Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia

Decision Date22 September 1998
Docket NumberSMITH-HAYNI,No. 96-7149,A,96-7149
Citation155 F.3d 575,1998 WL 642582
Parties77 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1499, 74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,564, 332 U.S.App.D.C. 182, 41 Fed.R.Serv.3d 949 Jessica C.ppellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA and Addison Davis, Appellees. District of Columbia Circuit
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 96cv00064).

JePhunneh Lawrence argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Sheila Kaplan, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for appellees. Jo Anne Robinson, Interim Corporation Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Martin B. White, Assistant Corporation Counsel, were on the brief. Charles F.C. Ruff, White House Counsel, entered an appearance.

Before: WALD, SENTELLE and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

WALD, Circuit Judge:

Jessica Smith-Haynie, an African-American woman, began working for the Firearms Identification Branch of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department ("M.P.D.") as a civilian "Firearms Technician Trainee" in 1984. According to Smith-Haynie's complaint, she was harassed and discriminated against because of her race and gender virtually from the start. She identifies her supervisor, George Wilson, as the chief offender. She also alleges that defendant Addison Davis, the M.P.D.'s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") officer, harassed her from 1988, when she first filed a discrimination complaint, through 1992, when she took maternity leave. Smith-Haynie filed a second complaint with the EEOC in 1992, charging Davis with harassment and retaliation for the earlier complaint. She states that she has not returned to her job since her maternity leave because of continuing problems with anxiety and work-related phobias.

Smith-Haynie received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on October 18, 1995. She filed her complaint in district court on January 18, 1996, charging the M.P.D. and Davis with violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Unfortunately for Smith-Haynie, she filed her suit 92 days after she received the letter--two days outside of the statutory period for filing suit under Title VII. Before filing an answer, defendants moved under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and ruled for defendants on all counts. 1 Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia et al., Civ. No. 96-0064 (D.D.C. May 10, 1996). Smith-Haynie appealed. Her arguments boil down to two: first, that defendants impermissibly raised the affirmative defense of untimeliness by dispositive motion before filing an answer under FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c); 2 and second, that ongoing and severe harassment rendered her non compos mentis during the limitations period and should result in either equitable tolling of the time limit or equitable estoppel of its operation.

We conclude that an affirmative defense can be properly raised in a pre-answer motion, and further, that Smith-Haynie did not produce adequate support for her non compos mentis argument. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.

I.

We decide de novo the legal question of whether the affirmative defense of statutory limitation can be raised in a pre-answer motion under the proper construction of Rules 12(b) and 8(c). See Harris v. Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 126 F.3d 339, 342 (D.C.Cir.1997). In Gordon v. National Youth Work Alliance, 675 F.2d 356, 360 (D.C.Cir.1982), we said that a statute of limitations defense under Title VII is an affirmative defense that is properly raised by dispositive motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Gordon did not, of course, address the precise situation involved in this case, whether defendants can raise an affirmative defense by filing a dispositive motion before they file an answer. Recently, we decided in Harris that an affirmative defense is forfeited if it is not raised in the answer and the answer is the first responsive pleading in the case. Harris used sweeping language: "In order to preserve the notice purpose of Rule 8(c) ..., we hold that Rule 8(c) means what it says: a party must first raise its affirmative defenses in a responsive pleading before it can raise them in a dispositive motion." Harris, 126 F.3d at 345.

However, this broad prohibition must be read in context. The precise holding of Harris is that an affirmative defense not raised by answer cannot be raised in dispositive motions that are filed post-answer. The defendant in Harris had filed its answer to the complaint, as well as answers to two amended complaints, and each time had failed to plead untimeliness as an affirmative defense. Since "[f]ailure to raise an affirmative defense in pleadings deprives the opposing party of precisely the notice that would enable it to dispute the crucial issues of the case on equal terms," id. at 343, a defendant forfeits an affirmative defense that is not pleaded in its answer or amended answer. In Harris, we cited with approval Funding Systems Leasing Corp. v. Pugh, 530 F.2d 91, 96 (5th Cir.1976), which adopted the majority view that unpled affirmative defenses cannot be raised by dispositive motion unless that motion is the first responsive pleading. See Harris, 126 F.3d at 345; see also 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1277 (2d ed.1990 & 1997 supp.). Courts that have adopted this majority rule, however, have also reasoned that since a plaintiff's complaint necessarily includes certain facts about an alleged offense, such as dates, the plaintiff does not suffer from lack of notice when a defendant bases a pre-answer motion on the facts as alleged in the complaint. See, e.g., Ghartey v. St. John's Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir.1989); Conerly v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 623 F.2d 117, 119 (9th Cir.1980); Wilburn v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 492 F.2d 1288, 1289 (8th Cir.1974); White v. Padgett, 475 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir.1973); Williams v. Murdoch, 330 F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir.1964); Rohner v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 225 F.2d 272, 274 (10th Cir.1955); Kincheloe v. Farmer, 214 F.2d 604, 605 (7th Cir.1954).

We find this reasoning to be sound and not in conflict with Harris. See Stanton v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 76-77 (D.C.Cir.1997) (acknowledging that an affirmative defense can be raised by pre-answer motion) (citing Harris ). Accordingly, we now explicitly hold that an affirmative defense may be raised by pre-answer motion under Rule 12(b) when the facts that give rise to the defense are clear from the face of the complaint.

This case fits the paradigm. Plaintiff states in her complaint that she received her right-to-sue letter 92 days before she filed suit. 3 The facts supporting defendants' dispositive motion were apparent to Smith-Haynie from the inception of her lawsuit. Defendants properly raised the untimeliness defense by a pre-answer motion under Rule 12(b)(6).

II.

Turning next to the merits of defendants' untimeliness defense, we review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. 4 See, e.g., Goldman v. Bequai, 19 F.3d 666 (D.C.Cir.1994).

Smith-Haynie interposes the threshold argument that the availability of equitable doctrines is a question for the jury and not for the judge when they involve disputed issues of material fact. Generally speaking, questions sounding in equity are for a judge to decide. See generally Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959). But this principle is sometimes muddled in the statute of limitations context. The discovery rule, a legal doctrine which governs when a limitations period begins to run in certain situations, is presumably for a jury to consider when issues of disputed fact surround the rule's application; equitable tolling and estoppel, which ask whether equity requires extending a limitations period, are for the judge to apply, using her discretion, regardless of the presence of a factual dispute. However, the "discovery rule" and "equitable tolling" are often treated as the same doctrine, leading courts to the tenuous conclusion that disputed issues of fact regarding both are for the jury to resolve. Compare Goldman, 19 F.3d at 671-72, with Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir.1994) and Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446 (7th Cir.1990). The province of the judge versus that of the jury does not need to be decided today, because even if we were to treat this as a jury question, we would conclude that Smith-Haynie failed to present sufficient proof to send the issue to a jury.

Summary judgment may be granted only if there remain no genuine issues of material fact, accepting all evidence offered by the nonmoving party as presumptively valid and drawing all justifiable inferences in her favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To avoid summary judgment, Smith-Haynie must show the existence of evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable conclusion that the statute of limitations should have been equitably tolled. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Smith-Haynie filed an affidavit in which she alleged that she was too distraught to grasp the meaning of the 90-day limitations period. At oral argument, her lawyer argued that he could have gathered more supporting material to prove her poor mental state but the case was dismissed before he was able to conduct discovery and obtain a psychological examination. Of course, Smith-Haynie could have moved the district court under FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f) for discovery, but no such motion was made in this case. We are left with her...

To continue reading

Request your trial
383 cases
  • Johnson v. District of Columbia
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • August 21, 2008
    ...untimeliness where the defendant has taken active steps to prevent the plaintiff from litigating in time. Smith-Haynie v. Dist. of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 580 (D.C.Cir. 1998). Hence, a case will not be for failure to exhaust administrative remedies where "affirmative misconduct on the part ......
  • Fletcher v. U.S. Parole Com'n
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • May 6, 2008
    ...under Rule 12(b) when the facts that give rise to the defense are clear from the face of the complaint." See Smith-Haynie v. District, of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 578 (D.C.Cir. 1998); see also McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 435-436 (2d Cir.2004) ("we see no reason why even a traditional ........
  • Smith v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • October 9, 2007
    ...places upon the Court the obligation of determining "whether equity requires extending a limitations period," Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 579 (D.C.Cir.1998), "[t]he discovery rule is presumably for a jury to consider when issues of disputed fact surround the rule's a......
  • Willis v. United States Department of Justice
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • October 10, 2008
    ...diligence, the plaintiff is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim) (citing Smith-Haynie v. Dist. of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 580 (D.C.Cir.1998)). Accordingly, the Court shall grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plainti......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 firm's commentaries
  • Court Denies Motion to Dismiss Based on Implied Preemption
    • United States
    • LexBlog United States
    • October 27, 2022
    ...rise to the defense.” Brown v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 869 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Smith–Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). But—precisely because facts sufficient to establish preemption are often judicially noticeable—it is inaccurate to s......
8 books & journal articles
  • Texas commission on human rights act: procedures and remedies
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Texas Employment Law. Volume 1 Part V. Discrimination in employment
    • May 5, 2018
    ...of Veterans Affairs , 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , 455 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1982); Smith-Haynie v. D.C. , 155 F.3d 575, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Rowe v. Sullivan , 967 F.2d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1992). Because a charging party’s failure to file suit within 90 days of......
  • Texas Commission on Human Rights Act: Procedures and Remedies
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Employment Law. Volume 1 - 2016 Part V. Discrimination in Employment
    • July 27, 2016
    ...Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1982); Smith-Haynie v. D.C., 155 F.3d 575, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 192 (5th Cir. 1992). Because a charging party’s failure to file suit within 90 days of re......
  • Table of cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Employment Law. Volume 2 - 2016 Part VIII. Selected Litigation Issues
    • July 27, 2016
    ...Smaw v. Commonwealth of Va. Dep’t of State Police , 862 F. Supp. 1469 (E.D. Va. 1994), §28:9.H Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia , 155 F.3d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1998), §18:7.B.2 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe , 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995), §§13:1.H.3.c, 13:2.D, 29:2.C.3.c Smith v. Ameritech , ......
  • Filing charges and lawsuits
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Age Discrimination Litigation
    • April 28, 2022
    ...may be tolled for equitable reasons in “extraordinary and carefully circumscribed instances.” Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia , 155 F.3d 575, 579-80 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In ADEA cases, the courts generally recognize the concepts of equitable tolling, equitable estoppel, and waiver. Note t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT