiff is seeking to hold Crown legally responsible for the same accident and the same injuries referred to in the original complaint. The amendment changes the alleged obligation of 'Doe One' from that of an operator to that of a manufacturer. This is no more drastic than the change of theory reflected by the amendment in Austin.' (259 Cal.App.2d at p. 651, 66 Cal.Rptr. at p. 523.)

Garrett and the instant case present a striking parallel. In Garrett the original complaint charged the named and fictitious defendants with liability based upon their operation and maintenance of a bus; in the present case plaintiff charged the named and fictitious defendants with liability based upon their control and operation of a lumber mill. In both cases the original complaint did not state any facts upon which defendants' liability as a manufacturer could be predicated; the amended complaints, however, sought to change the obligation of 'Doe One' from that of an operator to that of a manufacturer. Finally, in both cases the amended complaint sought recovery for the same accident and the same injuries as the original complaint. Rarely is a precedent so closely on point.

Nicholson does not assert that Garrett was wrongly decided, but unsuccessfully attempts to distinguish that precedent. Nicholson argues that in Garrett the original complaint referred to the bus as the cause of the accident, but that plaintiff's original complaint in the present case did not mention a debarking machine. But plaintiff's reference in the original complaint to defendants' control over the lumber mill necessarily includes defendants' control over machinery at that site; plaintiff's assertion of unsafe, dangerous and defective conditions at the mill is sufficiently general to comprehend any danger arising from defective mill machinery.

The crucial fact, moreover, is not whether the original complaint mentioned the debarking machine as the reason the...