Smith v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.

• Decision Date: 27 April 1979
• Parties: Dwight SMITH v. AMERICAN CAST IRON PIPE COMPANY, a corporation. 78-26.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 283

370 So.2d 283

Dwight SMITH v. AMERICAN CAST IRON PIPE COMPANY, a corporation.

78-26.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 27, 1979.

Carl E. Chamblee, Birmingham, for appellant.

Robert F. Childs, Jr., Birmingham, for appellee.

BEATTY, Justice.

This is an appeal by Dwight Smith from a grant of summary judgment in favor of American Cast Iron Pipe Company (ACIPCO).

Smith was employed by ACIPCO in 1969. On October 3, 1977, three suspicious cigarette butts were found in Smith's automobile which was parked in ACIPCO's parking lot. Later that morning Joe F. Curtis, the manager of Employment Safety and Security at ACIPCO, interviewed Smith regarding the discovery. As a result of this meeting disciplinary action against Smith was recommended.

On October 12, 1977, Smith met with the Investigative Committee of the Board of Operations. This subcommittee of the ACIPCO Discipline Committee is composed of four members elected by their fellow employees. The Investigative Committee, which investigates all disciplinary charges brought against employees of ACIPCO, read to Smith the letter from Curtis alleging violations of Company Rules 16 and 17. These rules dealt respectively with the possession of and "trafficking" in drugs. Smith admitted only that the substance was in his car and denied specifically that he was guilty of a Rule 17 infraction, which unlike a first violation of Rule 16, carries a penalty of discharge. On the advice of his attorney however Smith refused to take a polygraph test. The meeting was adjourned without further action. Later that morning Smith met with the Committee again and at that meeting he was read a September 22, 1977 clarification of ACIPCO's verification rule that provided for the dismissal of any employee who failed to cooperate with the investigation committee, including one who refused to take a polygraph test when required. Smith indicated that he was aware of the notice because he had seen it on the company bulletin boards. He still refused however to take the polygraph test. Thereafter Smith was informed that the Committee had scheduled a polygraph exam for the next day. Smith reported as directed, but once again he refused to be examined even though he was again read the rule and told of the consequences for refusal to comply. Later that morning the full Discipline Committee was convened. The minutes of that meeting reflect that "(u)pon review of (the) facts . . . Mr. Carter made a motion to discharge Dwight Smith for failure to cooperate in the Discipline Committee's investigation of alleged rule violations, including failure to take the polygraph test when requested. Mr. Langner seconded the motion. The vote for discharge was unanimous."

Smith filed suit for injunctive relief, declaratory relief and damages. After a hearing, ACIPCO's motion for directed verdict was granted. Smith then filed an amendment alleging breach of contract and fraud. This appeal arises from the grant of ACIPCO's motion for summary judgment.

A motion for summary judgment may be granted only when the movant has carried his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mason v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., Ala., 367 So.2d 1374 (1979); Board of Water and Sewer Commissioners of the City of Mobile v. Alabama Power Company, Ala.,363 So.2d 304 (1978); Powell v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., Ala.,361 So.2d 103 (1978).

This case presents essentially three issues, (1) whether Smith was in fact discharged for a failure to cooperate in the Discipline Committee's investigation; (2) whether there was a failure to cooperate under the terms of the contract; and (3) whether discharge for that offense was proper under our law. We answer all issues affirmatively.

The official minutes of the October 13, 1977 meeting of the Discipline Committee show that the appellant, Smith, was discharged for a failure of cooperation. Smith, however, refers us to testimony which he contends created an issue of fact on this matter. On direct examination the following exchange took place between Smith's attorney and Mr. Alex Fitts, an employee member of the Discipline Committee:

Q Okay. What is your understanding of the charges against Dwight Smith?

A He was charged with Rule 16 and 17.

Q Is that your total understanding of the charges against Dwight Smith?

A Yes, sir.

Later another employee member of the Discipline Committee, Mr. Luke Walker, was questioned by Smith's attorney:

Q Mr. Walker, as a member of the investigating group, as a member of the Discipline Committee, what is your understanding of the charges that were brought against Mr. Dwight Smith in which he was terminated?

A What is my understanding of the charges?

Q Yes, sir.

A My understanding is that he violated Plant Rules.

Q What rule, sir?

A Rule 16, I know.

Q Is that all, sir?

At this point the counsel for appellee objected, apparently to the line of questioning on the ground that the reason for discharge was reflected in the minutes of the meeting. The court sustained the objection. The evidence, however, was not excluded from the record and hence is properly before us. Nevertheless, from a review of the record, including the complete testimony of both the above persons, we do not find that a genuine issue of material fact is presented. The underlying charges against Dwight Smith were indeed violations of Rules 16 and 17. The cause of the discharge however was clearly a failure to cooperate in the investigation of those charges. Nothing in the testimony of Mr. Fitts, or Mr. Walker presents a scintilla of evidence that Smith was not discharged unanimously for this reason. Therefore we must determine whether Dwight Smith did indeed fail to cooperate.

ACIPCO relies only upon the refusal of Smith to take the polygraph test to show the failure of cooperation. Polygraph, or "lie detector," tests have been used by ACIPCO for investigative purposes since 1971. The appellant had once taken the test in the course of an investigation and been found to be lying, which he has since admitted to be the case. The basis for such an examination is found within the company handbook:

VERIFICATION

When reports and information furnished to the Discipline Committee are conflicting, a Polygraph test may be used to assist the Discipline Committee in making a fair decision on the matter. Only licensed Polygraph technicians will be used. Two members of the Discipline Committee (One employee representative from the Discipline Committee and one Management representative) will accompany those to be tested to furnish background and other information required by the Polygraph technicians in conducting the test. Wherever by Polygraph test or other means of verification the Discipline Committee finds that an employee has deliberately reported false information to the Committee, the penalty will be doubled. Any accusation determined to be false by the Discipline Committee through the use of Polygraph tests or other means of verification will be removed from the employee's record.

These rules and penalties may be abrogated or changed by the Company. (emphasis added)

The above rules, so long as in effect, will be enforced by the Company, and any employee violating any of the rules will be subjected to disciplinary action of not less than the minimum penalty above specified.

On September...