SMITH BY AND THROUGH SMITH v. Armontrout

• Decision Date: 05 April 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-4647-CV-C-5.,85-4647-CV-C-5.
• Citation: 632 F. Supp. 503
• Parties: Gerald M. SMITH, By and Through Eugene SMITH, Jr., as his Next Friend, Petitioner v. William ARMONTROUT, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

632 F. Supp. 503

Gerald M. SMITH, By and Through Eugene SMITH, Jr., as his Next Friend, Petitioner v. William ARMONTROUT, Respondent.

No. 85-4647-CV-C-5.

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, C.D.

April 5, 1986.

Richard Sindel, Sindel, Sindel & Sindel, St. Louis, Mo., for petitioner.

Kelly Mescher, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., for respondent.

ORDER

SCOTT O. WRIGHT, Chief Judge.

Gerald Smith, a death row inmate at the Missouri State Penitentiary, has stated that he does not want to pursue his post-conviction remedies and that he wants to proceed with his execution. The issue before the Court is whether Smith has the capacity to make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or whether he is suffering from a mental disorder which substantially affects his ability to make a rational decision. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Smith's decision is based on rationality and is not the product of a mental disorder. Accordingly, the next-friend habeas corpus petition filed by Gerald Smith's brother must be dismissed for lack of standing.

I. Background

In 1981, Gerald Smith was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1980 bludgeoning of one Karen Roberts. On direct appeal, Smith's conviction and death sentence were affirmed. See State v. Smith, 649 S.W.2d 417 (Mo.1983) (en banc). Smith next commenced a collateral attack on his conviction in the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis pursuant to Mo.S.Ct.R. 27.26. Smith subsequently moved to dismiss that proceeding. On October 5, 1984, the state circuit court sustained that motion and dismissed the 27.26 proceeding without conducting a formal hearing on the issue of Smith's competency to waive his post-conviction remedies.¹ On October 9, 1984, the Missouri Supreme Court held a special session and summoned Smith to appear before it. At that time, Smith advised the judges of that court of his wish to abandon further appeals.² The Missouri Supreme Court granted Smith's wish and set his execution for November 9, 1984.

On November 5, 1984, Gerald Smith's brother, Eugene, filed a next-friend petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On November 6, 1984, this Court found that a legitimate issue had been raised concerning Gerald Smith's competency³ and, accordingly, entered an order staying Smith's execution pending resolution of the competency issue. See Smith v. Armontrout, 604 F.Supp. 840 (W.D.Mo. 1984). By agreement of the parties, Smith was transferred to the Federal Medical Center in Springfield, Missouri, for a comprehensive psychiatric examination and evaluation.⁴ A hearing on the issue of Smith's competency was set for March 5, 1985.

Before the competency hearing took place, however, Smith changed his mind and announced that he wished to pursue his post-conviction remedies. Consequently, the competency question became moot and Gerald Smith was substituted for his brother as the sole petitioner. The Court thereupon treated Smith's case like any other habeas corpus proceeding. Several months later, it became apparent that Smith had not exhausted his state court remedies with respect to each of his claims for relief. Accordingly, pursuant to the rule of Rose v. Lundy,⁵ this Court had no choice but to dismiss Smith's petition without prejudice and turn the matter over to state courts.

In the meantime, Gerald Smith once again announced that he wanted to abandon all further attacks on his conviction and death sentence. The Missouri Supreme Court promptly set January 6, 1986 as Gerald Smith's execution date. Eugene Smith quickly responded by filing a next-friend petition pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rules 27.26 and 52.02 on behalf of his brother in the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis. In his petition, Eugene Smith alleged that Gerald Smith was not competent to make a rational decision about abandoning further appeals. At the same time, Eugene Smith filed a motion in the Missouri Supreme Court to stay Gerald Smith's execution pending a current evaluation of his competency. That motion was denied in one line and without any explanation.

Eugene Smith then went back to the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis and obtained a ruling from Judge Hamilton of that court that a next-friend 27.26 petition was a viable procedure under Missouri law.⁶ With Judge Hamilton's ruling in hand, Eugene Smith returned to the Missouri Supreme Court and renewed his motion for a stay of execution until the circuit court had a chance to resolve the question of Gerald Smith's competency. The Missouri Supreme Court, on its own motion, postponed the execution date until January 15, 1986. On January 8, 1986, however, the Missouri Supreme Court issued an order which held that the next-friend 27.26 proceeding in state court was a legal nullity and that no further extensions of Gerald Smith's execution date would be granted. The Missouri Supreme Court explained that, in its view, the October, 1984 state court ruling that Gerald Smith was competent foreclosed all further inquiry into the matter. Significantly, the Missouri Supreme Court did not hold a hearing or invite oral argument before handing down its decision.

In view of the Missouri Supreme Court's statement that there were no longer any state remedies available to Gerald Smith or his next-friend, the battleground returned to this Court. On December 27, 1985, Eugene Smith filed a brand-new next-friend petition in this Court. Once again, the threshold question before the Court was whether Gerald Smith was competent to waive his post-conviction remedies. On January 9, 1986 — the day after the Missouri Supreme Court washed its hands of the Gerald Smith case — this Court was called upon to stay Smith's execution pending an up-to-date determination of his competency.⁷ At the same time, the Court ordered that Smith be transferred to the Federal Medical Center in Springfield, Missouri, for an updated examination and evaluation. A hearing was set for February 18, 1986.

The hearing commenced on schedule. The testimony of six expert witnesses was received in evidence.⁸ The Court also received written reports compiled by three non-testifying experts — Dr. Daniel, Dr. Harry, and a clinical psychologist, Richard Fontana — as well as the written reports of the testifying experts, numerous medical records concerning Gerald Smith, and a variety of other documentary exhibits. In addition, two of Gerald Smith's fellow inmates testified specifically concerning Smith's behavior on death row and more generally about the conditions of confinement encountered by death row inmates. Finally, Gerald Smith testified in person for approximately three hours. The bulk of Smith's testimony came during cross-examination by petitioner's counsel.

Overall, the adversary hearing lasted approximately three full days. The testimony of the witnesses covered Gerald Smith's entire life, from his early childhood to his very recent past. Although some of the evidence received was not particularly helpful, the hearing demonstrated that the question of Smith's competency was a close one. More importantly, perhaps, the hearing also demonstrated the irreplaceable value of the adversary system as a tool for ascertaining the "truth."⁹ Although no one will ever be able to say with absolute certainty whether or not Gerald Smith is competent to waive his post-conviction remedies, this Court is now prepared to tackle this threshold question with the confidence that its decision is based upon complete information.

II. The Issue

As noted above, the issue presently before the Court is whether Gerald Smith has the capacity to make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or whether he is suffering from a mental disorder which substantially affects his ability to make a rational decision. According to the Court's research, this standard was first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 1506, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966) (per curiam). Since Rees, several federal courts have been confronted with the situation now facing this Court and, in each instance where there was at least some evidence of incompetence, the court has faithfully analyzed the issue after conducting an evidentiary hearing.¹⁰ Over the last twenty years, the courts have come to describe the issue as whether or not the death row inmate is "competent" to forego his post-conviction remedies.¹¹

Although the issue has been phrased in terms of "competency," it is important to note that the applicable standard is not the same as the standard for determining whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial.¹² Nor is the crucial issue whether or not Gerald Smith can be classified as "mentally ill."¹³ Instead, the central question is whether Gerald Smith's decision to forego further appeals is based on a rational thought process or whether his decision is a product of a mental disorder. It bears emphasis that the key to this issue is the rationality underlying Gerald Smith's decision.¹⁴ In order to find that Smith's decision is rational, however, this Court need not agree that Smith's decision is the "correct" one or the "best" one; the question is only whether or not his decision is based on a rational understanding of the circumstances before him.

III. The Evidence

The story of Gerald Smith is a true-life tale of a boy who never grew up. Smith was born in St. Louis, Missouri, on October 7, 1958. He was the third of nine children. As a young child, Smith sustained several serious head injuries. When he was less than two years old, he was admitted to St. Louis City Hospital for lead poisoning. The lead level in his body was dangerously high. No one knows if that incident had any long-term effects.

Smith's family life was disruptive and unstable. His father was an alcoholic who frequently beat both mother and...