Smith v. Alfred Brown Co.

• Decision Date: 04 February 1972
• Citation: 27 Utah 2d 155,493 P.2d 994
• Parties: d 155 Leon C. SMITH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALFRED BROWN COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. .no. 12399.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 994

493 P.2d 994

27 Utah 2d 155

Leon C. SMITH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.ALFRED BROWN COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

.no. 12399.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Feb. 4, 1972.

Jackson Howard, Howard & Lewis, Provo, for plaintiff and appellant.

Raymond M. Berry, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.

CROCKETT, Justice:

PlaintiffLeon C. Brown sued defendantAlfred Brown Company, general contractor, to recover for injuries plaintiff suffered when he fell from a six-story window while working as a brickmason constructing The Deseret Towers Residence Hall at Brigham Young University.

Three defenses were interposed:

(a) that the plaintiff was covered by workmen's compensation and his recovery was limited as provided in that act;

(b) that there was no negligence of the defendant; and

(c) that if there was any negligence, it was plaintiff's own which was the sole proximate cause of his injuries.

Upon a disclosure of facts by depositions, including that of the plaintiff, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action.Plaintiff appealed.

Alfred Brown Company was the general contractor to build the dormitory known as Deseret Towers.It subcontracted the masonry work to Ashton Construction Company.The latter employed plaintiff Smith as a brickmason.On the day of the accident, June 25, 1969, he was working on a scaffold about two and a half feet high laying bricks on an interior wall on the sixth floor.As he stepped off the scaffold his foot lit on some small loose 'unknown object' on the floor.In attempting to regain his balance, he stumbled backwards about eight feet and through an open window to the ground, which resulted in a brain concussion, broken bones, and internal injuries.

Plaintiff does not contend otherwise than that he was covered and has been awarded compensation under thw Workmen's Compensation Act.His position is that his employer is Ashton, and not the defendant Brown; and that he is entitled to sue the latter because Sec. 35--1--62 U.C.A.1953 of the Act preserves to an injured employee a right to sue a 'third person' by whose wrongful act he was injured.It provides:

When any injury or death for which compensation is payable . . . (is) . . . caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another person not in the same employment, the injured employee . . . may also have an action for damages against such third person.

In considering whether the defendant Brown can properly be regarded as a 'third person' and 'not in the same employment' as the plaintiff, it is appropriate to have in mind certain principles relating to workmen's compensation.The primary purpose was to eliminate the uncertainty, the time, effort and expense involved in the old system which required an injured employee to prove negligence of his employer as a prerequisite to any recovery, and to create a system whereby the injured employee would be assured of medical and hospital care, and a certain though modest compensation for injuries and disabilities suffered, with the attendant benefits to themselves, their families, and to society generally, including the stabilizing effect upon the economy.

The other side of the coin is the correlated important purose of assuring employers that if they provide this protection for their employees, the employers will themselves be protected against the possibility of exorbitant claims for injuries.¹The reasonable and fair concomitant of the foregoing is that inasmuch as the injured employee has the protection just mentioned with respect to his employer, he must forego the privilege of suing the employer.The Act expressly so provides in Sec. 35--1--60 U.C.A.1953:

The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an employee . . . shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer . . . and the liabilities of the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise . . .

The general rule, which has been approved by this court a number of times is that the act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose of providing protection to employees.²It would be quite inconsistent with our ideas of even-handed justice to apply a liberal interpretation of the Act in order to assure coverage to employees, but if it appears that there is other coverage, to then reverse the policy and apply a restrictive view to exclude coverage in order to allow an employee to sue an employer.³We think the ends of justice will best be served and the beneficial purposes of the Act will be best accomplished for employees and employers alike, if the statute is applied in an uniform manner, whoever's rights may be at stake.

Reverting our attention to the issue in this case in the light of the foregoing principles another section of the Act is pertinent.Sec. 35--1--42 provides:

Where any employer (general contractor Brown) procures any work to be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control, and such work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, such contractor, and all persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under him, ...