Smith, Application of

Decision Date23 March 1955
Parties, 55 A.L.R.2d 420 . Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Robert Ruppin, Lancaster, for petitioner.

J. Campbell Brandon, Butler, amicus curiae.

Paul A. Mueller, Lancaster, for respondents.

Morton Meyers, Johnstown, for Cambria County Bar Ass'n.

Before STERN, C. J., and STEARNE, JONES, BELL, CHIDSEY and MUSMANNO, JJ.

HORACE STERN, Chief Justice.

The question for determination is the constitutionality of the Act of January 14, 1952, P.L. 2087, amending the Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 715, 5 P.S. § 21 et seq., and the validity of the Rule of Court (Rule 43) adopted in pursuance of this legislation by the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County.

The Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 715, provided for an elaborate system of Reference and Arbitration. We are concerned here, however, only with those sections of the Act, 8 to 38 inclusive, which provided for compulsory arbitration. By those provisions it was made lawful 'for either party in any civil suit or action * * * to enter * * * a rule of reference, wherein he shall declare his determination to have arbitrators chosen * * * for the trial of all matters in variance in the suit between the parties.' Arbitrators were thereupon to be selected in a manner prescribed by the Act, and it was then their duty to proceed to determine the matters in controversy and to make an award, which award, when entered in the office of the prothonotary, should have the effect of a judgment. Each of the parties was given the right to appeal from the award to the court in which the cause was pending at the time the rule of reference was entered, but such appeal was subject to certain restrictions, one of which was that the party appealing should pay all the costs that had accrued in the action; there was a provision, however, that on presentation of an affidavit of poverty and consequent inability to pay the costs, the party against whom the award was made, not being the party by whom the rule of reference was taken out, might be allowed to appeal without paying the costs. Another condition of the right of appeal was that the party appealing should enter into a recognizance the condition of which should be, if the plaintiff were the appellant, that if he did not recover a greater sum than the award of the arbitrators he would pay the costs that would accrue in consequence of the appeal and also one dollar for every day lost by the defendant in attending on the appeal; if the defendant were the appellant the condition of the recognizance was that, if the plaintiff obtained a judgment for a sum equal to or greater than the award of the arbitrators, he would pay the costs that would accrue in consequence of the appeal and also one dollar for every day lost by the plaintiff in attending on the appeal. The costs paid by either party could be recovered of the adverse party if, as the result of the suit, the appellant was entitled to recover costs under the provisions of the Act. The arbitrators were given the power to subpoena witnesses, books and documents, to issue attachments against witnesses neglecting or refusing to attend to judge of the competency and credibility of witnesses and the propriety of admitting any written evidence that might be offered, to administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses, and to decide both the law and facts involved in the case. For their services the arbitrators were each to receive the sum of one dollar for every day necessarily employed in the hearing, but only after they had made and filed their report. 1

The Act of January 14, 1952, P.L. 2087, amended this Act of 1836 by adding a new section which provides, inter alia, that 'The several courts of common pleas may, by rules of court, provide that all cases which are at issue where the amount in controversy shall be one thousand dollars ($1000) or less, except those involving title to real estate, shall first be submitted to and heard by a board of three (3) members of the bar of the county for consideration and award.' 5 P.S. § 30. Instead of the method provided in the original Act for the selection of arbitrators it was now provided that the board should be appointed by the prothonotary from the list of attorneys qualified to act, the names of attorneys to be taken from the list in alphabetical order, the first member named to be chairman of the board. The board is to make its report and render its award within 20 days after hearing. The compensation of the arbitrators is to be determined by the court and paid by the county upon the filing of their report and award. Any party appealing must first repay to the county the fees of the arbitrators thus paid by the county, but such fees are not to be taxed as costs or be recoverable from the adverse party in any proceeding; in other words, they are not to follow the award. All appeals are to be de novo. The arbitrators are not required to make a record of the proceedings before them, but if any party desires a record the arbitrators shall provide a reporter and cause a record to be made and the party requesting the same shall pay the cost thereof.

In pursuance of the authority given by the Act the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County adopted a rule of court (Rule 43) providing, inter alia, that all cases at issue, where the amount in controversy is $500 or less, with the exception of certain actions which need not here be detailed, shall be submitted to, and be heard and decided by, Boards of Arbitration each consisting of three attorneys, members of the bar of the county. Each arbitrator is to receive as compensation for his services in each case a fee of $25, but in cases requiring hearings of unusual duration or involving questions of unusual complexity the court may allow additional compensation.

Harvey A. Smith, a resident of Lancaster County, filed in this court a petition for a writ directed to the judges of the Court of Common Pleas of that county prohibiting them from putting this rule into effect on the ground that both it and the statute authorizing it are unconstitutional. He alleged that he had brought suit in trespass to recover damages arising out of an automobile collision; that the amount of damages sought to be recovered was $249.19; that the action was at issue and had been listed for jury trial before the rule of court went into effect; that he desired to have his action tried by a jury; and that under the provisions of the statute and the rule he will be deprived of a jury trial except under 'burdensome, oppressive and unreasonable conditions.' We denied the petition, but substituted for it a rule on the judges of the court below to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue directing them to place the case on the list for trial before a jury. The judges having filed an answer, the rule to show cause is now before us for decision. The Cambria County Bar Association and J. Campbell Brandon, Esq., of Butler County, have filed briefs as amici curiae.

The Act of 1952, greatly enlarging, as it does, the scope of the Act of 1836, is of extreme importance in that it effects a decided innovation in procedure for the adjudication of the class of minor claims to which it relates. It has many obvious advantages. It is clearly designed to meet the situation which prevails in some communities of jury lists being clogged to a point where trials can be had only after long periods of delay,--a condition resulting largely from the modern influx of negligence cases arising from automobile accidents in a great mumber of which no serious personal injuries are involved. Removing the smaller claims from the lists not only paves the way for the speedier trial of actions involving larger amounts, but, what is of equal or perhaps even greater importance, makes it possible for the immediate disposition of the smaller claims themselves, thus satisfying the need for prompt relief in such cases. By the same token, and working to the same end, the use of the Act will free courts for the speedier performance of other judicial functions. Moreover, there will be a saving to claimants of both time and expense by reason of greater flexibility in fixing the exact day and hour for hearings before the arbitrators as compared with the more cumbersome and less adaptable arrangements of court calendars. The operation of the Act has proved eminently successful in all respects, it appearing from statistics gathered in 19 of the 31 counties or more which have thus far put the statute into effect that there were 585 cases tried by arbitrators under its provisions in the period from July 1 to December 28, 1954, in only 30 or 5% of which appeals were taken to the courts of common pleas. It would seem clear, therefore, that the system of arbitration set up by this statute offers encouraging prospects for the speedier administration of justice in the Commonwealth.

What, then, are the objections voiced against it on the alleged ground of unconstitutionality?

The main charge is that the Act violates Article I, section 6, of the Constitution, P.S. that 'Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate.' It is true, of course, that this provision of the Constitution would be violated by a statute the effect of which was to compel parties to submit to arbitration against their will or without their assent. Cutler & Hinds v. Richley, 151 Pa. 195, 25 A. 96. Indeed compulsory arbitration conflicts also with the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution in that it works a deprivation of property and liberty of contract without due process of law. Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of State of Kansas, 262 U.S. 522, 43 S.Ct. 630, 67 L.Ed. 1103; Dorchy v. State of Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 44 S.Ct. 323, 68 L.Ed. 686. But this is so only where the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
97 cases
  • United Farm Workers Nat. Union v. Babbitt
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Arizona
    • April 20, 1978
    ...property without due process of law, 55 A.L.R.2d 445, 510, or as depriving parties of constitutional right to a trial by jury. Re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625, app. dismissed, 350 U.S. 858, 76 S.Ct. 105, 100 L.Ed. 762 Furthermore, under Arizona law pertaining to arbitration which contai......
  • Barrett v. Baird
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Nevada
    • December 19, 1995
    ...the right practically unavailable.' " Williams v. Williams, 110 Nev. 830, 833, 877 P.2d 1081, 1083 (1994) (quoting Application of Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625, 629 (1955)). We hold that the screening panel statute does not make a medical malpractice claimant's right to a jury trial prac......
  • Chmielewski v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • May 14, 1991
    ...Union, 221 F.2d 644, 647 (6th Cir.1955); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 O.O.3d 164, 167, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976); Smith Case, 381 Pa. 223, 230, 112 A.2d 625, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 858, 76 S.Ct. 105, 100 L.Ed. 762 (1955). None of those cases, however, has differentiated between ......
  • Attorney General v. Johnson
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • April 5, 1978
    ...the constitutionality of arbitration statutes do not even mention the question of separation of powers. See, e. g., Application of Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (upholding statute permitting courts to adopt rules providing for compulsory arbitration of civil suits involving $1,000 or les......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT