Smith-Jackson v. Chao
| Decision Date | 05 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:15-cv-1688-WSD-JKL |
| Parties | PAULA SMITH-JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. ELAINE CHAO, In her Official Capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Transportation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Plaintiff Paula Smith-Jackson is an employee of the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") and has filed the instant employment discrimination suit against the Secretary of the Department of Transportation. The case is presently before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment [Doc. 55], Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendant's reply brief in support of summary judgment and response to Smith-Jackson's statement of material facts [Doc. 69], and Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendant's "notice of filing" correcting its replybrief [Doc. 74]. For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff's motions to strike, [Docs. 69, 74], are DENIED, and I RECOMMEND that Defendant's motion for summary judgment [Doc. 55] be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, I recommend that summary judgment be granted as to Plaintiff's Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") claim but denied as to all other claims.
Because they have the potential to affect the evidence before the Court, I will address Smith-Jackson's motion to strike at the outset. For various reasons discussed below, Smith-Jackson has moved to strike two of Defendant's filings. Specifically, she asks that the Court strike portions of Defendant's reply brief [Doc. 67] and Defendant's "notice of filing" [Doc. 72]. Smith-Jackson also indicated to the Court that she wished to challenge Defendant's later "notice of filing" [Doc. 82], and I informed the parties that I would consider the arguments made in opposition to Docket Entry 72 applicable to Docket Entry 82 as well.
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes motions to strike, states that "the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalousmatter." The rule explicitly provides that the object of a strike must be in a "pleading," which the Rules define as a complaint; an answer; a reply to a counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim; a third-party complaint; or a third-party answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). Because Smith-Jackson has not asked this Court to strike anything that would be considered a pleading, her motions [Docs. 69, 74] are DENIED. I will, however, consider the substance of the objections contained in Smith-Jackson's motions.
Smith-Jackson argues that Defendant's citations to the findings of fact of an Administrative Judge who previously ruled on this case are inadmissible. Defendant responds that they are admissible because this Court could accept those findings "in an independent exercise of judgment while engaging in its own de novo review." [See Doc. 71 at 2.] Even accepting Defendant's position as correct, I would still have to review evidence beyond the EEO Judge's order in order to conduct anything resembling an "independent exercise of judgment." Accordingly, I will not consider any fact to be true based solely on a citation to the EEO Judge's order. Moreover, given the posture of the case, reliance on such facts is even more inappropriate. The EEO Judge was likely making factual findings upon a complete review of the record. Here, at summary judgment, Imust make all factual inferences in Smith-Jackson's favor. Even if, therefore, the EEO Judge made a factual finding that is supported in the record, I cannot accept such facts for purposes of the instant motion unless they are beyond dispute.
Smith-Jackson also asks this Court to disregard Exhibit 20 to Defendant's reply brief, which consists of a chart of alleged comparators. [See Doc. 67-1.] The exhibit, in its initial form, was unsupported by authentication. Defendant later, without leave of the court, supplemented the exhibit with a authentication from the AUSA assigned to the case stating that she created the document during the course of litigation and it was intended as a form of demonstrative evidence. [Doc. 72-2.] As defense counsel is not a fact witness to the case, I will consider the chart as a demonstrative aid only. Anything in the chart will be considered factual only if found elsewhere in the record. Further, again, anything in the chart will be considered a "fact" for summary judgment purposes only if undisputed.
I also agree with Smith-Jackson that many of Defendant's responses to her statements of material fact are problematic. But, I also find generally problematic the argumentative nature of many of the asserted facts from both parties and conclusory nature of many of the objections from both as well. For that reason, I will rely on the parties' statements of material facts and responses only to theextent that a party admitted to a straightforward statement of fact from the other party. See Lovett v. SJAC Fulton IND I, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-983-WSD, 2016 WL 4425363, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 22, 2016) ().
Smith-Jackson is also correct that Defendant twice supplemented filings well beyond this Court's deadlines2 without requesting leave to do so. [See Docs. 72, 82.] Defendant cites to the local rules for a different court for the proposition that a mere correction to a timely filing may be made at any time, and to the local rules for this court, which do not specifically outline a deadline for such corrections. [See Doc. 76.] As Defendant acknowledges, the rules of another court do not apply here. Further, Defendant's late filings were not mere corrections, but substantive additions to exhibits. For the reasons discussed above, Smith-Jackson's motion to strike is denied as procedurally improper. Nevertheless, her arguments on this point are well taken. But, as nothing in Defendant's supplemental filings contributes to my below analysis, I do not findit necessary to make any ruling on the admissibility of such evidence, beyond noting the dispute for the District Judge should he find anything in the late filings dispositive.
Based on the nature of this case and the arguments that the parties have made, I find that it is more efficient to give a brief factual and procedural summary at the beginning, but discuss some of the more claim-specific facts in the course of the analysis only. This basic factual background consists only of facts upon which the parties agree.
Smith-Jackson began her employment with Defendant in 1982 in Peoria, Illinois. [Doc. 58 ¶ 2.] In January 2005, Smith-Jackson moved to Atlanta and began the training at the air traffic control tower in Atlanta ("Atlanta Tower"). [Id. ¶ 4.] Smith-Jackson had previously been fully certified to work as an air traffic control at a level 8 facility, but Atlanta was a level 12 facility, the highest rating of facility. [Id. ¶¶ 3-4.] In May 2005, Smith-Jackson withdrew from training for the operational air traffic controller position in Atlanta because of an inability to perform the required training. [Id. ¶ 10.] At that time, Smith-Jackson requested a reassignment to a lower level facility. [Id.]
Smith-Jackson has alleged that, on November 8, 2005, she was present when a white male coworker made a racially insensitive comment to a group of visitors. [Doc. 58 ¶ 28.] That incident caused Smith-Jackson's psychological injury, and she suffered from anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. [Doc. 57-1 ¶ 4.]3 Following that incident, Smith-Jackson began receiving a monthly payment, through the present, from the Office of Workers' Compensation. [Doc. 58 ¶ 31.]
In June 2006, Smith-Jackson was declared medically disqualified from working as an air traffic controller. [Doc. 57-1 ¶ 6.] In September 2006, Defendant proposed to remove Smith-Jackson due to her failure to maintain her medical certification. [Doc. 58 ¶ 36.] In October 2006, Smith-Jackson requested a permanent reassignment within the Atlanta "commuting area." [Id. ¶ 38.] Later in October, Smith-Jackson turned down a job that was offered to her because it required her to drive more than 30 miles, contrary to her doctor's restrictions. [Id. ¶ 41.] Smith-Jackson offered to accept the same position if it were available within her driving range. [Doc. 57-1 ¶¶ 13-15.]
In November 2006, Defendant convened a "Reasonable Accommodation Team" meeting to discuss Smith-Jackson. [Doc. 58 ¶ 42.] The parties dispute the actions of Defendant in attempting to accommodate Smith-Jackson, discussed in more detail in the analysis section. But, the parties agree that, from December 2006 through June 2008, Smith-Jackson applied for numerous vacant positions throughout the agency. [Doc. 57-1 ¶ 10.] In July 2007, Defendant notified Smith-Jackson that it was removing her from service effective August 18, 2007 for failing to maintain medical certification. [Doc. 58 ¶ 52.] On August 18, Smith-Jackson was terminated, but retained her workers' compensation payments. [Id. ¶ 53.]
In July 2008 (following some amount of internal administrative proceedings), Defendant offered Smith-Jackson a clerical position, but then withdrew the offer. [Doc. 57-1 ¶ 20.] In August 2008, Smith-Jackson was placed in a permanent position as a secretary. [Doc. 58 ¶ 63.] In July 2011, an administrative judge issued a bench decision on an EEO complaint that Smith-Jackson had filed awarding some damages but not finding race, age, gender, or intentional disability discrimination. [Id. ¶¶ 64-66.] In September 2011, an EEOC administrative judge increased the amount of damages awarded. [Id. ¶¶67-69.] Defendant paid Smith-Jackson the money awarded by the initial administrative...
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